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ABSTRACT
This dissertation, using the methodology of cognitive psychology,
addressed several questions about the structure and process of human
long-term memory (LTM)
.
First, several arguments were presented for
viewing LTM as a dynamic network structure.
Within this framework, the major structural question addressed in
this dissertation is whether there are isolable. LTM sub -structures.
Several possible partitions of LTM were considered, and a specific multi
layered LTM hypothesis was developed. An assumption of this hypothesis
which was tested is that there are isolable. lexical (word) and semantic
(concept) memories. Previous work relevant to this issue was reviewed.
VThile associative retrieval is a natural type of processing in a
network structure $ whether there are more complex, constructive, but
still automatic retrieval processes (i.e. procedural retrieval) was the
major processing question addressed in this dissertation. Two types of
associative retrieval processes—intersection and generate-test—were
described, and several notions about procedural retrieval were outlined.
Previous experimental work addressed at related questions was reviewed.
The approach used to address these issues was to require subjects
to make simple timed responses to experimentally presented material.
They retrieved one of several types of information about one of several
words on each of several hundred randomly sequenced trials. A general
process model was constructed which was assumed to reflect the flow of
information processing required to complete the task, and reaction time
(RT) data were used to analyze the retrieval stage. Of special interes
was the pattern of sequential effects. How does RT to retrieve a fact
vary as a function of the relationship between to-be-retrieved and
recently-retrieved information? What does this imply about the structure
and process of LTM? Sequential predictions concerning the multi-layered
LTM and procedural retrieval hypotheses were derived.
The major purpose of Experiment I was to address the processing
question. Interesting sequential effects which could be assigned to the
retrieval stage of processing were observed. Among other things, faster
RT to retrieve the same type of information about different concepts on
pairs of successive trials was inconsistent with purely associative re-
trieval models but was consistent with procedural retrieval.
Experiment II, using different stimulus materials, replicated the
findings of Experiment I, and also addressed the major structural ques-
tion. In particular, different patterns of sequential effects were ob-
tained for pairs of successive trials hypothesized to involve retrieiv-
ing information from the same versus a different LTM layer, a result
consistent with the multi-layered notion. However, the exact nature of
these results were not easily accounted for by purely associative multi-
layered models.
Experiment III using different stimulus materials, replicated the
major findings of Experiments I and II. A modification of associative
multi-layered models was introduced to account for the structural results
of Experiments II and III, and was further tested in Experiment IV. In
addition, Experiment III examined the special role that semantic rela-
tions (i.e. CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and PROPERTY) may play in retrieval of
semantic facts by looking at sequential effects among these three types
of retrieval. While such effects were. present
,
they were not accounted
for by purely associative models, but were explained in terms of a pro-
cedurally-oriented LTM.
Experiment IV re-examined the structural question and found that
even the modified associative model was inadequate. The results were
also explained in terms of a procedurally-oriented LTM.
Finally, several comments about the nature of a procedurally-
oriented LTM were made. Specifically, the ambiguity of the distinction
between structure and process is emphasized in such models, as is the
constructive property of LTM. However, such a notion should not be
viewed as antithetical to network models which emphasize the associative
property of LTM. Rather, further work is required to better understand
the coordination of these important properties of LTM.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
From classical philosophers to modern neuroscientists , students of
the mind have attempted to delineate a set of isolable cognitive struc-
tures and processes which are both necessary and sufficient to account
for the variety of intellectual functions humans are capable of. By
viewing the mind as an information processing system and by examining
the behavior of the system when different information and/or task
demands are imposed upon it, cognitive psychologists have recently made
considerable progress toward a structuralist description of the mind.
Figure 1, adapted from Broadbent (1958), presents a generally
accepted schematization of the human information processing system.
Cognitive processing is viewed as a series of transformations of in-
formation, each influenced by previous experience and knowledge and by
limiting properties of relevant parts of the system. This dissertation
is concerned with the long-term memory (LTM) component, the store for
the variety of knowledge we have and for the processes which allow us
to use that knowledge in interesting ways.
In this chapter, several arguments will be presented for viewing
LTM as a network, and three processing assumptions which follow from
previous experimental work will be described; these notions about LTM
structure and process provide, the theoretical framework in which the
questions addressed in this dissertation will be posed. The next two
chanters will diSfcUSS a number of general icsues about ways to refine
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the dynamic LTM network described in the introduction. First, various
proposals about a more differentiated LTM will be discussed, and exper-
imental attempts to validate some of these notions will be reviewed.
Then several types of LTM processes will be contrasted, and relevant
experimental work will also be. reviewed. Finally, the last six chapters
will present the logic, results, and conclusions of a series of experi-
ments designed to test hypotheses about structure and process raised in
earlier chapters.
Structural Assumptions
An increasingly popular, but by no means new, way to conceptualize
LTM is as a network—a set of nodes interconnected by arcs. This view
does not constitute a strong predictive model, but is rather a weak
heuristic, flexible enough to represent both simple and complex types of
knowledge necessary to account for human cognitive processing. Before
summarizing some of the advantages of a network conceptualization, two
alternative views of LTM, sequential data structures and feature models,
will be briefly discussed, and their inadequacies pointed out.
Alternative c. on c e p tua1 i za t i
o
1 1 s . The first alternative LTM repre-
sentation, sequential data structures, has its origins in metaphors to
computer memories. The important property of these memories is that
they are not content addressable, but rather must be searched serially.
While this idea has been useful as a model of short-term memory (c.f.
Sternberg, 1969j Theios, 1973), it is probably inadequate to capture
4important properties of LTM for which network models are well-suited.
Specifically, we know that previous experience influences cognitive
processing in ways not easily accounted for by models which postulate
storage of memories in isolated memory stacks (Perlrautter, Harsip, and
Myers, in press; Perlmutter, Sorce, and Myers, 1976)
.
Feature models (c.f. Smith, Rips, and Shoben, 1974; Smith, Shoben,
and Rips, 1974) are another possible approach to representation of in-
formation in LTM. A major difficulty of these models is specifying a
psychologically acceptable set of features. While on the one hand, it
has been demonstrated that a sufficient feature analysis may not be
available for all concepts (c.f. Wittgenstein, 1958), on the other hand,
Taylor (1976) has demonstrated the serious consequences of deriving
predictions from feature models with incorrect identification of fea-
tures. Since there are difficulties in deciding on an appropriate set
of features, and since feature models are a special case of network
models (see Hollan, 1975), it seems appropriate to work with the weaker
class; we will thus return to discussion of network models.
Philosophical considerations . Three broad and converging investi-
gations of cognition provide positive support for a network conceptual-
ization of LTM. First, the associative nature of the human mind has
been a dominant and recurring epistomological claim. Thus, since net-
works are abstract associative structures, we might conclude that they
are well-suited as models of memory. However, it is important to con-
sider recent controversy between psychologists who believe that mem-
ory is primarily constructive and should not be represented by networks
5(c.f. Anderson and Ortony, 1975; Jenkins, 1974), and those who empha-
size its associative property (e.g. Anderson and Bower, 1973). The
present position is that it should be clear that memory is both asso-
ciative and constructive, but that both properties can be incorporated
into complex memory networks. There are several recent sources of sup-
port for this claim. First, Foss and Harwood (1975) have described how
configural information can be encoded in memory networks. Second,
existing artificial intelligence (AI) programs which attempt to process
natural language (e.g. Schank, 1972; 1973), do in fact, represent know-
ledge generated by their constructive processes in associative networks.
Finally, also within the domain of AI, a number of investigators (e.g.
Winograd, 1972, 1973; Norman and Rumelhart, 1975) embed procedural
knowledge, within associative networks which has the consequence of
making them constructive memories.
Biological considerations. A second reason for preferring neta^crk
models is that they are naturally occurring biological structures. The
fact that the brain is built from networks of neurons and that low
level behavior can be modeled in terms of neural networks, makes the
network metaphor of LTM somewhat more appealing than less natural
structures (e.g. stacks). Of course, this argument is extremely weak
since the level of analysis of cognitive, theories is so distant from
biological considerations.
AI considerations . The third source of support for the claim that
network models might be able to capture the richness of the human in-
formation processing system comes from work which attempts to program
6computers to behave intelligently, AI. Following Quillian's (1968; 1969)
seminal work on the use of semantic networks in a natural language proc-
essing system, virtually all AI projects which represent diversified
bodies of real world knowledge do so in network data structures. A
defining property of these structures is that pointers (arcs in the
network) are used to divorce the logical organization from the physical
organization. This leads to flexible retrieval since the subset of
memory examined for any particular problem can be limited by tracing
only logically relevant pointers. Also, efficiency o£ storage is ob-
tained because information units need be represented only once; point-
ers, rather than copies of memories, may then be used to reference or
modify memory. The relevance of this point to human LTM can be seen by
noting that while we sometimes have the capacity to analyze complex
concepts into their component features, to have to do so in the con-
text of storing or retrieving each memory of a complex concept is not
always possible and would be wasteful of storage and processing re-
sources. Rather, the more fundamental property of human memory seems
to be its ability to recognize the identity of complex concepts in dif-
ferent contexts, as well as the similarity of related complex concepts.
A final point about work in AI is that most recent ideas about,
representation of knowledge (e.g. Arbib's schemes, 1975; Hewitt's
actors, 1973; Hinsky's frames, 1975; Schank's scripts, 1975; or Wino-
grad's frames, 1975) while much more sophisticated than Quillian's
(1963) original jdeas, can be viewed as extensions of, rather than
alternatives to, semantic networks.
7Summary
.
To summarize, the present work assumes that it is useful
to conceptualize LTM as a network. Several arguments for this position
were presented. Further, while this theoretical perspective is weak,
it raises interesting questions about the nature of LTM. The purpose
of the. present dissertation is to address some of these questions.
The first set of questions which grow out of this framework deal
with further specification of the organization of LTM. Should the LTM
network be viewed as one homgeneous knowledge store, or is it more use-
ful to view LTM as a layered network, or as some other heterogeneous
structure? Further, what are the isolable substructures of LTM, and
what type of experimental evidence can confirm or disconfirm the exis-
tence of a particular hypothesized LTM structure?
In addition to specifying the structure of LTM, it is important to
understand what types of fundamental cognitive, processes allow us to make
use of our stored knowledge. One natural type of processing in a net-
work simply involves traversing pathways to obtain relevant information,
associative retrieval. A second focus of this dissertation will be to
begin to isolate more complex cognitive processes.
Before dealing with these questions in more detail, it is important
to specify three assumptions about the dynamics of the LTM network.
These assumptions are derived from experimental work which will be
briefly summarized. Their relevance is due to the fact that the present
methodology relies on viewing LTM as a dynamic network. Inferences about
LTM structure and process are based on experimentally-induced changes in
cognitive behavior as a function of recent processing.
8Processing Assumptions
Strength assumption
. An important point in the present formula-
tion of LTM is that associations in the network have strength values
which influence processing times: High strength associations are proc-
essed faster than low strength associations. Support for this assump-
tion is found in the results of several recent experiments dealing with
semantic memory. For example, Wilkins (1971) found that time to decide
whether or not a word is a member of a semantic category depends on the
conjoint frequency of category and instance. Conrad (1972) found that
time to verify the relationship between a subject and predicate de-
creases as associative strength between them increases. Consistent with
these findings, Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) found that time to verify
propositions decreases as a function of rated distance between subject
and predicate. Also, Sanford and Seymour (1974) found that time to
produce the correct superset of a category instance is less for "close"
than for "far" instances.
A series of experiments which investigated retrieval processes in
episodic memory (Perlmutter, Sorce, and Myers, 1976) indicated that
strength directs episodic retrieval as well. Further, these experiments
led us to conclude that strength varies both as a function of proc-
essing which occurs in the laboratory and as a function of pre-experi-
mental conditions. Subjects memorized lists of from three to twenty-
four pairs of words. Then reaction time (RT) to recall a response to a
visually presented cue was measured on each of several hundred randomly
sequenced trials. RT increased as a negatively accelerated function of
list length, both the slope and intercept of this function decreased
with practice, and RT increased with lag (number of items intervening
since the current item was last probed) but decreased with consecutive
repetitions of a single cue. These findings were accounted for by a
model which assumed that strength increases when an association is
retrieved but decreases at other times and that RT is an inverse func-
tion of strength. Further, the influence of pre-experimental strength
was accounted for by viewing it as a minimum strength level, specific
to each association. These assumptions about the dynamics of strength
fluctuations will be adopted in the present work.
Competitive search assumption. The second processing assumption
is that associative retrieval involves a competitive search among
associations from a starting node, and amount of competition is related
to strength of other associations. Our own work with memorized pairs
of words (Perlmutter, Harsip, and Myers, in press) indicates that
semantic associations of words interfere with the retrieval of mem-
orized associations. A complementary finding by Lewis and Anderson
(1976) is that RT to verify a pre-experimentally known fact about a
famous person increases as number of experimentally memorized facts
about the person increases. Also, King and Anderson (1975) have found
that number of experimentally memorized facts about a concept predicts
recognition time to any one of them, and Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth
(1975) obtained equivalent results and also showed that amount of com-
petition can be experimentally manipulated by practice of selected
10
associations. Thus, there seems to be ample evidence that both pre-
experimental and experimentally learned associations compete for proc-
essing when any type of information is retrieved. It should be noted
that the competitive search notion is consistent with various formula-
tions of interference theory (c.f. Postman and Underwood, 1973), and
with several recently proposed models in which retrieval is based on a
ratio-of-strength rule (Rundus, 1973; Shiffrin, 1970).
Spreading activation assumption
. The previous two conclusions:
(1) that strength of associations increases during processing and de-
creases at other times; and (2) that other associations from a node are
processed during retrieval, suggest that these other associations may
also fluctuate in strength. This conjecture finds support in experi-
ments which have demonstrated that recent processing in LTM has conse-
quences, for subsequent processing. In a variety of tasks, there is
evidence for the belief that activation persists for several seconds.
Meyer and his co-workers (Meyer and Schvaneveldt , 1971; Meyer,
Schvanveldt, and Ruddy, 1974; Schvanveldt and Meyer, 1973) found that
time to decide that two letter strings are both English words is
shorter for associated words (e.g. BREAD-BUTTER) than for nonassociated
words (e.g. NURSE-BUTTER). Following a series of experiments employing
this lexical decision task, they concluded that facilitation of the
second lexical decision was attributable to a spread of activation,
that the encoding stage was facilitated, and that activation decays
within a few seconds.
Spreading activation may also facilitate the retrieval stage of
11
processing. Collins and Loftus (1975) recently interpreted a large
body of results within the context of spreading activation. They re-
viewed several experiments in which subjects were required to produce
an instance of a category (e.g. FRUIT) which began with a specified
letter (e.g. A) or had a specified property (e.g. RED). Shorter RT was
observed when the category was supplied before the restriction (Freed-
man and Loftus, 1971), when category and instance were highly associated
(Loftus, 1973), and when the same category had been presented on the
preceding trial (Loftus and Loftus, 1974). The authors argue that in
all conditions in which responses are facilitated, activation from a
concept node is spread over a more restricted set of paths. Assuming
a fixed amount of activation, more activation on each path under these
conditions than under conditions in which activation is spread more
diffusely, should result in faster retrieval. A similar interpretation
is applicable to results of a study by Collins and Quillian (1970).
Employing a verification task, they found shorter RT when pre-specif ied
categories were narrower.
That spreading activation can interfere with response retrieval is
suggested by a study reported by Gorfein and Jacobson (1973). They used
the Brown-Peterson paradigm in which subjects are presented with a word,
required to recall it approximately 10 seconds later, and then pre-
sented with the. next study word after a rest interval of about 5 se-
conds. In the. Gorfein and Jacobson (1973) experiment, each successive
set of six words was from the same semantic category. Time to recall
increased with serial position within a semantic set and decreased
12
when a word from a new category was presented. These data suggest that
search for a word is slowed by increased activation on paths to related
and recently processed words.
Results from our recall task (Perlmutter and Myers, 1974, in prep-
aration) may also be interpreted in this way. Recall of memorized asso-
ciates was significantly slower when all cue words were from the same
semantic category than when they were all from different categories.
Our interpretation is that presentation of any one cue sets up patterns
of activation which provides competition to the correct response for
other, related cues.
Warren (1972; 1974) presented subjects with a list of one or more
items for later recall, then measured time to name the color in which a
word was printed. Color naming required more tine when the color word
(word printed in color) was a member of the to-be-remembered list, a
category label for items in that list, or an associate of items in the
list. In the case of uni-directional associates, the interference
effect occurred only when the memory word elicited the color word.
Warren interpreted these results as support fpr the hypothesis that en-
coding a word entails activation of its associates. Attempts to deter-
mine the time course of such activation produced conflicting results but
it appears that interference can be obtained with lags of at least 15
second between presentation of memory and color word.
Summary
.
To summarize, three LTM processing constraints were pre-
sented. First, associations in the LTM network are assumed to have
strength values. The magnitude of these strengths is both a function
13
of long-tern semantic knowledge and recent processing. When associa-
tions are processed their strength increases and at other times it
decreases to its semantic base rate. Second, search through this net-
work is directed by current strength values, and is competitive among
associations from the starting node. Third, a spreading activation
process serves to increase strength on pathways recently processed and
their neighbors in the LTM network.
CHAPTER II
STRUCTURAL ISSUES
Thus far, arguments for viewing LTM as a network were presented
and evidence for three assumptions about processing within that network
was reviewed. A major focus of the present dissertation is to consider
the possibility that LTM can be best viewed as consisting of several
isolable, but interconnected memories. Noting the many different
classes of information which are apparently represented in human LTM,
many memory theorists have postulated the existence of "functionally
distinct" sub-structures, with LTM being partitioned along the same
lines as the knowledge which is represented within it. While the poten-
tial advantages of this "divide and conquer" strategy are apparent
enough, it should be equally clear that such an epistomological approach
toward understanding memory must be viewed with caution. While a theory
of knowledge can provide hypotheses about useful ways to conceptualize
LTM, independent criteria must be established for verifying these ideas.
One reason to hypothesize the existence of more than one LTM sub-
structure is that some information is best represented in one type of
data structure, while other information is better represented in
another type of data structure. A second reason for hypothesizing the
existence of multiple LTM sub-structures is if different bodies of know-
ledge are better organized along different dimensions . In this section
several LTM distinctions will be discussed with respect to these two
coding criteria and related considerations. This will result in the
15
presentation of one hypothesis about the organization of LTM. The ex-
periments to be reported are, in part, attempts to validate several
details of this conceptualization.
Memory Distinctions
Conceptual and peripheral memories . One reason the human informa-
tion processing system is both so fascinating and difficult to study is
that it operates in three very different modes. It directly interprets
information from its five senses (sensory mode) ; it interprets and
generates symbolic information through the use of language (linguistic
mode) ; and it interprets and generates information of an even more
abstract form when it thinks (conceptual mode). The important point is
that while there are systematic relationships among the contents of all
three of these information modes, the appropriate way to capture them
in a cognitive theory is by no means obvious.
One way to deal with this problem is to assume that the informa-
tion mode of thought (the conceptual mode) is the fundamental mode of
the human information processing system, perhaps analogous to a com-
puter's machine language. Then linguistic and sensory information re-
quires translation into the conceptual form. An LTM model can capture
this notion by postulating that one component, a conceptual store,
retains general knowledge and specific memories, while additional LTM
components (peripheral memories) retain modality specific information.
It should be emphasized that what are being referred to here as lin-
guistic and sensory stores are, in fact, components of LTM because
16
they retain the knowledge necessary to interpret external stimuli and
to transform that information into conceptual memories.
Drawing a gross distinction between a single conceptual memory
and a number of mode specific peripheral memories seems well-founded
on a number of grounds. First, with respect to the second coding cri-
terion, a conceptual store should be organized along semantic dimen-
sions, whereas a linguistic store might be better organized along
phonemic and/or orthographic dimensions, and each sensory modality might
have its own best organizing principle (e.g. visual memories are prob-
ably temporally organized)
.
The second major reason for hypothesizing several modality specific
peripheral memories and a single conceptual memory is that there seems
to be a many-to-one mapping of peripheral representations to conceptual
memories
. ) So , for example, the memory representation for "TREE" and
" / i " probably map into a single conceptual memory. That we
know about the commonality between these two stimuli leads to hypoth-
esizing a single conceptual store. That we know about the differences
between them (e.g. that the first stimulus is related to "BEE", but
the second stimulus is not related to
"l^-^A^. •
YrTT
~in the same way)
leads to hypothesizing multiple peripheral stores.
Sensory and linguistic memories . A number of memory theorists,
most notably Paivio (1974), focus on the clear differences among inputs
to the human information processing system and postulate memory dis-
tinctions along the same lines. Since so much of our non-linguistic
sensory input is visual, virtually all such theories consist of visual
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and verbal memories, but presumably there are equivalent memories for
other senses. On the other hand, some theorists (e.g. Anderson and
Bower, 1973; Pylyshyn, 1973; 1975) focus on the conceptual equivalence
of modality specific inputs and argue for a single LTM. By summarizing
arguments of the former theorists, advantages of hypothesizing multiple
peripheral memories should be apparent. By summarizing arguments of
the latter theorists, on the other hand, advantages of hypothesizing a
single modality independent store at a more central level (the conceptu-
al level) should also be apparent.
The four types of evidence which have led Paivio to the dual-store
position are: (1) that there are individual differences in human
abilities for independent symbolic systems (Guilford, 1967; DiVesta,
Ingersoll, and Sunshine, 1971); (2) that a perceptual task can inter-
fere with performance on a memory task, or vice versa, if the two in-
volve the same perceptual-motor systems (Brooks, 1968; Bryne, 197^-;
Klee and Eysenck, 1973); (3) that imagery and verbal encoding instruc-
tions affect recall in memory experiments (Paivio and Csapo, 1973); and
(4) that visual information appears to be processed in an analogue
fashion (Cooper and Shepard, 1973; Kosslyn, 1975). These points are
well- taken; however, they could all be accounted for by a model which
makes the visual-verbal distinction at a peripheral level only.
Pylyshyn (1973; 1975) has, in fact, presented convincing arguments
that any visual information, including that used in mental rotation or
relative size judgement experiments, could be represented in the same
types of data structures as verbal information (i.e. propositions). In
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fact, he suggests that believing that analogical representations are
more natural solutions is simply sweeping the problem under the rug.
Whether a discrete or analogue data structure is used, the theorist
must account for how information about physical laws which govern non-
linguistic stimuli is encoded. To believe that these issues are auto-
matically resolved in analogical representations is naive. Pylyshyn's
position, then, is that propositional data structures, about which we
know more than analogical data structures, should be further explored
for solutions to representing visual knowledge.
To summarize, it is suggested here that LTM be viewed as several
modality specific peripheral memories (including visual and verbal
stores), and a single conceptual memory. We will now turn to discus-
sion of one issue which has led to a sub-division of conceptual memory.
Universal and particular memories > One dimension along which con-
ceptual information has often been classified is its degree of generali-
ty. At one extreme is analytic knowledge—what we know, by definition,
to be true of all possible worlds (e.g. All bachelors are unmarried).
Another type of knowledge, synthetic knowledge, we apparently know by
induction to be true in this world (e.g. All milk is white). However,
even synthetic knowledge is quite general compared to a third type of
knowledge, knowledge we have of specific events (e.g. The milk I drank
this morning was white). That humans can distinguish among these
classes of knowledge and that most people share the same intuitions
about how to classify any given fact, indicate that the LTM in which
they are a] .1 represented encodes information about generality of mem-
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ories.
Many memory theorists have been sensitive to issues about generali-
ty of knowledge, and several different solutions to the question of
precisely where it is theoretically important to draw distinctions
between classes of knowledge have been offered. The present position
is that it is important to distinguish between universal memories which
conserve generalized knowledge (both analytic and synthetic) in an ab-
stracted or schematized form, and particular memories which conserve ex-
periences. This distinction is consistent with Tulving's (1972) "pre-
theoretical" distinction between semantic and episodic memory. The
major distinguishing features between these two memories are that while
episodic memories are more or less faithful records of a person's ex-
periences which can be described in terms of perceptual properties and
temporal-spatial relationships to other events, semantic memories are
much less literal and do not require storage of temporal-spatial infor-
mation. Further, episodic memories have autobiographical references
and are susceptible to transformation and loss, whereas semantic mem-
ories have cognitive references and are stable.
Theorists who have proposed more specific LTM models than Tulving
(1972), especially computer modelers, have also found it useful to draw
a distinction between universal and particular knowledge. While these
theories differ in detail, the universal-particular dichotomy seems to
be a common theme among the LTM distinctions summarized in Table 1.
Quillian's (1968) work on semantic networks introduced the distinction
between type (universal) and token (particular) nodes to information
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Table 1
Representation of Universal and Particular Knowledge
THEORY UNIVERSAL
Anderson & Bower (1973)
Atkinson and Juola (1973)
Fiksel and Bower (1973)
Quiillian (1969)
Rumelhart, Lindsay, & Norman
(1972)
Schank (1975)
Tulving (1972)
Concept node
Lexicon
Semantic store
Type node
Primary node
Scripts
Semantic store
PARTICULAR
Individual node
Event/knowledge store
Propositional store
Token node
Secondary node
Episodes
Episodic store
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processing modelers. Similar distinctions are seen in Anderson and
Bower's (1973) concept versus individual nodes, and in Rumelhart, Lind-
say, and Norman's (1972) primary versus secondary node. The type-token
node distinction has afforded semantic network models considerable
efficiency of storage because universal knowledge can be stored once at
type nodes and thereby holds implicitly for token nodes which point to
types. There is also a good deal of flexibility for retrieving related
memories in such a system, because the type nodes serve as a complex
cross-reference system. Furthermore, that a single token node may
reference an arbitrarily complex structure, gives semantic network models
considerably more flexibility to account for complex cognitive phenomena
than previously believed possible of fundamentally associative struc-
tures.
One major difference among the models summarized in Table 1 is
whether lexical knowledge (knowledge about words) is retained in the
universal store or in a separate peripheral memory as proposed here.
Anderson and Bower (1973) and Schank (1975) are most explicit, about
retaining word information separately from conceptual information,
whereas the other theorists mentioned in Table 1 seem to believe that
information about the word that stands for a concept is one type of
universal knowledge. On the other hand, a recent model proposed by
Collins and Loftus (1975) distinguishes between lexical and semantic
memories, but is not explicit about how particular memories are encoded.
In addition to the facts that we seem tc be able to classify in-
formation on a generality continuum, and that computer modelers have
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found the universal-particular distinction useful, there is at least
one other reason for including this distinction in an LTM model. The
first coding criterion mentioned above indicates that one reason to
hypothesize distinct LTM stores is that the knowledge retained in each
is best represented in different types of data structures. Since a
good deal of universal knowledge seems to be abstracted, procedural
representations are well-suited data structures. On the other hand,
particular memories seem to be adequately represented in declarative
data structures. This suggestion is realized in Schank's (1975) model
in which universal knowledge is encoded in what he calls scripts which
are stereotyped procedures, whereas particular memories are encoded in
propositions. Further discussion of viewing memory of universal know-
ledge, at least in part, as a set of procedures v/hich use particular
memories as data will be presented in the next chapter on LTM processing.
At this point, the present position on the three structural distinctions
discussed in this section will be summarized by introducing one hypoth-
esis about the organization of LTM.
Three-layered LTM network . It was previously suggested that a use-
ful way to view LTM is as consisting of a conceptual store and several
peripheral stores. Since the present work will focus on processing of
linguistic material, the relevant peripheral store will be referred to
as the lexicon; other peripheral stores may be thought of as being in
the same memory level since they also map into conceptual representations.
For the present purposes, it is hypothesized that there are three
distinct levels of memory: (1) lexical memory where information about
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words is conserved; (2) semantic memory where universal knowledge about
concepts is conserved; and (3) episodic memory where particular know-
ledge about episodes is conserved. The latter two memories are both
components, but at different levels, of conceptual memory; lexical
memory, on the other hand, is one of a number of peripheral memories
which share a single LTM level. The notion of level captures the fact
that there is a one-to-many mapping of nodes from lexical to semantic
and from semantic to episodic memory, although some episodic nodes have
no semantic correlates and some semantic nodes have no lexical corre-
lates.
In line with the first coding criterion, there seem to be prior
reasons to believe that different data structures might be better
suited to representing these three classes of knowledge, and AI work in
natural language processing supports this claim. While lexical memory
could easily be represented by a look-up table of phonemic, orthographic,
and possibly syntactic features, the conceptual stores must be much more
associative. In fact, a number of investigators have shown that declara-
tive representations are well-suited for encoding episodic knowledge.
On the other hand, abstractions of particular memories, that is semantic
knowledge, may be better encoded in procedural representations. Such
representations may actually encode a good deal of knowledge about the
concept, or may simply be a set of procedures for examining corres-
ponding episodic memories, The models of Anderson (in press), Norman
and Rumelhart (1975), and Schank (1975) are most consistent with this
position. In line with the second coding criterion, organization of
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lexical memory should be along phonemic and/or orthographic dimensions,
semantic memory along conceptual dimensions, and episodic memory along
temporal-spatial dimensions.
Figure 2 is an example of part of this three-layered memory which
encodes the sentences "Mary paid a bill," "John sent a bill," and "The
bird has a bill." The important points to note are that: (1) literal
lexical information is not available in conceptual memory; (2) there
are one- to-many mappings from lexical to semantic, and from semantic
to episodic memory; (3) some semantic nodes have no lexical equivalents,
and similarly some episodic nodes have no semantic equivalents (in this
example, the overall propositions); and (4) semantic nodes can be asso-
ciated to other semantic nodes and episodic nodes can be associated to
other episodic nodes. Perhaps the most important point about the
layered network perspective of LTM is that while there seem to be good
prior reasons to draw a number of distinctions about types of knowledge
in LTM, each layer is connected to other layers. We use universal
knowledge to understand particular events; we use particular events to
infer universal knowledge; and we understand the meaning of words by
the episodes they have been used in.
A further point about this network is that the three processing
assumptions discussed previously—strength valued associations, com-
petitive search, and spreading activation—are all hypothesized to
hold throughout the network. While the simple associative retrieval
implied by these assumptions is certainly a fundamental type of proc-
essing which is involved in a good deal of cognitive processing, one
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goal of the present work was to find support for the existence of more
complex, but non-strategic, LTM processes. Since the type of processes
investigated make use of semantic information, hypothesized to be repre-
sented procedurally, their isolation may be taken as support for the
notion of a procedurally represented semantic memory. Further discus-
sion of this will be postponed until the next chapter. At this point,
since a major goal of the present work is to provide experimental sup-
port for the notion of distinct lexical and conceptual memories, several
previous approaches to investigating this issue will be reviewed.
Empirical Evidence
Four types of empirical evidence provide some support for the no-
tion of a multi-layered LTM. All of these classes of evidence are
weaker than would be desired. However, the package as a whole lends
some credence to the issues of interest, and the experiments to be re-
ported in subsequent chapters provide converging evidence for the con-
clusions derived from the empirical work reviewed here.
Physiological evidence . Perhaps the strongest type of evidence
which can be used to isolate an LTM component is physiological. One
example is that when we find patients with selective memory deficits,
we might want to conclude that the type of knowledge they are lacking
is analogous to an isolable type of memory. So, for example, the very
existence of patients with alexicas, auditory agnosias, and digraphias
may be taken as support of the notion of an isolable lexicon. While
a number of theorists (c.f. Luria, 1973) would like to use this type of
evidence to draw much more detailed pictures of the relationship between
parts of the brain and cognitive functioning, there seems to be enough
confusion in the relevant literature (c.f. Geschwind, 1969) to suggest
that such an endeavor might be best postponed.
Another source of physiological evidence, which at least weakly
supports the notion of an isolable lexicon, is work done on hemispheric
specialization (see Dimond and Beaumont, 1974 for an interesting col-
lection of papers on this topic). While older work suggested a neat
distinction bettveen linguistic functioning in the dominant (left)
hemisphere, and non-Unguis tic functioning in the other hemisphere,
more recent work indicates that this conclusion is premature. However,
an emerging picture now seems to support the notion that both hemispheres
have access to a conceptual memory, whereas only the left hemisphere
has access to lexical knowledge. That the right hemisphere does not
process at the lexical level seems most clear in the domain of speech
production, but appears likely to hold for word recognition as well.
Same-different RT experiments . A second approach to isolating LTM
sub-structures is exemplified by the notion of levels of processing
which has provided a major thrust to an extensive research program by
Posner and his co-workers (c.f. Posner, 1969, 1973; Posner and Mitchell,
1967; Posner, Lewis, and Conrad, 1972). They measure subjects' RT to
make same-different judgements to pairs of simultaneously presented
stimuli; the same-different rule is based on physical (e.g. A A),
name (e.g. A a), vowel versus consonant (e.g. A E) , or category (e.g.
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Dog Cat) identity rules.
Two types of evidence from these experiments can be used to confirm
a levels of processing analysis. First, if RT remains constant to make
same decisions to a given stimulus pair while varying the decision rule,
different levels of processing must be involved. For example, the
finding that RT to make same judgements to physically identical stimuli
(e.g. A A) was equal under physical and name identity decision rules
,
implies that there are distinct physical and name codes. This is be-
cause if both decisions were based on a single measure of similarity, a
less stringent criterion could be used to say same under name than
physical identity instructions. Contrary to the observed result, this
would lead to faster RT under name than physical identity instructions.
Second, if RT remains constant to make different decisions while varying
amount of irrelevant similarities in pairs, but holding the decision
rule constant, different levels of processing must be involved. For
example, the finding that RT was equal to make different judgements
to same (e.g. A a) and different (e.g. A b) name pairs under a physical
identity decision rule also implies that there arc distinct physical and
name codes. This is because if decisions were based on a single measure
of similarity, a different response could be arrived at more quickly for
less globally similar different name pairs (e.g. A b) than for more
globally similar same name pairs (e.g. A a), again a finding disconfirmed
by the data.
A difficulty for the levels analysis, however, became apparent in
an experiment in which Eichelman (1970) required subjects to name letters
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as quickly as possible. He found that RT decreased when the same let-
ter was repeated on successive trials. That this repetition effect was
greater for physically identical letters than for those having only
their name in common is not naturally accounted for by the levels of
processing notion. Rather, Posner and Snyder (1975) have recently
appended a general spreading activation notion to their theory. They
argue that:
In a naming experiment subjects appear to benefit
from automatic activation primarily. In simulta-
neous matching tasks the levels of processing com-
ponent seems to dominate. In successive matching,
both factors may be involved.
This additional complication suggests that the same-different paradigm
may not be very useful for distinguishing among more complex levels of
knowledge. The next experimental approach, examining the effect of
various orienting tasks on incidental learning, on the other hand, has
the potential to be more appropriate to such an endeavor.
Incidental learning experiments
. Craik and his co-workers (Craik,
1973; Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Craik and Tulving, 1975) have also
proposed a levels of processing analysis of memory. However, the major
focus of their work is considerably different from Posner' s. Their
basic idea is that it is useful to view an LTM trace as a consequence
of the perceptual analysis which encoded the initial stimulus. Further,
they believe that trace persistence is a function of the depth of per-
ceptual analysis. Shallow analyses are concerned with less persistent
physical features while deeper analyses are concerned with more persis-
tent, more abstract, meaningful features.
30
The experimental work most relevant to this theoretical position
are studies which measure incidental memory as a function of type of
orienting task. Shallow orienting tasks generally deal with the
stimulus words on a physical level (e.g. Is there an e in the word?
or produce a rhyme); on the other hand, deeper orienting tasks gener-
ally deal with the stimulus words on a meaningful level (e.g. Is the
word pleasant or not? or produce an associate) . When orienting tasks
are either scaled by experimenters, or on the basis of time to make
discriminations, "deeper" orienting tasks lead to better incidental
recall (e.g. Hyde and Jenkins, 1969; 1973; Johnston and Jenkins, 1971;
Till and Jenkins, 1973; Walsh and Jenkins, 1973) and incidental recogni-
tion (Craik and Tulving, 1975).
Unfortunately, it is not clear that this line of investigation
could lead to the identification of isolable memory codes or levels of
processing. Rather, it might simply demonstrate that "meaningful events
are well-remembered." While Craik and Tulving (page 270) entertain this
possibility, they reject it (I am not clear why). That their most
recent experiments (Craik and Tulving, 1975, especially Experiment 8)
led them to conclude that it is more useful to think of enduring LTM
traces as resulting from elaborative, rather than deeper processing,
seems to support the suggestion that their approach will not lead to a
precise specification of isolable levels of processing. At the same
time, it does not rule out the possibility that such a goal is achiev-
able.
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Priming experiments. The final experimental approach to the iden-
tification of isolable LTM sub-structures, priming studies, rests on
the assumption that there is a spreading activation process in LTM.
Further, retrieval is conceptualized as resulting from the intersection
of several strength directed search processes (see Collins and Loftus,
1975)
.
A number of experiments in this domain by Loftus and her co-
workers (e
. g. , Freedman and Loftus, 1971; Grober and Loftus, 1974;
Loftus and Cole, 1974) have led Loftus (1973) to postulate a lexicon,
distinct from semantic memory.
Freedman and Loftus (1971) had subjects produce an instance of a
category that began with a given letter (e.g. A-Fruit) or was charac-
terized by a given adjective (e.g. Red-Fruit). That subjects were
faster when the category was given first than when cither the letter
or adjective were given first was explained by the fact that spreading
activation would be restricted to a less diffuse area of LTM and would
thus be stronger when the category name was seen first. Grober and
Loftus (1974) used the same task, but category names always came first.
They ran one condition which blocked letter and adjective trials
separately, and one which randomly mixed both trial types. While
blocking facilitated letter trial RT, it had no effect on adjective
trial RT. Collins and Loftus (1975) interpreted these results as
support for the notion of distinct lexical and semantic memories which
can be separately primed. Another relevant experiment which Collins
and Loftus (1975) explain in terms of their model was reported by Lof-
tus and Cole (1974). In this experiment, subjects' RT to produce an
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appropriate instance to noun, adjective, letter triples (e.g. Animal,
Small, M) was measured. That subjects were faster when the adjective
was presented before the letter was explained as follows:
When the adjective appears before the letter, acti-
vation will spread from a small set of instances in
the semantic network to the lexical network where
the intersection occurs, since the letter can be
expected. When the letter is presented before the
adjective, activation will spread from a small set
of instances in the lexical network back to seman-
tic network where an intersection with the adjec-
tive will occur. Then the subject must return
again to the lexical network to retrieve the name,
so there is an extra transit necessary in this con-
dition.
Thus, the results of these experiments seem consistent with a
model which postulates separate lexical and conceptual memories. The
experiments to be presented here represent an alternative application
of the priming methodology to examine the same LTM layers. Before
turning to a discussion of these experiments, some general questions
about the nature of processing in LTM will be raised.
CHAPTER III
PROCESSING ISSUES
The previous section discussed questions about how the variety of
knowledge we have may be organized in LTM. The present section will
consider questions about the processes which allow us to make use of
that knowledge. It is important to realize, however, that any neat
dichotomy between cognitive structure and process is more apparent
than real. In fact, Anderson (in press) has recently proved that there
are systematic trade-offs between cognitive structures and processes of
a theory of LTM. Behavioral data which can be predicted by any parti-
cular theory could be equivalently predicted by an infinite number of
theories which hypothesize different cognitive structures, but simul-
taneously compensate by modifying the postulated cognitive processes.
For the present purposes, this leaves us in the position of looking for
cognitive processes which complement the network model of LTM previously
argued for.
This section will consider three classes of retrieval processes-
—
intersection, generate-test , and procedural. The first two are most
familiar in the psychological literature on memory. There are. well-
defined models of each which have been explored both theoretically and
empirically. The notion of procedural retrieval, on the other hand, is
less precise. While one could unearth many historical roots, including
ideas from Gestalt, motor, and schema-oriented theories, applications
of these ideas to memory have not yet been precisely modeled. Nor have
34
conditions for empirical validation of procedural retrieval been well-
defined. The present discussion of this class of retrieval processes
will focus on more current theoretical developments which come from AI.
As presented in the next chapter, a major goal of this dissertation was
to define experimental conditions in which the notion of procedural
retrieval could be investigated. The second part of this chapter will
review some possibly relevant empirical work.
Retrieval Processes
Intersection retrieval . The network view of LTM claims that the
meaning of a concept is, at least in part, encoded by the set of associ-
ations which intersect at its LTM node. Thus, a fundamental type of
process which can make use of this type of knowledge is associative
retrieval, traversing arcs in the LTM network. The first type of
associative retrieval to be considered is intersection retrieval. The
basic idea is that a response is available at the intersection of two
or more associative chains. Precisely how such a process can solve
cognitive problems depends upon the specific task involved, as well
as structural details of the network. However, a number of models in
the literature (e.g. Anderson, in press; Collins and Quillian, 1972;
Collins and Loftus, 1975; Fiksel and Bower, 1976) indicate that' such a
retrieval process is, in fact, capable of: (1) retrieving facts; (2)
recognizing which facts have been previously encoded in LTM; and (3)
computing simple inferences. A more detailed discussion of perhaps
the most formally precise model, Fiksel and Bower's (1976), should
serve to support the claim that intersection retrieval is capable of a
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good deal of the cognitive processing people seem capable of, and indi-
cate how such a process works.
An interesting point about Fiksel and Bower's model is that each
node in their LTM network is a finite state automaton, which has a
finite number of labeled limbs connected to other nodes in the network,
thus encoding associative relationships. When a particular problem is
posed to this LTM, a control process establishes the task requirements
in terms of a sequence of relational types (limb labelings)
. Associa-
tive retrieval is accomplished by propagating activation through the
network in a manner sensitive to the relational structure, while
keeping track of what the memory is searching for, and how far it has
preceded.
Given this representation, Fiksel and Bower have proven that a
finite solution to any well-specified fact retrieval problem can be
found. (By well-specified it is meant that the relationship between
the cued and required concept can be established in terms of the rela-
tional types.) This fact retrieval is accomplished by propagating
activation from the cued node along appropriately labeled limbs until
the entire relational sequence is satisfied. Also, Fiksel and Bower
have proven that their system can determine whether any well-specified
relationship between two LTM concepts is already encoded in memory.
This is accomplished by simultaneously propagating activation from the
two LTM nodes. In one case the relational sequence is traced in a for-
ward manner; in the other case it is traced in a reverse order, using
inverse relations. If an intersection is achieved between these two
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processes at precisely the point when the relational sequence is ex-
hausted, the fact was previously encoded in LTM. Finally, by including
production operators which make use of logical information such as "A
property of a superset of a concept is a property of the concept",
Fiksel and Bower's LTM network is also able to compute simple infer-
ences. This is accomplished, using the inference rule mentioned as
follows: When a property relation occurs in the relational sequence,
appropriately encoded activation is propagated along property and super-
set limbs; in the case of the superset limbs, an additional property
relation is inserted in the relational sequence.
To summarize, by way of example it was argued that intersection
retrieval processes could make use of a good deal of knowledge stored
in LTM networks. Specifically, fact retrieval, recognition memory, and
simple inference can be accomplished by such a simple process. Further,
it is suggested that assumptions about the dynamics of network, such
as those presented in the introduction (i.e., strength valued arcs, com-
petitive search, and spreading activation) can serve to make the LTM
network context sensitive and account for quantitative aspects of a num-
ber of experimental results.
Generate-test retrieval . A second type of associative retrieval
process which has been explored in network models of LTM is generate- '
test retrieval. This type of process is best conceptualized as con-
sisting of two sub-stages. During the first sub-stage associations re-
lated to a cued concept are generated; during the second sub-stage they
are tested for correctness. Precise mathematical models of many varia-
37
tions of each of these sub-stages exist in the literature on memory,
perception, and sensation. Such analyses will not, however, be dis-
cussed here because aspects of generate-test retrieval relevant to the
present work are not dependent upon these finer grain considerations.
Rather, they hinge on the basic assumption that there are two sub-
stages of retrieval, the first of which is directed from a single cued
concept
.
As with intersection retrieval, one well-specified decision re-
trieval model of LTM (Anderson and Bower, 1972; 1973) will be described
with the goal of indicating how such a process can accomplish a number
of simple cognitive tasks. In Anderson and Bower's model, each node in
the LTM network has a set of relation-specific GETLISTS which encode
associative relationships. When a particular problem is posed to this
LTM, the cued concept is accessed. Then, possible solutions are gener-
ated by scanning the properly-labeled GETLIST. The test sub-stage in-
volves checking that an appropriate associative configuration can be
traced from a particular GETLIST entry.
In many ways, this type of processing is similar to intersection
retrieval. In fact, Anderson and Bower have demonstrated that cheir
model is capable of the same types of processing that Fiksel and Bower's
model is capable of. Both of the retrieval processes are associative
in that retrieval involves tracing appropriate associations in search
of a pre-specif ied configuration. In intersection retrieval, more
than one requirement of the solution can be simultaneously cued and a
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solution is defined at the intersection of these search processes. In
generate-test retrieval, on the other hand, search is initiated from a
single cued element and possible solutions are tested with respect to
all other relevant information. This distinction may evaporate when
generate-test retrieval processes are allowed to proceed in parallel
from several nodes, as they are in Anderson and Bower's model; however,
this complication will not be considered in the present work.
To summarize, generate-test retrieval, like intersection retrieval,
can be easily incorporated into a dynamic network representation of LTM.
It is also capable of accomplishing many of the simple, but fundamental,
cognitive tasks human beings are capable of. A distinguishing feature
of generate-test retrieval is that there is a single focus from which
associations are first generated, and then tested for relevance. At
this point we turn from these basically associative retrieval processes
to consideration of more complex, but less well-defined, procedural
retrieval processes.
Procedural retrieval
. While some form of associative retrieval
seems to be a fundamental type of cognitive processing, it is interest-
ing to ask whether more complex processes are directly available in
LTM. That is, while it is clear that we can solve complex cognitive
problems, must we construct appropriate associative chains on line, or
are there some types of processing for which there are isolable LTM
procedures directly available? For ?xample, is there an isolable LTM
procedure which can find a particular class of information (e.g. CATE-
GORY or COLOR) about any concept? If the answer is yes, what are the
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types of knowledge for which these procedures are psychologically valid?
How may they be incorporated into network models of LTM? How can their
existence be experimentally demonstrated? It is suggested here that
some insights into all but the last question may be provided by con-
sidering ideas about procedural representation which have come out of
recent work in AI. The final question about experimental verification
of some of these ideas will be postponed to the next section.
As was previously mentioned, much work in AI, particularly natural
language processing, has provided cognitive psychologists with a rich
source of theoretical ideas. In particular, Quillian's (1969) work on
semantic networks indicated how a network structure provided with inter-
section retrieval processes could accomplish many cognitive tasks. The
notion of semantic networks has been further developed in natural lan-
guage processing systems (c.f. Simmons, 1973) and cognitive theories
of LTM (c.f, Collins and Loftus, 1975; Fiksel and Bower, 1976) and has
led to a good understanding of declarative (propositional) data struc-
tures (c.f. Pylyshyn, 1973; Sandewall, 1970). However, as these no-
tions have been more fully explored and their limits noted, ideas about
alternative procedural representations (e.g. Norman and Rumelhart, 1975;
Winograd, 1972) have provided an exciting new dimension to second
generation AI projects and are particularly relevant to the present
discussion of LTM processes.
A better understanding of the distinction between declarative and
procedural representations can be attained by noting a parallel philo-
sophical distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how". Also,
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Piaget's distinction between figurative and operative memory has the
same flavor. The former memories are static structures, while the lat-
ter are dynamic processes.
The present suggestion is that just as natural language processing
systems found semantic networks to be limited, cognitive theories which
do not postulate cognitive processes more complex than associative
retrieval may be limited. Rather, isolable cognitive processes in the
form of procedures may capture a new dimension of the human information
processing system. To the extent that this is true, it will be impor-
tant to more precisely define these LTM procedures and the control
structure which coordinates their computation. For now they may be
viewed as knowledge packages which have the capacity to actively derive
knowledge from other parts of LTM.
Several advantages of the procedural notion will be mentioned.
First, referring to the previously made distinction between represen-
tation of universal and particular knowledge, it is interesting to
speculate that a procedural memory generates universal knowledge from
declarative, particular representations. Second, procedural represen-
tations are extremely efficient means of storage, since one rule may
generate an infinite amount of information (for example, it can be
used to classify an infinite number of stimuli which represent the same
concept). Third, procedural representations provide a link between
mental representations and action, a link which is missing from purely
declarative representations . Fourth, the idea of storing information
procedurally negates the structure-process distinction which was
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previously questioned; in procedural representations, the structure is
the process which operates on memory.
It is important to address the question of whether and how these
procedural representations may be incorporated into network conceptuali-
zations of LTM since it was previously argued that such a framework was
valuable. A number of memory theorists (e.g. Anderson and Ortony, 1975;
Jenkins, 1974) have argued that these more complex ideas about process
are antithetical to network structures. For example, Jenkins said
that:
...at rock bottom there is a profound difference
in belief between associationism
, which presup-
poses fundamental units and relations out of which
all else is constructed, and contextualism
, which
presupposes that events are primary and that the
quality of events determines what the possibilities
are for a host of analyses.
(Jenkins, 1974; page 794)
However, it is argued here that the type of network model entertained
in the previous section is associative, but does not make the fatal
assumptions Jenkins associates all associative theories with. In fact,
the third generation of natural language processing systems (e.g.
Minsky, 1975; Moore and Newell, 197 3; Schank, 1975; Winograd, 1975)
have been especially concerned with the problem of finding useful ways
of combining declarative and procedural knowledge in usable information
packets, and developing appropriate control structures to coordinate
processing in these complex systems. As was previously mentioned,
these ideas can be viewed as an extension of semantic networks, rather
than as alternatives. Yet, it is important to note the change in em-
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phasis to more complex and dynamic memory components in these new
models. A parallel change in focus may be warranted in the domain of
LTM theories. We will now turn to a discussion of the type of experi-
mental work which might be applicable to investigating these more com-
plex ideas about cognitive processing.
Empirical Evidence
There is probably no disagreement with the claim that humans make
use of both simple associative and complex procedural (constructive)
processing. At the extremes, neural transmission is associative, while
planful behavior is procedural. The present problem is to more clearly
delineate the nature of an intermediate level of processing. Specifical-
ly, is there evidence for procedural types of processing which can be
characterized as non-strategic, automatic, etc.? Two approaches to
addressing this issue will be mentioned here and relevant empirical
work will be summarized. The experiments to be reported in later chap-
ters provide an alternative approach to the same problem.
Mental arithmetic experiments . Since there may be a large number
of heterogeneous LTM procedures, one way to demonstrate their role in
retrieval is to carefully investigate the processing involved in a
limited and well-specified task domain. Chronometric studies of mental
arithmetic and number comparison (e.g. Groen and Parkman, 1972; Parkman,
1971, 1972; Parkman and Groen, 1971; Restle, 1970), provide an example
of this approach. The basic idea behind this work is that process
models can be developed on the basis of well-defined computational
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algorithms, and RT predictions can be derived. If the structural vari-
ables assumed to influence processing (e.g. minimum number, maximum num-
ber, sum, etc.) account for observed RT differences, support for a par-
ticular process model of the task, and the general idea of procedural
retrieval is obtained.
In this vein, Parkman and Groen (1971) proposed a counting model to
account for the finding that mental addition time increases linearly with
sum and minimum of two addends. Specifically, in their model a counter
is set to the larger number, and then incremented an appropriate number
of times. If time to set and increment the counter is constant, the
correct RT predictions result. However, alternative associative proc-
esses might lead to the same pattern of RTs. For example, Groen and
Parkman (1972) suggested that:
The counting model could easily be reformulated as re-
trieval algorithms that calculated an index, rather
than a sum, with the index being used for a memory re-
trieval operation. Alternatively, one might reformu-
late each model in terms of a list structure. The set-
ting operation might then correspond to an operation
that accessed a given list, while the incrementing oper-
ation might correspond to finding the next element on
the list.
In fact, two types of weak evidence have, been interpreted as supporting
the associative notion.
First, Parkman (1972) has argued that if similar patterns of RT
differences are obtained for mental addition and mental multiplication,
the associative notion should be preferred. This is because different
computational algorithms would be involved in the two arithmetic tasks,
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but a common structural representation of the number system would direct
associative processes. That the same variables affected RTs in both
tasks, therefore, was taken as support of associative retrieval.
Second, Groen and Parkman (1972) used a developmental approach to
distinguish between procedural and associative explanations of mental
arithmetic data. Specifically, they found that the slope of a regres-
sion line relating mental addition time to minimum addend was 400 msec
for first grade children, but only 20 msec for adults. While they point
out that this developmental difference may be indicative of shorter in-
crementation time in adults, they prefer the alternative conclusion that
children use procedural retrieval processes, but adults generally use
associative processes.
A considerably different approach toward understanding number proc-
essing in particular, and cognitive processing in general, is provided
by the work of Shepard, Kilpatrick, and Cunningham (1975). Rather than
testing models of simple processing tasks, they attempt to infer the form
of the internal representation of numbers by scaling paired comparison
ratings. Their relevant point is that:
...a satisfactory explanation of the pattern of reac-
tion times from such chronomecric experiments may not
be possible solely in terms of an information-process-
ing model that takes no account of the structural rela-
tionship among the internal representations.
Rather, they argue that if the appropriate non-linear transformation of
magnitude is chosen, a single variable could account for a good deal of
RT data from mental arithmetic and number comparison studies. If this
is true, it may be that chronometric analysis of well-specified task
domains cannot provide definitive evidence of procedural retrieval proc-
esses. We will now turn to work which has operationally defined this
notion in a way which may lead to such evidence.
Automatic versus conscious processing
. While human capacity for
planful behavior provides clear evidence of constructive information
processing, whether such processing is available as unitized, auto-
matic, non-strategic procedural retrieval is the question of present
interest. How a number of investigators define automatic processing
(e.g. LaBerge and Samuels, 1974; Posner and Synder, 1975), and attempt
to empirically demonstrate it, is therefore relevant. Posner and Sny-
der (1975) provide three operational indicants of automatic processing:
(1) it occurs without intention; (2) it occurs without giving rise to
conscious awareness; and (3) it occurs without producing interference
with other ongoing mental activity. Likewise, LaBerge and Samuels
(1974) define automaticity as processing which does not require atten-
tion.
Using these criteria, LaBerge (1975) attempted to demonstrate that
repeated experience causes perceptual and associative processes to be-
come automatic. Specifically, he measured subjects' RT to match and
classify familiar and unfamiliar letters. The relevant trials in his
experiment were proceded by invalid cues, and therefore required a
switch in attention. A critical assumption is that familiar letters
are automatically processed. Then, that an initially large difference
in RT for the two sets of letters diminished after five experimental
sessions, can be taken as evidence that processing the unfamiliar let-
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ters also became automatic. While such experiments clearly demonstrate
learning, it is less clear that they provide insight into the nature of
automatic processing.
Posner and Snyder (1975), on the other hand, believe that their
experiments indicate what type of processing is automatic. Like LaBerge,
they examined matching and classification RT but they varied the prob-
ability that a priming cue was a valid indicator of the. next trial.
Assuming that generally invalid cues would not be attended to, priming
effects in this condition are examples of automatic processing. On the
other hand, since generally valid cues would be attended to, priming
effects in this condition would include conscious as well as automatic
processing. The relevant findings were: (1) in low cue validity condi-
tions informative cue trials were faster than neutral cue trials which
did not differ from mis-informative cue trials; and (2) in high cue
validity conditions all three trial types differed (i.e. informative cue
trials were faster than neutral cue trials which were faster than mis-
informative cue trials) . Posner and Snyder (1975) interpreted these
results as supporting their theory that automatic priming present in
low cue validity conditions is due to pathway activation. Priming in
high cue validity conditions, on the other hand, includes conscious
allocation of attention as well.
Whether pathway activation is the only type of automatic processing,
as implied by Posner and Snyder (1975) and Posner and Rogers (in press),
is of interest. The present suggestion is that such purely associative
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processing may only be one type of automatic processing; retrieval using
isolable procedures may be a second example. Kolers (1975) recently
argued that this latter type of processing plays a role in perception.
The finding which led him to this conclusion was a larger speed advan-
tage for reading second sentences which shared visual features with pre-
viously read sentences, than for second sentences which only shared
words or meanings with previously read sentences. We will now turn to
discussion of the present approach used to investigate automatic pro-
cedural processing in a fact retrieval domain.
CHAPTER IV
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of the present dissertation is to refine the theoreti-
cal view of human LTM developed in previous chapters. More specifical-
ly, several questions about the organizational structure and retrieval
processes of LTM which follow from viewing it as a dynamic network
will be pursued. In particular, two goals of the present work are to
obtain experimental support for: (1) the notion of a multi-layered LTM
and (2) the notion of isolable LTM procedures. Several additional ques
tions about details of structure and process will be raised in the con-
text of specific experiments.
The approach used to address these issues was to require subjects
to make simple timed responses to experimentally presented material.
The experimental task was assumed to necessitate subjects' use of LTM
structures and processes which are of particular interest here. A
general process model was constructed which was assumed to reflect the
flow of information processing required to complete the task, and RT
data were used to analyze the retrieval stage.
The axioms of the present argument fall into three classes. First
the assumption that time to produce a response directly reflects the
mental operations involved, an assumption shared by most contemporary
cognitive psychologists, plays an important role in the current work.
The particular use of RT data in the present work requires the assump-
tion that a fixed and finite set of stages is involved in the experi-
mental task. However, additional assumptions about seriality of stages
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stage independence, and stochastic independence which have often been
employed in RT studies will not be required here. Rather, following
Taylor (1976), it will be assumed that corrections to basic stage times
required by interdependence or temporal overlap can be expressed as
linear functions of the stage times involved.
The second set of assumptions will be made explicit in a general
information processing model. In particular, this model will indicate:
(1) what stages of processing are assumed to be involved in the experi-
mental task; (2) which experimental variables are assumed to affect
specific processing stages; and (3) what aspects of the data can be
used to assign the effects of other variables to processing stages.
Finally, the three LTM assumptions discussed in the introduction
—
strength valued network, competitive search, and spreading activation
will also be employed. More specifically, the competitive search
assumption implies that retrieval time varies as a function of current
strength of to-be-retrieved associations relative to current strength
of neighbor associations. Further, the spreading activation assumption
implies that the strength of recently processed associations and their
neighbors in the LTM network are temporarily in a high-strength state.
Thus, strength, and hence RT, should vary as a function of the struc-
tural relationship between to-be-retrieved and recently-retrieved infor-
mation. By a simple extension of this logic, we might also expect
isolable LTM procedures to vary in accessibility or speed of computation,
as a function of whether or not they have been recently used, and for
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this phenomenon to be reflected in RT measures. Prior to presenting
a more detailed outline of the specific ways these three sets of as-
sumptions were employed to address the questions posed above, the ex-
perimental paradigm will be described and a general process model will
be presented.
Experimental Paradigm
In all of the present experiments, subjects' RT to retrieve one of
several types of information about one of several words was measured on
each of several hundred randomly sequenced trials. Upon entering the
laboratory, subjects read detailed instructions about the experiment.
This included familiarizing themselves with a matrix of the stimulus
material to be used in their session. Each row label of this matrix
was one. of the ITEM words which subjects retrieved information about,
each column label was one of the TASK types of information they re-
trieved, and each cell entry was an appropriate RESPONSE to a particu-
lar ITEM-TASK pair. After the subject read the instructions, the ex-
perimenter reviewed the procedure making sure the subject understood
exactly what was required.
A PDP-8 computer controlled the sequencing and timing of stimuli,
and recorded trial type, response (i.e. correct or error), and RT for
all trials. On each trial one TASK word and one ITEM word were ran-
domly and independently sampled for presentation, with the restriction
that each ITEM appear equally often In each block of trials. Depending
upon the condition, either the ITEM or TASK was displayed on a video
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screen; following a short DELAY the other word was added several lines
below the first. The subject was to vocalize the correct response as
quickly as possible; a vocal response caused the words on the screen to
be replaced by the correct response and the subject's RT for that trial.
The subject then pulled one of two triggers to indicate whether the res-
ponse was correct or not, and to initiate a new trial.
RT was measured from the onset of the second word until triggering
of the voice key. Minimum time between consecutive trials was 3.5 se-
conds, and each trial was preceded by a .5 second warning tone. Figure
3 schematically presents the sequence of events for one trial. Twelve
blocks of 48 trials of data were collected for each subject; the first
block of trials was practice and not included in any analyses.
The specific ITEM and TASK words varied between experiments, but
were constant for all subjects in any given experiment. One between
subjects manipulation was ORDER. For half of the subjects in each ex-
periment, the TASK word always preceded the ITEM word (O(T-I) condi-
tion); for the other half of the subjects, the reverse was true (O(I-T)
condition). In addition, in Experiment I, the DELAY between onset of
the first and second words of the stimulus was a between subjects
manipulation; an equal number of subjects had DELAY s of 0, 500, and
1000 msec. In all subsequent experiments, the DELAY was 500 msec for
all subjects.
Information Processing Model
The approach used in the present investigation of LTM was to con-
Figure 3
Eyperirr.er.tal Paradigm
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struct a simple model which captures the flow of information processing
assumed necessary to complete the experimental task. Then, assumptions
about where some experimental variables have their influence were made,
and several methods were employed to assign the effects of other vari-
ables to appropriate stages. Finally, as will be described in the next
three sections of this chapter, the composite picture can be used to
analyze the types of structures and processes involved in retrieving
information from LTM. At this point, the process model schematically
represented in Figure 4 will be briefly described.
It is assumed that subjects begin encoding the first word (Stage I)
of the stimulus pair as soon as it appears on the video screen; this
assumption seems warranted since a warning tone insures that the sub-
ject is aware of the onset of a trial. Next, it is further assumed that
subjects become aware of the second word (Stage II) and begin encoding
it (Stage IV) as soon as possible; since each subject experiences a con-
stant DELAY between onset of the two words of the stimulus, this strat-
egy is quite natural. Under conditions of a long DELAY between presen-
tation of the two words of the stimulus, it is hypothesized that sub-
jects engage in post-encoding processing of the first word (Stage III).
While the exact nature of this processing cannot be specified yet, it
will be referred to as "priming". Further, while this term should be
interpreted in a theoretically neutral way, it is suggested that it may
shorten the retrieval stage, but does not influence encoding or res-
ponse execution in the present experiments. Following encoding of both
words of the stimulus, the retrieval stage (Stage V) is initiated.
Figure
A Process Model of the Experimental Paradigm
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While the encoding processes are assumed to result in access of memory
representations of the stimulus words, the retrieval process is assumed
to result in access of a memory representation of the correct response.
Since the nature of structures and processes involved in retrieval are
of primary interest, they will be further discussed below. Finally,
the verbal response is executed in the final stage (Stage VI).
To avoid assuming that stages are non-over-lapping and independent,
the procedure suggested by Taylor (1976) was employed to derive RT pre-
dictions from this model. In this procedure total RT is viewed as the
sura of corrected stage times, where each corrected stage time is a
linear function of all basic stage times. Such a correction procedure
has enough flexibility to capture many possible types of inter-depen-
dencies among stages. By algebreically recombining terms, RT expres-
sions can be obtained which differ from those derived using more tradi-
tional procedures in two ways. Under the present formulation: (1) each
basic stage time component has a weighting factor; and (2) the final
expression has one extra parameter for correction constants. Infer-
ences drawn from the presence of main or interaction effects on mean
RT are consistent with those derived using more traditional procedures.
The present procedure, however, underscores the ambiguity inherent in
a failure to obtain such effects. Since at the level of corrected
stage times, basic stage times may be partially or totally masked by
other stages, it is clear that mean RT may not reflect the effect some
variable exerts on a particular stage. For this reason, and because
of the difficulties generally associated with accepting the null
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hypothesis, conclusions based on failures to influence RT must remain
tentative.
With these points in mind, RT predictions will be derived for the
present model. An additional assumption in the present work is that
time required to encode a single word is less than or equal to 500 msec.
Previous work using a variety of procedures suggests that this assump-
tion is valid. Employing it leads to the following two equations:
RT (DELAY = 0) = W + t'(I) + t'(IV) + t'(V) + t ! (VI) (1)
RT (DELAY > 500) + W + t'(IV) + t'(V) + t'(VI) (2)
where t'(i) is the weighted
stage time for stage (i) , and W
is the correction constant.
That is, since RT is measured from onset of the second word, under con-
ditions where the first word was completely encoded prior to presenta-
tion of the second word (i.e. DELAY 500), RT is simply a function of
the last three processing stages. On the other hand, at zero DELAY, RT
includes the time required to encode the first word as well.
The present formulation also suggests that time allotted to priming
following presentation of the first word (Stage III) increases with
DELAY between the two words. More specifically:
t(III) = DELAY - t(I) when DELAY^t(I) (3)
t(III) = 0 when DELAY < t(I) (A)
Also, the nature of Stage III processing may differ for the two ORDERS
of stimulus presentation. For example, in the case where the ITEM is
presented first, it is likely that Stage III processing involves priming
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associations of the ITEM. Jn the case where the TASK is presented
first, on the other hand, such priming may have little effect because
the class of associates is so diffuse (see Collins and Loftus, 1975).
An alternative type of Stage III processing which may occur when the
TASK is presented first is priming of a TASK-specif ic piocedure. Fur-
ther consideration of differential implications of these possibilities
will be raised in the final section of this chapter. For now, it is
important to summarize the following three assumptions: (1) the effect
of Stage III processing may reduce retrieval time, and is thus indi-
rectly observable in overall RT; (2) the quantity of Stage III proc-
essing can be experimentally manipulated by varying the DELAY between
onset of the first and second stimulus words; and (3) the nature of
Stage III processing may be experimentally manipulated by varying the
ORDER of onset of the two stimulus words.
To summarize, a general model of the stages involved in the pre-
sent experimental task was described. The way manipulation of DELAY
between onset of the two stimulus words was assumed to influence proc-
essing was incorporated into RT predictions.
,
Further, it was suggested
that the ORDER manipulation may affect retrieval, but should not in-
fluence encoding or response execution stages of processing.
It was previously suggested that viewing LTM as a dynamic network
suggests that examination of sequential effects—how RT varies as a
function of recent processing—would be useful to drawing inferences
about structure and process. It is discussion of this logic, to which we
will now turn.
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Sequential Analyses
A general analysis will be described which allows assignment of
sequential effects to several stages of the process model just presented.
In addition, two issues of major interest—assessing the notions of a
multi-layered LTM and of isolable LTM procedures—can be addressed by
examining RT as a function of the relationship between TASKS on pairs
of successive trials. Special consideration of these two issues will
follow a more general discussion of sequential analyses.
Considering irfiether or not the ITEM, RESPONSE, and/or TASK have
been repeated on pairs of successive trials leads to five possible types
of trials in the present experiments. These are outlined with examples
in Table 2. Eight contrasts involving these five trial types will be
used to assess ITEM, RESPONSE, and TASK repetition effects, as well as
an hypothesis about additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition effects.
These contrasts are defined in Table 3, and will be briefly described
below.
ITEM repeition effects
. Contrasts 1 and 2 (see Table 3) provide
two independent assessments of ITEM repetition effects. In the first
contrast, the difference between RT(1) and RT(2) must be attributed to
the effect of ITEM repetition because both trial types involve different
TASKS and .RESPONSES. Likewise, in the second contrast, the difference
between RT(5) and RT(4) must also be attributed to the effect of ITEM
repetition; in this case both trial types involve same TASKS and RES-
PONSES, The presence of ITEM repetition effects may be due to either
59
Table 2
Five Repetition Trial Types
TRIAL
TYPE
ITEM TASK RESPONSE EXAMPLE
Trial n-1 Trial n
'Diff Diff Diff
Same Diff Diff
Diff Same Diff
Same Same Same
Diff Same Same
SUN
SYLLABLES
ONE
FROG
SYLLABLES
ONE
CORN
COLOR
YELLOW
FROG
COLOR
GREEN
GRASS
COLOR
GREEN
FROG
COLOR
GREEN
FROG
COLOR
GREEN
FROG
COLOR
GREEN
FROG
COLOR
GREEN
FROG
COLOR
GREEN
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Table 3
Repetition Contrasts
ITEM REPETITION
CONTRAST (1)=RT (1) -RT (2)
CONTRAST (2)=RT (5)- RT (4)
(Different TASK; RESPONSE)
(Same TASK; RESPONSE)
RESPONSE REPETITION
CONTRAST ( 3 ) =RT ( 3 ) -RT ( 5
)
(Different ITEM; same TASK)
TASK REPETITION
CONTRAST ( 4 ) =RT ( 1 ) -RT ( 3
CONTRAST (5)=RT(I)-RT(5)-35
CONTRAST (6) =RT (2) -RT (4) -CONTRAST (3)
CONTRAST ( 7 ) =RT ( 2 ) --RT ( 4 ) - 3
5
(Different ITEM; RESPONSE)
(Different ITEM; estimated
RESPONSE repetition)
(Same ITEM; corrected for
RESPONSE repetition)
(Same ITEM; estimated
RESPONSE repetition)
ADDITIVITY CONTRAST
CONTRAST (8) ^CONTRAST (1) -CONTRAST (2)
=CONTRAST (4) -CONTRAST (6)
^CONTRAST ( 5 ) -CONTRAST ( 7
)
encoding or retrieval phenomena.
RESPONSE repetition effects. Contrast 3 (see Table 3) provides a
single assessment of RESPONSE repetition effects. The difference be-
tween RT(3) and RT(5) must be attributed to the effect of RESPONSE rep-
etition because both trial types involve different ITEMS and same TASKS.
The presence of RESPONSE repetition effects may be due to either re-
trieval or response execution phenomena.
TASK repetition effects
. TASK repetition effects attributable to
the retrieval stage are of major importance in addressing the present
questions. Four contrasts (Contrast 4, 5, 6, and 7) which have been
devised to assess TASK repetition effects will be described here. The
issue of assigning these and other repetition effects to the appropriate
processing stage will be considered at the end of this section. Final-
ly, the implications of certain patterns of TASK repetition effects for
the questions of major interest will be considered in the last two sec-
tions of this chapter.
Analogous to the situation in which we were able to assess ITEM
repetition effects in the context of different and same TASKS, we will
assess TASK repetition effects in the context of different (Contrasts
4 and 5) and same (Contrasts 6 and 7) ITEMS. The logic behind Contrast
4 is straightforward. In this case, where we compare pairs of succes-
sive trials with different ITEMS and different RESPONSES, the differ-
ence between RT(1) and RT(3) must be attributed to TASK repetition.
The situation is not quite so simple when the same ITEM is presented
on pairs of successive trials. In this case, TASK and RESPONSE repeti-
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tion are confounded (see trial types 2 and 4 in Table 2). Contrast 6,
therefore, relies on the subtractive method (Sternberg, 1969) to iso-
late the effect of TASK repetition. Specifically, Contrast 3 is used
as an estimate of the RESPONSE repetition component and is subtracted
from the difference between RT(2) and RT(4).
Two additional TASK repetition contrasts, Contrasts 5 and 7, are
analogous to Contrasts 4 and 6 respectively. However, both of these
contrasts used an alternative procedure for estimating the RESPONSE
repetition component which was subtracted from the comparison of trials
in which TASK and RESPONSE repetition was confounded. Specifically,
the single best estimate of the RESPONSE repetition effect calculated
over experiments, ORDERS, DELAYS, and TASKS, 35 msec, was used. This
correction was deemed appropriate since there were no consistent ef-
fects of any of these variables on the RESPONSE repetition Contrast 3.
Further, these contrasts were deemed necessary since for some TASKS in
some experiments, Contrast 6, the other measure of TASK repetition in
the context of a repeated ITEM, was not directly calculable. This was
true for TASKS which required unique RESPONSES for each ITEM. Thus,
due to the importance of assessing the TASK repetition effect in the
present work, this additional procedure seemed worthy of consideration.
Additivity contrast . Contrast 8 is a test of the hypothesis that
ITEM and TASK repetition effects are independent. Specifically, it can
be viewed as any of the three algebreically equivalent contrasts pre-
sented in Table 3. In the first form, it is clear that Contrast 8
assesses the equivalence of ITEM repetition effects in the context of
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different versus same TASKS. In the last two forms, on the other hand,
it is clear that Contrast 8 assesses the equivalence of TASK repetition
effects in the context of different versus same ITEMS.
Assignment to stages
. Contrasts 1 through 7 were constructed so
that their signs indicate the nature of repetition effects; negative
contrasts are indicative of interference, while positive contrasts are
indicative of facilitation. Further, the sign of Contrast 8 indicates
whether ITEM and TASK repetition effects attenuate or enhance each
other; a negative sign is indicative of the former result, while a posi-
tive sign is indicative of the latter result. Investigating what types
of repetition influence retrieval and whether interference or facilita-
tion result are of primary interest. However, it is possible that ef-
fects of ITEM and/or TASK repetition should be attributed to encoding
stages while effects of RESPONSE repetition should be attributed to the
response execution stage. Several techniques used to assign repetition
effects to the retrieval stage of processing will be outlined here.
One rule of inference is that while facilitation could be attrib-
utable to any stage of processing, interference must be attributed to
the retrieval stage. This is because the competitive search assumption
indicates that recently processed associations which are in a high-
strength state compete with to-be-retrieved associations and can cause
interference. However, the spreading activation assumption indicates
that tc-be--retrieved associations which are neighbors of recently-
retrieved associations may themselves be in a high-strength state and
be retrieved more quickly. Thus, previous assumptions about the re-
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trieval stage imply that repetition effects attributable to it could be
exhibited as either interference or facilitation at the level of RT.
Previous notions about encoding and response execution, on the other
hand, predict only facilitatory effects.
Second, examining the RT predictions from Equations 1 and 2 for
the two ORDER conditions (see Table 4), we can see that ITEM first-long
DELAY RT does not include ITEM encoding time, while TASK first-long
DELAY RT does not include TASK encoding time. Presence of ITEM repeti-
tion effects in the former conditions or TASK repetition effects in the
latter conditions must therefore be attributed to the retrieval stage.
One difficulty with the previous rule is that in TASK first con-
ditions, Stage III processing may mask TASK repetition effects which
are most important in the present work. A third rule of inference, an
application of the subtractive method (Sternberg, 1969), provides a way
to isolate TASK repetition effects attributable to retrieval which may
be present in ITEM first conditions. This argument requires the rea-
sonable assumption that encoding repetition effects are approximately
equal for ITEM and TASK words. Then, ITEM repetition effects present
in TASK first conditions, which may be attributable to the encoding
and/or retrieval stage, can be used as upper bound estimates of repeti-
tion effects attributable to encoding. Thus, to the extent that TASK
repetition effects in ITEM first conditions are larger than ITEM repeti-
tion effects in TASK first conditions, the retrieval stage must be im-
plicated. This procedure, however, is only appropriate if there is no
ITEM interference in the retrieval stage. Since both theoretically and
Table 4
Stages of Processing Contributing to RT for
ORDER by DELAY Conditions
DELAY=ZERO
DELAY >500
Encode TASK
Encode ITEM
Retrieve RESPONSE
Execute RESPONSE
Encode ITEM
Retrieve RESPONSE
Execute RESPONSE
Encode ITEM
Encode TASK
Retrieve RESPONSE
Execute RESPONSE
Encode TASK
Retrieve RESPONSE
Execute PESPONSE
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empirically this qualification is met for ITEM repetition in the con-
text of a repeated TASK (i.e. Contrast 2), but may not be in the con-
text of a non-repeated TASK (i.e. Contrast 1), the latter application
of the present rule must be viewed with caution.
A fourth rule of inference is an application of the additive fac-
tors logic (Sternberg, 1969). That is, variables which interact at the
level of mean RT probably affect common stages. Thus, to the extent
that we are willing to assume or are able to infer that one of two
interacting variables influences retrieval, we should draw the same
conclusion about the second variable. Since it seems reasonable to
assume that differences in overall RT for the various TASKS used in
these experiments should be attributed to different retrieval proc-
esses, repetition effects which vary over TASKS should also be assigned
to the retrieval stage. In addition, since it was previously assumed
that manipulation of DELAY directly affects amount of Stage III proc-
essing, and hence indirectly affects retrieval (Stage V), repetition
effects which differ for 500 and 1000 msec DELAY conditions should also
be assigned to the retrieval stage. Note that RT for these DELAY con-
ditions, but not the zero DELAY, include the same encoding stages (see
Table 4) .
Finally, a violation of additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition
effects, as measured by Contrast 8, is indicative of their common in-
fluence on some stage. While the encoding stage may be responsible,
the alternative conclusion of common influence on the retrieval stage
is more sound. This is because such non-additivity could be naturally
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incorporated into a retrieval process (see discussion below), but it
is more reasonable to assume that encoding of the two stimulus words
involves relatively independent processes. Further, only the retrieval
conclusion is sensible if the non-additivity of ITEM and RESPONSE repe-
tition holds equally for ORDER by DELAY conditions in which RT reflects
encoding of one or both stimulus words.
To summarize, a general sequential analysis which can be used to
assess ITEM, RESPONSE, and TASK repetition effects and assign them co
appropriate stages of processing was developed. This analysis will be
especially helpful for addressing processing questions. Before con-
sidering those questions, a more detailed sequential analysis of trials
with different TASKS (i.e. RT(1) and RT(2», which can be used to shed
light on the multi-layered LTM hypothesis, will be described; such an
analysis, was employed in Experiments II-IV.
Structural Analyses
The logic for the present test of the multi-layered LTM hypothesis
rests on the strength assumptions. That is, the notion of isolable LTM
layers may be defined in terms of the scope of competitive search and
spreading activation. Then relative strength, and hence retrieval times,
should vary as a function of whether to-be-retrieved information is from
the same or different LTM layers as recently-retrieved information.
In terms of the present experiments, a particular hypothesis about
LTM layers can be assessed by further analyzing trials with different
TASKS on pairs of successive trials (i.e. RT(1) and RT(2) from Table 2).
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Specifically, these trials may be partitioned according to whether the
TASKS were from the same or different hypothesized LTM layers. If, as
in the present experiments, the hypothesis of interest is that there
are isolable lexical and semantic LTM layers, two types of support are
available. If RT to lexical TASKS varies as a function of whether
lexical or semantic information was retrieved on the preceding trial,
or if RT to semantic TASKS varies as a function of class of information
retrieved on the preceding trial, the hypothesis would be supported.
By comparing pairs of trials in which ITEM and TASK repetition have
been held constant, we can be assured that such effects are not due
to simple repetition effects.
An example of an analysis sufficient to test the hypothesis that
COLOR and CATEGORY information are conserved in a semantic memory,
isolable from lexical memory which contains NAME information, is pre-
sented in Table 5. This three-by- three table would provide RTs for
trial n as a function of TASK on trials n and n-1. The important
points are that a multi-layered LTM model predicts that NAME RT should
be equal when preceded by COLOR and CATEGORY trials because both of
these TASKS are from the same non-lexical memory. On the other hand,
COLOR RT and CATEGORY RT should vary as a function of whether the pre-
ceding trial involved a TASK from the same (RT (COLOR | CATEGORY) and
RT (CATEGORY
|
COLOR)) or different. (RT (COLOR |NAME) and RT (CATEGORY
|
NAME)
)
memories. In considering these predictions one should bear in mind
that models which view LTM as a single homogeneous network have no ex-
plicit mechanism which would lead to systematic effects of TASK
Table 5
TASK Sequencing Effects
TASK
TRIAL n-1
NAME
COLOR
CATEGORY
NAME
TASK-TRIAL n
COLOR
TASK
Repetition
Different
Memory
Different
Memory
Different
Memory
TASK
Repetition
Same
Memory
CATEGORY
Different
Memory
Same
Memory
TASK
Repetition
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sequencing.
The above analysis relied on the general dynamic property of LTM
to test the multi-layered hypothesis. However, no precise mechanism
for predicting TASK sequencing effects was offered. The imprecision of
this analysis is further attested to by the fact that either facilita-
tion or interference from recently-retrieved, same-layer information
could be taken as support of the multi-layered hypothesis. Two more
precise models which are especially compatible with associative retriev-
al processes will be considered here; one which is more compatible with
procedural retrieval will be considered in the final chapter.
Direct access model
.
Both associative multi-layered LTM models
make directional predictions about TASK sequencing effects for trials
with different TASKS but repeated ITEMS (i.e. RT(2)). However, neither
of them have natural ways of accounting for such effects when the ITEM
is not repeated (i.e. RT(1)). In the first model, the direct access
model, either the lexical or semantic representation of an ITEM is
directly accessible as a result of encoding. Figure 5a presents such
a two-layered memory representation of a concept with two different
lexical (i.e. SYLLABLES and NAME) and two different semantic (i.e.
CATEGORY and COLOR) associations. In the left-hand panel, lexical
information (i.e. SYLLABLES) was just retrieved; in the right-hand
panel, semantic information (i.e. COLOR) was just retrieved. This is
indicated by the dark associations, assumed to be in high-strength
states. The multi-layered notion is that interference resulting from
increased competition from recently processed, high-strength associa-
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tions is layer-specific. Then both lexical and semantic trials which
have been preceded by TASKS from the same memory should be slower than
if they were preceded by TASKS from the other memory. Further, this
should only hold for trials with repeated ITEMS.
Lexical access model. In the second model, the lexical access
model, predictions for semantic trials are more flexible. In this
model encoding a word involves accessing its lexical representation.
Then retrieving semantic information involves accessing the semantic
node and searching for the appropriate semantic information. Retriev-
ing lexical information, on the other hand, requires only the latter
type of process. Figure 5b is analogous to Figure 5a, but holds for
the lexical access model. Predictions for lexical trials are equiva-
lent to those of the direct access model. Specifically, search inter-
ference, is predicted for lexical trials preceded by other lexical
TASKS. Therefore, as in the direct access model, RT should be slower
for lexical trials preceded by other lexical rather than semantic TASKS;
lexical interference is predicted. The two associative multi-layered
models should, however, be discriminable on the basis of semantic
trials. In the lexical access model sequential effects for semantic
trials may be manifest in either the semantic access or semantic search
sub-stage of retrieval. Since the relative magnitude of predicted
semantic access facilitation and search interference is unknown, RT
predictions for semantic trials are ambiguous. Therefore, the pre-
sence of semantic facilitation in the present experiments should be
taken as support of the lexical access model relative to the direct
access model. On the other hand, if both lexical and semantic inter-
ference are observed, further research would be required to discrimi-
nate between the two associative models. Such experiments should be
straightforward since the lexical access model implies that semantic
access facilitation and search interference can be independently manip-
ulated. Finally, if neither lexical nor semantic interference are ob-
served, or if there are TASK sequencing effects for trials with non-
repeated ITEMS, alternatives to these associative conceptualizations
will be required.
To summarize, it was argued that the presence of any semantic
effects of sequencing pairs of different TASKS may be taken as support
of the notion of a multi-layered LTM. In addition, two multi-layered
network models which are compatible with associative retrieval were
described and more precise predictions were derived for trials with
repeated ITEMS
.
Finally, it is suggested here that to the extent that
support is obtained for the multi-layered network, we might expect the
present paradigm to be useful in classifying "levels of information
storage". The relationship between such a concept and that of "levels
of processing TASKS" will be considered in the final chapter of the
present dissertation. At this point, we will turn to consideration of
isolating LTM procedures, presumably a pre-requisite to the latter
analysis
.
Processing Analyses
The results of the repetition contrasts discussed in the context
74
of a general sequential analysis, and assignment of their effects to
appropriate stages of processing should be of interest, regardless of
the theoretical biases one is working in. In this section, however,
we will consider the constraints repetition effects assigned to the
retrieval stage impose upon the type of processes which grow out of a
dynamic network perspective. In the chapter on processing issues
three classes of retrieval processes were characterized—intersection,
generate- test, and procedural. In this section natural ways these
retrieval processes might be brought to bear in the present experimental
paradigm will be discussed and several differential predictions will be
made. First, a memory representation and process model will be des-
cribed for each class of retrieval; then, predictions relevant to the
present experiments will be outlined.
Intersection retrieval . As described in Chapter III, intersection
retrieval involves processes which traverse appropriate pathways in the
LTM network. Usually retrieval is accomplished when two such processes
intersect at a desired response. In terms of the present experiments,
it is reasonable to assume that search emanates from memory representa-
tions of the ITEM and TASK, and intersection occurs at the representa-
tion for the RESPONSE.
The network in Figure 6 presents a relevant portion of LTM in
which the five trial types of the present experiments can be represented.
The labels on the nodes and associations in this network correspond to
the trial types of Table 2. The lines labeled A should be viewed as
reference instances of associations retrieved on the preceding trial
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and hence in high-strength states (i.e. same ITEM, TASK, and RESPONSE).
The other trial types are indicated in appropriate relationship to the
type 4 ITEM, TASK, and RESPONSE. The flow chart in Figure 6 indicates
the type of processing which is compatible with an intersection re-
trieval model.
An important aspect of intersection retrieval is that search can
proceed from the ITEM or TASK node immediately following their respec-
tive encodings. Thus, search from the first word (i.e. TASK for O(T-I)
and ITEM for O(I-T)) may be initiated during the DELAY interval. This
has the consequence of causing the search process associated with the
second word (i.e. ITEM for O(T-I) and TASK for O(I-T)) to dominate RT
for long DELAY conditions; on the other hand, both processes should
affect RT in zero DELAY conditions. Further, the competitive search
and spreading activation principles influence both of these search
processes and lead to predictions about repetition effects which will
be summarized following discussion of the other two classes of retrieval,
Generate-test retrieval
. Generate-test retrieval involves two
sub-stages. First, candidate responses are generated; then they are
tested for appropriateness. In the context of the present experiments,
associated RESPONSES of the ITEM are generated and then tested for
relevance to the TASK.
Figure 7 presents a network representation of a portion of LTM
which might be used in the present experiments . The labels on the
associations correspond to the trial types of Table 2. A process
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model of generatc-test retrieval is also provided.
An important point about simple versions of this type of retrieval
is that the ITEM dominates processing regardless of ORDER. That is,
candidate RESPONSES can not be generated until the ITEM is available.
Further, the competitive search and spreading activation assumptions
which provide repetition effect predictions for intersection retrieval
only apply to the generate sub-stage involving search from the ITEM for
generate-test retrieval. On the other hand, TASK repetition effects
may be expected in the test dub-stage and are analogous to effects
predicted for procedural retrieval to which we will now turn.
Procedural retrieval. The basic notion behind procedural retrieval
is that LTM has isolable computation devices which are used to access
entire classes of information. While it seems clear that associative
retrieval is a fundamental process available to LTM, it is suggested
here that more complex processing may be available as well. In par-
ticular, in the context of the present experiments, it is suggested that
the semantic representation of TASK concepts (e.g. NAME, COLOR, or
CATEGORY) may be best thought of as isolable procedures which take
ITEMS as parameters and return RESPONSES. An important point of this
conceptualization is that the procedures are themselves dynamic memory
components which vary in accessibility and/or speed of computation.
Thus, in the present experiments, a minimal finding to support the pro-
cedural retrieval notion is the presence of TASK repetition effects
which are attributable to the retrieval stage of processing.
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In an attempt to further distinguish, both conceptually and pre-
dictively, the notion of procedural retrieval from intersection and
generate-test retrieval, a memory representation and a process model
which indicate how procedural retrieval could accomplish the present
experimental task are presented in Figure 8. Once again, the labels
on the associations agree with the trial types of Table 2, and the dark
associations and procedure are assumed to be in high-strength states,
having just been used.
An important point of this type of retrieval is that the TASK
plays a central role. Conceptually, the situation is exactly opposite
generate-test retrieval. In that case, initiation of processing was
contingent upon accessing the relevant ITEM; here the relevant TASK
must be accessed for retrieval to begin. This dominance of the TASK
in procedural retrieval is also responsible for the fundamental predic-
tion of TASK facilitation. On the other hand, the competitive search
and spreading activation assumptions seem less important in procedural,
than they were for associative, retrieval. Yet, the dynamic property
of LTM is fundamental to the present investigation of LTM. Thus, it is
suggested here that, to the extent that procedural retrieval seems to
be a useful concept, further research will be required to investigate
more precisely how it is coordinated with the strength principles.
Predictions
.
Simple ways in which three classes of retrieval
models might account for processing in the present experimental para-
digm were outlined. It should be emphasized that the predictions de-
rived from these models may not be properties of general classes of
Figure 8
Procedural Retrieval
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retrieval, but rather of only particular simple interpretations of
them. In fact, it is suggested that slight changes in assumptions
about the relevant memory structures of the parameters of the spreading
activation process may have marked predictive consequences. Neverthe-
less, failures of the particular models considered here may point to
more fundamental inadequacies of the classes of retrieval they are
examples of. Also, successes of these models should indicate which
classes of retrieval should be more systematically investigated in the
future.
Table 6 summarizes predictions about the main effect of ORDER as
well as the predicted sign of the repetition contrasts (see Table 3)
for each ORDER, for each of the three retrieval processes. The con-
trast predictions are derived for long DELAY conditions in which Stage
III processing is assumed to maximize ORDER effects. At shorter DELAYS
(possibily including the longest DELAYS in the present experiments), we
might expect both O(T-I) and O(I-T) effects to be present. Thus Table
6 should be viewed as predicting the direction of ORDER, DELAY, and
ORDER by DELAY effects on each repetition effect attributable to the
retrieval stage. At this point these predictions will be briefly. sum-
marized
.
Main effect of ORDER: While there is a basic symmetry between the
ITEM and TASK in intersection retrieval, generate-test retrieval cannot
be initiated until the ITEM is accessed, and procedural retrieval cannot
be initiated until the TASK is accessed. Therefore, while no main effect
of ORDER is predicted for intersection retrieval, generate-test retrieval
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Table 6
Retrieval Predictions
INTERSECTION
O(T-I) O(I-T)
GENERATE-TEST
O(T-I) 0(I-T)
PROCEDURAL
O(T-I) O(I-T)
ORDER Main Effect O(T-I) = O(I-T) O(T-I) > O(I-T) O(T-I) < O(I-T)
ITEM Repetition
Contrast 1
(different TASK)
Contrast 2
(same TASK)
< 0 =0
>0 =0
<o <o
>0 >o
? =0
>0 =0
RESPONSE Repetition
Contrast 3
(same TASK)
=0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0
TASK Repetition
Contrasts 4, 5
(different ITEM)
Contrasts 6, 7
(same ITEM)
=0 <0
=0 >0
=0 >0
=0 >0 >0
.
>0
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predicts that ITEM first conditions should be fastest while procedural
retrieval predicts that TASK first conditions should be fastest.
ITEM repetition contrasts: Since the ITEM dominates RT for the
TASK first ORDER under intersection retrieval and for both ORDERS under
generate-test retrieval, these are the conditions under which we expect
ITEM repetition effects. The predictions are weakest, however, for the "
ITEM first ORDER of generate-test retrieval because in this case Stage
III processing may mask ITEM repetition effects. Predictions rest on
two principles derived from the strength assumptions. First, associa-
tions which have just been retrieved should be retrieved more rapidly
than any other associations on the following trial. Second, other
associations emanating from the same starting node as associations just
retrieved should be retrieved more slowly than any other associations
on the following trials.
In Contrast 1 retrieval of two non-repeated associations is compared
(i.e. 1 from SUN and 2 from FROG in Figures 6 and 7). However, the
second association emanates from a repeated ITEM and must compete with
a high-strength association (i.e. 4 from FROG). In this case RT should
be long, and therefore Contrast 1 should be negative. In Contrast 2,
on the other hand, retrieval of a repeated association (i.e. A from FROG)
is compared to retrieval of a non-repeated association (i.e. 5 from
GRASS). Retrieval of the former association should be faster, and there-
fore Contrast 2 should be positive.
Whether the competitive search assumption should be applied to
procedural retrieval in the same way as it was for the associative
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retrieval processes is unclear. Predictions for Contrast 1 are espe-
cially ambiguous, although it is likely that Contrast 2 should be posi-
tive for procedural retrieval as well.
RESPONSE repetition contrasts: In intersection retrieval (see
Figure 6) the RESPONSE repetition Contrast 3 is analogous to the ITEM
repetition Contrast 2, but should be operative when retrieval from the
TASK dominates RT (i.e. O(I-T)). Retrieving the repeated association
(i.e. 5 from COLOR) should be faster than the non-repeated association
(i.e. 3 from COLOR) and therefore Contrast 3 should be positive.
For simple versions of generate-test retrieval (see Figure 7) the
generate, sub-stage should not be influenced by RESPONSE repetition,
although the test sub-stage may be facilitated. Since the test sub-
stage cannot be initiated during Stage III processing, this facilita-
tion would not be masked and we therefore expect RESPONSE repetition
effects in both ORDERS. Finally, in procedural retrieval (see Figure
8), there may also be RESPONSE facilitation, but as in generate— test
retrieval, it should not vary with ORDER.
TASK repetition contrasts: Once again .the principles operating in
intersection retrieval (see Figure 6) follow from the strength assump-
tions. In this case they hold when retrieval from the TASK dominates
RT (i.e. O(I-T)). In Contrast 4 we compare retrieval of two non-
repeated associations (i.e. 1 from SYLLABLES and 3 from COLOR). Since
the latter association is in the context of a competing high-strength
association (i.e. 4 from COLOR), RT should be longer and therefore
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Contrast 4 should be negative. Predictions concerning the second set
of TASK repetition contrasts, those in the context of a repeated ITEM,
are less clear because of the necessary correction for RESPONSE repe-
tition (see discussion in the section on sequential analyses). However,
the predictions presented in Table 6 assume that this correction ad-
justs for response execution stage RESPONSE repetition effects only.
Then the relevant comparison is between retrieval for trial types 2
and 4. Under intersection retrieval this is analogous to ITEM repeti-
tion Contrast 2, but should be operative in conditions in which the
TASK dominates retrieval (i.e. O(I-T)). Retrieving the repeated asso-
ciation (i.e. 4 from COLOR) should be faster than retrieving the non-
repeated association (i.e. 2 from SYLLABLES). Therefore, facilitation
is predicted.
In generate-test retrieval (see Figure 7) TASK repetition should
not influence the generate sub-stage, but may prime the TASK and thus
facilitate the test sub-stage. In contrast to intersection retrieval,
this facilitation should occur regardless of whether or not the ITEM
was repeated. However, like intersection retrieval, this priming may
be equivalent to Stage III processing assumed to occur when the TASK
is presented first. Therefore, TASK facilitation may not be apparent
for that ORDER.
In procedural retrieval (see Figure 8) , TASK repetition should
increase accessibility and/or computation speed of the TASK regardless
of whether or not the ITEM was repeated. However, as in generate-
test retrieval, Stage III processing may mask TASK facilitation in
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TASK first condition. On the other hand, one possibility is that
Stage III processing increases TASK accessibility but not computation
speed, while TASK repetition has both effects. If this is true> the
TASK repetition contrasts should be positive for both ORDERS
,
although
they may be attenuated for TASK first conditions.
To summarize, the three classes of retrieval make different predic-
tions with respect to the present experiments (see Table 6). Of parti-
cular importance are predictions concerning an ORDER main effect and
TASK repetition effects in the context of a non-repeated TASK. Specif-
ically, generate- test and procedural retrieval models make strong oppo-
site predictions concerning the former effect; while generate-test re-
trieval predicts faster RT for ITEM first conditions, procedural re-
trieval predicts faster RT for TASK first conditions. Intersection re-
trieval, on the other hand, can be discriminated from both of these on
the basis of strong opposite predictions concerning the latter effect;
while intersection retrieval predicts TASK interference, the other two
types of retrieval predict TASK facilitation in the context of a non-
repeated ITEM.
Summary
The purpose of the present section was to develop the logic used
to investigate some of the questions about structure and process of
human LTM raised in the previous three chapters. The experimental
paradigm used in the experiments to be reported was described, and a
general model assumed to capture the flow of information processing
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was presented. In addition, the logic behind the sequential analyses
to be used was discussed. Finally, specific ways the results of these
experiments could be interpreted with respect to the structure and
processing issues of major interest were considered. It is hoped that
armed with this development, and especially with the Tables and Figures
of this section for fast reference, the implications of the experiments
to which we now turn will be apparent.
CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT I
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to establish the usefulness
of the paradigm introduced in the last chapter for addressing questions
about LTM. Would the type of sequential effects previously discussed
be apparent in the data? Finding ORDER by DELAY conditions in which
TASK repetition effects could be studied was of special interest be-
cause support for the notion of isolable LTM procedures is contingent
upon such findings. This initial experiment, therefore, included two
TASKS, two stimulus ORDERS, and three stimulus DELAY conditions.
Method
The procedure was the same as described in Chapter IV.
Subjects. Seventy-two undergraduates at the University of Massa-
chusetts served as subjects; they received extra credit in their psy-
chology classes for participation.
Design, For half the subjects TASK words appeared above ITEM
words on the video display (O(T-I) condition); for the other half of
the subjects the reverse was the case (O(I-T) condition). In addition,
the DELAY between presentation of the top and bottom words on the dis-
play was manipulated as a between subjects variable. Equal groups of
subjects had 0, 500, and 1000 msec DELAY intervals. Thus, the overall
design of this experiment was a two (O(T-I) versus 0(I-T)) by three
(0 versus 500 versus 1000) factor completely randomized between sub-
jects design. All other manipulations were varied within subjects.
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Materials. Subjects were familiarized with material used in this
experiment during the instruction phase. They were asked to retrieve
the number cf SYLLABLES in an ITEM word, or the COLOR of an ITEM con-
cept. Eight color-specific nouns served as ITEMS (FROG, GRASS, DOLLAR,
TURTLE, CORN, SUN, LEMON, and BUTTER). They were chosen so there were
two exemplars of each combination of number of SYLLABLES (one or two)
and COLOR (yellow or green). Since ITEMS had either one or two SYL-
LABLES and referred to either yellow or green concepts, and since there
were two TASKS, regardless of ORDER, total processing of the first
word allowed subjects to narrow the set of possible responses from four
to two. For example, if O(T-I) subjects totally processed the TASK
word COLOR during the DELAY interval, they could narrow the set of pos-
sible RESPONSES to yellow or green; if the TASK word was SYLLABLES, one
or two would be required. On the other hand, if O(I-T) subjects total-
ly processed an ITEM word (e.g. TURTLE) during the DELAY interval, they
could also narrow the set of possible RESPONSES to two (i.e. two or
green). While it is unlikely that subjects in the 0 DELAY condition
employed this strategy, it is possible that subjects in the 1000 msec
DELAY condition did. The important point is that since ITEMS and TASKS
were chosen independently for each trial, the present choice of materi-
als allows us to reject information reduction explanations of ORDER or
TASK effects for all DELAY conditions.
Results
All error trials (machine and subject errors) and RTs less than
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rses in
300 msec or greater than 2000 msec were excluded from all analy £
this and subsequent experiments. Averaged over conditions, this ac-
counted for 6% of the trials. Table 7 presents mean correct RT and
error rate for each of the six experimental conditions. As can be
seen, RT and error rate are positively correlated, a finding which dis-
credits speed-accuracy trade-off explanations of these data.
The dependent variable entered into all analyses of variance was
mean correct RT for each subject for each within subject condition.
All variables were treated as fixed effect variables. While this
assumption is justified for the between subjects variables, and per-
haps to a lesser extent for TASKS, it would be preferable to be able
to extend conclusions about ITEMS to a larger set than used in each
experiment. However, given the type of sequential analyses of interest
and the. amount of data available from each subject, conclusions about
generality of findings will have to be made across, rather than within,
experiments.
ORDER and DELAY. Two manipulations of interest in this experiment
are ORDER of presentation of the stimulus words, and DELAY interval
between them. The relevant means are plotted in Figure 9. First, it
is apparent that TASK first conditions were consistently faster than
ITEM first conditions (mean RTs equal 651 and 736 msec for 0(T-I) and
O(I-T) respectively) (F(l,66)=12. 71, £ < .01) . Further, there was a
significant decrease in RT with increases in DELAY (mean RTs equal 792,
650, and 638 msec for the 0, 500, and 1000 msec DELAY conditions res-
pectively) (F(2,66)=17.27, £<.01). Closer inspection of the DELAY
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Table 7
Mean RT and Error Rate for ORDER by DELAY Conditions
(Experiment I)
0 DELAY 500 DELAY 1000 DELAY MEAN
RT % Error RT /i Error RT 5I Error RT % Error
O(T-I) 763 7% 592 6% 598 5% 651 6%
O(I-T) 822 9% 708 5% 678 7% 736 7%
MEAN 792 8% 650 5% 638 6% 694 6%
Figure. 9
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manipulation using the. Neuman-Keuls procedure (EW<.01) indicates
that while the 0 DELAY condition led to longer RT than either other
DELAY, the other two conditions were not reliably different from each
other. Finally, the effect of DELAY was the same in both ORDER condi-
tions (F(2,66) <1.00 for the DELAY by ORDER interaction).
Stimulus material
. Mean RT for each ITEM by TASK and ORDER by
TASK condition is presented in Table 8. Overall, RT to decide how
many SYLLABLES in a word is reliably faster than RT to decide the
COLOR of the concept (mean RTs equal 680 and 707 msec for SYLLABLE and
COLOR TASKS respectively) (F(l,66)=ll. 88, p_<.01). However, while
this difference held in TASK first conditions (mean difference equals
60 msec), it did not hold in ITEM first conditions (mean difference
equals -8 msec). A Neuman-Keuls analysis (EW< .01) of the significant
interaction between TASK and ORDER (F(l,66)=19
. 56, p_< .01) attests to
the reliability of the TASK effect for O(T-I) but not for O(I-T) con-
ditions .
In addition, there was significant variability among ITEMS
(F(7,464)=27.43,
.01). Further, the magnitude and direction of the
TASK effect varied over ITEMS (F(7 ,462)=70. 90, p_< .01) for the TASK by
ITEMS interaction, as did the magnitude but not the direction of the
ORDER effect (F (7 #462) =3. 14, £< .01 for the ORDER by ITEMS interaction).
Finally, the nature of the TASK by ORDER interaction also varied over
ITEMS (F( 7, 462) =7. 62, p_< .01 for the three-way interaction). On the
other hand, DELAY did not interact with TASKS, ITEMS, their interac-
tion, nor their interactions with ORDER.
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Table 8
Mean RT for ITEM by TASK and ORDER by TASK Conditi
(Experiment I)
ITEM SYLT ATVT COLOR
FROG ONE
687
GREEN
693
GRASS ONE
749
GREEN
667
DOLLAR TWO
654
GREEN
790
TURTLE TWO
644
vji\jiirj]N
750
CORN ONE
701
YELLOW
700
SUN ONE
663
YELLOW
658
LEMON TWO
698
YELLOW
680
BUTTER TWO
649
YELLOW
715
TASK FIRST 621 681
ITEM FIRST 740 732
MEAN 680 707
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Repetition contrasts
. Mean RTs for the five repetition trial
types (see Table 2) are presented for DELAY by ORDER conditions in
Table 9 and for TASK by ORDER conditions in Table 10. Differences
among these trial types will be considered in terms of the repetition
contrasts (see Table 3). The magnitude and F-tests associated with
each contrast are presented for DELAY by ORDER conditions in Table 11
and Figure 10, and for TASK by ORDER conditions in Table 12. Since,
in the entire experiment, only one interaction involving DELAY by TASK
was significant, it will be mentioned in the text, but other non-signif-
icant effects involving this level of interaction will not be presented.
Also, since assessing the absolute and relative magnitude of repetition
contrasts for each DELAY by ORDER condition was of primary interest,
Neuman-Keuls analyses (EW<.05) were used to compare the contrasts for
each cdndition to other conditions and to zero. Each of the four
classes of contrasts (i.e. ITEM repetition, RESPONSE repetition, TASK
repetition, and additivity) will now be considered.
ITEM repetition: Contrast 1 examines the effect of ITEM repeti-
tion in the context of a non-repeated TASK. Overall, this contrast
was not significant, and it was not significantly affected by ORDER,
DELAY, nor by their interaction (see Table 11). However, closer in-
spection of this contrast in Figure 10 indicates several interesting
trends which were tested by the Neuman-Keuls analysis. First, this
is the only contrast in which there is a suggestion of interference.
In particular, there is significant interference in the TASK first-
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Table 9
Mean RT for Five Trial Types for ORDER by DELAY Conditions
(Experiment I)
0 DELAY 500 DELAY 1000 DELAY MEAN
—
RT(1) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
774
842
597
733
603
711
658
762
MEAN 808 665 657 710
RT(2) O(T-I)
O(l-T)
803
833
607
747
604
714
671
764
MEAN 818 677 659 718
RT(3) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
743
807
593
693
597
662
644
721
MEAN 775 643 629 682
RT(4) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
709
773
587
650
579
623
625
682
MEAN 741 618 601
654
RT(5) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
736
788
579
676
596
631
637
698
MEAN 762 628 613
668
Table 10
Mean RT for Five Trial Types for ORDER by TASK Conditions
SYLLABLES COLOR MEAN
RT(1) O(T-I) 692 624 658
O(I-T) 763 761 762
MEAN 693 728 710
RT(2) O(T-I) 697 645 671
O(X-T) 779 749 764
MEAN 698 738 718
RT(3) O(T-I) 676 613 644
O(I-T) 708 733 721
MEAN 673 692 682
RT(4) O(T-I) 644 606 654
O(I-T) 672 693 682
MEAN 649 658 654
RT(5) O(T-I) 669 605 637
O(I-T) 691 705 698
MEAN 655 680 668
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Table 11
Repetition Contrasts for ORDER by DELAY Conditions
(Experiment I)
0 DELAY 500 DELAY 1000 DELAY MEAN
°T-I °I-T °T-I °I-T °T-I °I-T °T-I °I-T MEAN
Contrast 1 (RT(1)
-RT(2))
Contrast F(l,66)=2.63
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
-28 10Order F(l,66)=1.30 -10 -14 - 1 - 3 -13 - 2 - 8
Delay x Order F(2,66)=2.08
Contrast 2 (RT(5)-
-RT(4)
Contrast F(l,66)=9.16**
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
27 15Order F(l,66)<1.00 - 7 26 17 8 12 16 14
Delay x Order F(2,66)=2.43
Contract 3 CRTfTl-Kl )
Con f" va q f" r (.1 , oo;=l9 . 24**
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
8 19 14Order V f 1 CAW/ Q£ +r , bo;
-4 . o6* 17 1 31 7 J? 1 cXj
Delay x Order F(2,66)=1.41
Contrast 4 (RT(1)-•RT(3))
Contrast F(l,66)=45.41**
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
31 36 40Order F (1,66)
-11. 33** 5 6 49 14 42 28
DpIav x Ordpr
:ontrast 5 (RT(1)- RT(5)-35)
Contrast F(l,66)=3.78
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
19 -17 22Order F(l,66)=31.13** 3 -28 45 -14 29 7
Delay x Order F(2,66)=4.86**
Contrast 6 ((Rr(2)
-RT(4))-(RT(3)-RT(5)))
Contrast F(l,66)=44.61**
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
86 41 79 23Order F(l,66)=2.06 7 59 39 60 49
Delay x Order F(2,66)=5.52**
Contrast 7 (RT(2)-RT(4)-35)
Contrast F(l,66)=18.21**
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
58 25 -15
'
61 -11 55Order F(l,66)=7.03** 11 47 29
Delay x Order F(2,66)=6.64**
Contrast 8 (Additivity)
Contrast F(l,66)-8.74**
Delay F(2,66)<1.00
-55
-39 -18 -10Order F(1,6G)<1.00 - 5 - 2 -30 -18 -22
Delay x Order F(2,66)-2.93
*£ < . 05
**£ < .01
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Table 12
Repetition Contrasts for ORDER by TASK Conditions
Contrast 1 (RT(1)-
Contrast
Task
Order
Task x Order
Contrast 2 (RT( 5 )-
Contrast
Task
Order
Task x Order
RT(2)
F(l,66)=2.63
F(l,66)<1.00
F(l,66)=1.30
P(l,66)-7.45**
RT(4))
F(l,66)=9<16**
F(l,66)=4.31*
F(l,66)<1.00
F(l,66)=1.41
Contrast 3
Contrast
Task
Ordsr
Task x Order
(RT(3)-RT(5))
F(l,66)=19.24**
F(l,66)<1.00
F(l,66)=4.86*
F(l,66)<1.00
SYLLABLES COLOR
°T-I °I-T °T-I °I-t
-21 12 -5 -17
-1 13 24 19
8 28 7 17
MEAN
°T-I °I-T
-13 -2
12 16
7 22
GRAND
MEAN
14
15
Contrast 4 (RT(1)-RT(3)
Contrast F(l ,66)=45.41**
Task F(l,66)=7.63**
Order F(l,66)=ll. 33**
Task x Order F(l,66)=3.42
Contrast5 (RT( 1 )-RT(5)-35)
Contrast F(l,66)=3.78
Task ' F(l,66)=3.61
Order F(l,66)=31.13**
Task'x Order F(l,66)=1.09
Contrast 6 ( (RT (2)-RT (4) )-(RT (3) -RT (5) )
)
Contrast F(l,66)=44.61**
Task F(l,66)=10.47**
Order F(l,66)=2.06
Task x Order F(l ,66)=4 . 19*
Contrast 7 (RT(2)-RT(4)-35)
Contrast F(l,66)=18.21**
Task F(l,66)=9.42**
Order F(l,66)-7 .03**
Task x Order F(l,66)=3.26
il 28 16 55
-16 21 -12 36
32 29
4 21
46 91
18 73
Contrast 8 (Additivity)
Contrast F(l,66)=8. 74**
Task F(l,66)=4.30
Order F(l,66)<1.00
-20 -1 -29 -36
Task x Order F(l,66)=1.58
14 41 28
-14 29
39 60
11 47
-25 -18
49
-22
*p_ <.05
*p_ <.01
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0 DELAY condition. Further, for TASK first conditions, interference
diminishes with increases in DELAY
. On the other hand, the situation
is less clear for ITEM first conditions, where Contrast 1 was statis-
tically equal for all DELAY conditions and did not differ from zero.
Finally, as can be seen in Table 12, while the overall magnitude of
Contrast 1 was equivalent for both TASKS, interference was present for
SYLLABLE trials in the 0(1-1) but not O(I-T) conditions and the reverse
was true for COLOR trials.
Contrast 2 examines the effect of ITEM repetition in the context
of a repeated TASK. In this case there is significant facilitation
'
due to ITEM repetition, and it is not significantly affected by ORDER,
DELAY, nor their interaction (see Table 11). However, a Neuman-Keuls
analysis supports the impression from Figure 10, that the TASK first-
500 DELAY conditions is aberrant; it differs from other conditions, but
not from zero. Also, the ITEM first-1000 DELAY contrast is not signifi-
cantly greater than zero, while other conditions are. Finally, as can
be seen in Table 12, Contrast 2 is consistently larger for COLOR than
SYLLABLE trials.
RESPONSE repetition: Overall, there is significant RESPONSE
facilitation (see Contrast 3 in Table 11). However, in the present ex-
periment, simple effects tests indicate that this effect is only reli-
able in ITEM first conditiions, a phenomenon consistent with the sig-
nificant influence of ORDER on Contrast 3. The RESPONSE repetition
effect is not, however, influenced by DELAY. Further, while the ORDER
by DELAY interaction is not significant, a Neuman-Keuls analysis sup-
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ports the impression from Figure 10, that the effect of ORDER on RES-
PONSE repetition is only reliable at the 1000 msec DELAY. Finally,
the only RESPONSE repetition effect that varies as a function of wheth-
er a SYLLABLE or COLOR trial was involved is the ORDER by DELAY inter-
action (F(l,66)=8.43, £ <.01, for the three-way interaction), an inter-
action not readily interpreted.
TASK repetition: While Contrasts 5 and 7 have been included in
Tables 11 and 12 for completeness, only TASK repetition Contrasts 4 and
6 will be discussed with respect to this experiment. The reasons for
this omission. are threefold. First, an assumption required for Con-
trasts 5 and 7, that the RESPONSE repetition effect is constant ever
ORDER, was not met in this experiment (although it was in all subse-
quent experiments). Second, the 35 msec best estimate of RESPONSE
facilitation used in Contrasts 5 and 7 was significantly larger than
the effect observed in the present experiment (mean RESPONSE repetition
effect equals 22 msec) (F(l,66)=36.08, p <.01); this was also not true
in any subsequent experiment. Third, while Contrast 6 could not be
derived for some TASKS in all other experiments, this was not a problem
in the present experiment where no ITEM by TASK conditions had unique
RESPONSES. Thus, Contrasts 4 and 6 are sufficient and superior tests
of TASK repetition effects here.
Contrast 4 examines the TASK repetition effect in the context of
a non-repeatsd ITEM (see Table 11). Overall, this contrast was sig-
nificantly larger than zero. Further, while the effect was more marked
for ITEM first than TASK first conditions, as evidenced by the signifi-
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cant ORDER effect, simple effects tests found significant facilitation
for both ORDERS. Also, while neither the DELAY main effect nor the
DELAY by ORDER interaction was significant, closer examination of the
six means using Neuman-Keuls procedure (EW <.01) is of considerable
interest. First, this analysis indicated that the magnitude of Con-
trast 4 was positive and equal for all DELAY conditions of the ITEM
first ORDER. Second, for TASK first conditions, the 0 DELAY contrast
was positive and larger than other DELAY conditions which did not
differ from each other nor from zero. Finally, as can be seen in
Table 12, the TASK repetition effect tested by Contrast 4 was more
marked for COLOR than for SYLLABLE trials.
Contrast 6 examines the TASK repetition effect in the context of
a repeated ITEM. This contrast was significantly larger than zero and
its magnitude was constant over levels of ORDER and DELAY (see Table
11). The interaction of these two variables did, however, affect Con-
trast 6, and analysis of the six means using the Neuman-Keuls procedure
is of interest. First, at 0 DELAY the TASK first effect was larger
than the ITEM first effect; however, the reverse was true at the other
two DELAY intervals. Second, while all ITEM first conditions exhibited
significant TASK facilitation, the contrast for the 0 DELAY condition
was smaller than for the other two DELAY conditions, which did not
differ from each other. Third, for the TASK first ORDER, the contrast
for the 0 DELAY condition was larger than for the other two DELAY con-
ditions which did not differ from each other nor from zero. Finally,
as can be seen in Table 12, and consistent with Contrast 4, the TASK
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repetition effect measured by Contrast 6 was more marked for COLOR
than for SYLLABLE trials.
Additivity: Contrast 8 tests the null hypothesis of additivity
of ITEM and TASK repetition effects. Is the ITEM repetition effect
equivalent in the context of a repeated or non-repeated TASK, or
analogously, is the TASK repetition effect equivalent in the context
of a repeated or non-repeated ITEM? The answer to these questions is
clearly negative (see Table 11) . ITEM and TASK repetition effects are
more marked in the context of repeating the other stimulus word. Fur-
ther, this violation is constant over ORDER and DELAY manipulations,
but is more marked for COLOR than SYLLABLE trials (see Table 12).
Task sequencing. The analysis of TASK sequencing is of major
interest in the remaining experiments which address the issue of a
multi-layered LTM. This question cannot, however, be addressed in the
present experiment because only two TASKS were used. Therefore, the
analyses suggested in Table 5 and Figure 5 are redundant with the
repetition contrasts just discussed. Nevertheless, for comparative
purposes, means and F_-tests derived from the present experiment are
presented in this alternative form in Table 13. As in subsequent ex-
periments, variability attributed to between subjects manipulations
was partitioned from this analysis but only the relevant within sub-
ject means and F-tests are reported. Since discussion of these data
in terms of the repetition contrasts is more consistent with the goals
of the present experiment, Table 13 will not be considered further.
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Table 33
Mean RT as a Function of TASK on Trials n and n-1
(Experiment I)
TRIAL n-1
TASK ITEM SYLLABLES
TRIAL n
COLOR
SYLLABLES DIFF 665 726
SAME 651 739
MEAN 658 733
COLOR DIFF 691 688
SAME 697 654
MEAN 694 671
MEAN DIFF 678 707
SAME 674 697
GRAND MEAN 676 702
Task(n)
Task(n-l)
Item
Task(n) x Task(n-l)
Task(n) x Item
Task(n-l) x Item
Task(n) x Task(n-l) x Item
F(l,66)=12.75**
F (1,66) =17. 12**
F(l,66)» 6.34*
F(l,66)=162.43**
F(l,66)= 1.05
F(l,66)= 5.68
F(l,66)=21.56**
* £ <.05
** £ < . 01
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Discussion
The main effects of ORDER and DELAY will first be summarized and
interpreted; then the repetition effects will receive equivalent con-
sideration. First, there is an 85 msec speed-advantage for TASK first
subjects relative to ITEM first subjects. As discussed in Chapter IV,
this is compatible with the notion of procedural retrieval which re-
quires access of a TASK procedure before retrieval can be initiated.
On the other hand, it is especially incompatible with generate- test
retrieval where access of the ITEM is required to initiate retrieval;
in that case an ORDER effect opposite the one observed is predicted.
Second, RT is markedly reduced when a DELAY intervenes between
onset of the two stimulus words, but this reduction is not statistical-
ly greater for a 1000 than a 500 msec DELAY. As discussed in Chapter
IV, decreases in RT with increases in DELAY should be attributed to
eliminating encoding time associated with the first stimulus word from
measured RT, and priming of memory which reduces retrieval time. Since
the 500 and 1000 msec DELAYS had equivalent effects and, since there
was not a significant interaction between DELAY and ORDER, the encoding
phenomenon is probably largely responsible for the RT reduction with
DELAY. However, a non-signif icantly larger DELAY effect for TASK first
conditions (mean DELAY effect equals 168 and 129 msec for the TASK
first and ITEM first conditions respectively) suggests that priming
the TASK may be more useful than priming the ITEM. This notion is
consistent with the previous explanation of the ORDER main effect.
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The repetition effects are most apparent in Figure 10 and will be
briefly summarized here. First, there is a trend of ITEM interference
when we consider ITEM repetition in the context of a non-repeated TASK,
but this effect diminishes at long DELAYS. In the context of a re-
peated TASK, on the other hand, there is clear ITEM facilitation which
is more marked for COLOR than for SYLLABLE trials. Second, there is
RESPONSE facilitation which is larger for ITEM first conditions. Third,
there is a large TASK facilitation effect whether or not the ITEM has
been repeated. This effect, however, is markedly diminished (possibly
non-existent) when the TASK word precedes the ITEM word by a long DELAY.
Also, the TASK facilitation effect is larger for COLOR than for SYLLA-
BLE trials. Fourth, the effects of ITEM and TASK repetition are larger
in the context of a repeated second stimulus.
The present TASK is first to assign these repetition effects to
appropriate stages of processing and then to consider what constraints
they impose upon the retrieval stage. Prior to considering these points,
the criteria used to assign repetition effects to the retrieval stage
will be briefly reviewed. First, due to previous assumptions about
encoding, retrieval, and response execution, interference effects can
only be attributed to the retrieval stage. Second, for long DELAYS,
RT does not include TASK encoding time for TASK first conditions or
ITEM encoding time for ITEM first conditions (see Table 4). Therefore,
TASK repetition effects present in the first case and ITEM repetition
effects present in the second case must be attributed to the retrieval
stage. Third, by application of the subtractive method, TASK repeti-
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tlon effects in ITEM first conditions, which exceed ITEM repetition
effects in TASK first conditions, should be attributed, at least in
part, to the retrieval stage. However, this rule is of questionable
merit when the second stimulus word is not repeated. Fourth, by appli-
cation of the additive factors logic, repetition effects which vary
over TASK or DELAY should be assigned to the retrieval stage. Fifth,
non-additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition effects can also be taken
as evidence that both affect the retrieval stage.
There is ample evidence that all repetition effects influence the
retrieval stage and are thus of value in assessing the three classes
of retrieval which are of present interest. The evidence which sup-
ports this conclusion with respect to ITEM repetition is: (1) the pos-
sibility of ITEM interference in Contrast 1; (2) the presence of ITEM
facilitation for ITEM first-long DELAY conditions in Contrast 2; (3)
the larger ITEM facilitation effect for COLOR than SYLLABLE trials in
Contrast 2; and (4) the non-additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition
effects which is stable over ORDER by DELAY conditions. The RESPONSE
repetition effect may be attributed, at least in part, to the retrieval
stage because it varies over ORDERS. Likewise, several lines of evi-
dence indicate that TASK repetition influences retrieval. They are:
(1) that TASK facilitation for ITEM first conditions is
larger than
ITEM facilitation for TASK first conditions (see Table 11) ; (2)
that
TASK facilitation is larger for COLOR than SYLLABLE trials
in both
Contrasts 4 and 6; and (3) the non-additivity of ITEM and
TASK repeti-
tion effects which is stable over ORDER by DELAY
conditions.
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In deciding what the repetition effects tell us about how we
'
retrieve information from LTM, we can refer to Table 6 which outlined
the predictions of three classes of retrieval processes. First, the
pattern of ITEM repetition effects is generally consistent with all
of the retrieval processes, although lack of an ORDER effect in either
Contrasts 1 or 2 may be taken as weak support for generate-test retri
al. Second, that RESPONSE repetition effects were larger in ITEM first
conditions is most consistent with intersection retrieval. Third, the
clear TASK facilitation for ITEM first conditions, both in the context
of repeated and non-repeated ITEMS, is consistent with either generate-
test or procedural retrieval. On the other hand, this result is incon-
sistent with intersection retrieval which predicts an interference ef-
fect when the TASK but not the ITEM is repeated.
In summary, the results of Experiment I support procedural re-
trieval and are damaging to both alternatives. While the particular
pattern of ITEM and RESPONSE repetition effects are somewhat more con-
sistent with generate-test and intersection retrieval respectively, the
relevant contrasts were not incompatible with the procedural model.
On the other hand, results relevant to the more fundamental predictions
concerning an ORDER main effect, and TASK repetition effects provide
strong evidence against generate-test and intersection retrieval res-
pectively, but are consistent with procedural retrieval. While this
latter notion is still ill-defined, the idea of isolable LTM procedures
which play an important role in retrieving information from LTM seems
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to be sound. Prior to speculating about the nature of a procedurally
oriented LTM, the remaining experiments, among other things, test the
reliability of the results which support this notion using a wider
variety of TASKS
.
CHAPTER V I
EXPERIMENT II
Experiment I established the usefulness of the present paradigm.
Of special interest was evidence of TASK facilitation, isolable from
ITEM and RESPONSE repetition effects and attributable to the retrieval
stage of processing. The purposes of Experiment IT. are twofold. First,
given the results of Experiment I, it is of considerable interest to
replicate the findings which were interpreted as supportive of the no-
tion of isolable LTM procedures. Second, Experiment II was designed so
the notion of a multi-layered LTM could be assessed.
Specifically, in this experiment, two lexical and two semantic
(CATEGORY and COLOR) TASKS were. used. The operational distinction
between these two classes of TASKS is that the former involves retriev-
ing information about ITEM words, while the latter involves retrieving
information about concepts the words refer to. To the extent that RT
varies as a function of whether the TASK on the preceding trial involved
the same or a different class of information (i.e. lexical versus seman-
tic), we may obtain support for the multi-layer analysis of LTM.
Method
The procedure was the same as described in Chapter IV.
Subjects
.
Forty-eight undergraduates at the University of Massa-
chusetts served as subjects; they received extra credit in their psy-
chology classes for participation.
Design. For half the subjects TASK words appeared above ITEM
words on the video display (O(T-I) condition); for the other half of
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the subjects the reverse was the case (O(I-T) condition). There was a
500 msec DELAY between onset of the first and second words for all
subjects. By assumption, this interval is sufficiently long to elimi-
nate TASK encoding time from TASK first subjects' measured RT and ITEM
encoding time from ITEM first subjects' measured RT. Further, the
results of Experiment I indicate that longer intervals do not signifi-
cantly increase the effect of Stage III processing on retrieval.
Materials
.
Subjects were familiarized with material used in this
experiment during the instruction phase. They were asked to NAME the
ITEM word, or tell how many SYLLABLES it had (lexical TASKS), or re-
trieve the CATEGORY or COLOR of the ITEM concept (semantic TASKS)
.
Eight color-specific nouns (PEPPER, PEAS, LEMON, CHEESE, TURTLE, FROG,
TIGER, and BEE) served as ITEMS. Each ITEM was uniquely defined by the
conjunction of its number of SYLLABLES, CATEGORY, and COLOR. However,
ITEMS were chosen so half of them had each of the two RESPONSES associ-
ated with each of these three TASKS.
Results
Error trials (machine and subject errors) and RTs less than 300
msec or greater than 2000 msec were excluded from all analyses. This
accounted for 6% of the trials. Consistent with Experiment I, RTs from
the TASK first condition were significantly faster than those from the
ITEM first condition (mean RTs equal 686 and 846 msec for O(T-I) and
O(I-T) respectively) (F(l ,46)=25.89, p_< .01).
Stimulus material. Mean RT for each ITEM by TASK and ORDER by
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TASK condition is presented in Table 14. There was significant vari-
ability among TASKS (mean RTs equal 655, 715, 902, and 793 msec for
the NAME
,
SYLLABLE, CATEGORY, and COLOR TASKS respectively) (F(3,138)=
186.10, p_ <.01). Further analyses of these means (Bonferroni t tests,
EW <.01) indicate that each TASK differs from each of the other three.
In addition, while O(T-I) subjects were faster than O(I-T) subjects
for all TASKS, the magnitude of this effect varied over TASKS (F(3,138)
9.24, p_ <.01, for the TASK by ORDER interaction). Specifically, as can
be seen from Table 14, the ORDER effect was statistically equal and
smallest for CATEGORY and COLOR TASKS (mean ORDER effect equals 126
and 117 msec for CATEGORY and COLOR TASKS respectively) , but larger
for SYLLABLE (mean ORDER effect equals 179 msec) and NAME TASKS (mean
ORDER effect equals 218 msec) (Bonferroni
_t tests, EW <.05).
In addition, there was significant variability among ITEMS (F(7,
322) --6. 37, p_ <.01). Further, the magnitude (and in one case the direc-
tion) of the TASK effect varied over ITEMS (F(21, 966)=12.61, £<.01,
for the TASK by ITEMS interaction). The ORDER effect, however, was
stable over ITEMS (F(7,322)< 1.00, for the ORDER by ITEMS interaction),
as was the TASK by ORDER interaction (F(21,966)=l. 25 £>.05 for the
three-way interaction)
.
Repetition contrasts . RT for the five repetition trial types
(see Table 2) are presented for TASK by ORDER conditions in Table 15.
Differences among these trial types will be considered in terms of
repetition contrasts (see Table 3) which are presented with F-tests
Table 14
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Mean RT for ITEM by TASK and
(Experiment
ORDER by TASK
II)
Conditions
ITEM NAME SYLLABLES CATEGORY COLOR
PEPPER PEPPER
657
TWO
685
FOOD
940
GREEN
815
PEAS PEAS
669
ONE
711
FOOD
940
GREEN
778
LEMON LEMON
671
TWO
748
FOOD
949
YELLOW
748
CHEESE CHEESE
644
ONE
789
FOOD
922
I J1LLUW
763
TURTLE TURTLE
659
TWO
688
ANIMAL
889
GREEN
oxz
FROG FROG
6S 3
ONE
/15
ANIMAL
856
GREEN
790
TIGER TIGER
647
TWO
707
ANIMAL
346
YELLOW
BEE BEE
644
ONE
674
ANIMAL
871
YELLOW
820
TASK FIRST 546 625 839 735
ITEM FIRST 764 804 965 852
MEAN 655 715 902 820
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Table 15
Mean RT for Five Trial Types for ORDER by TASK Condition,(Experiment II)
NAME SYLLABLES CATEGORY COLOR MEAN
O(T-I)
O(I-T)
MEAN
556
775
665
612
809
710
840
966
cmiyuj
727
859
793
684
852
768
RT(2) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
MEAN
545
785
665
617
803
710
818
998
908
721
868
795
675
863
769
RT(3) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
520
732
638
799
888
982
753
832
700
836
MEAN 626 718 935 792 768
RT(4) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
494
682
631
753
724
832
714
771
741
763
MEAN 588 692 786 742 702
RT(5) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
639
766
780
868
739
804
720
813
MEAN 702 824 772
—
.
766
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-^ «. Numbers tn parentheses mder contrasts ^ ^ ^ ^
r
ns computed f°r the iasks
-—
—
—
8« comPUted
Ci.e. SYLLABLE
, CATECORY, and C0L0R^ and _^ ^ _
Pa.au-.ve purposes
. Bon£erronl £^ ^^ ^^
assess these contrasts when they were significant^ , nflj-Mi-Ln ntly influenced by ORDER,
TASK, or their interaction.
ITEM repetition: Contrast 1 examines the effect of ITEM repeti-
tion in the context of a non-repeated TASK. No snch ef£ect
in any ORDER or TASK condition (see Table i6). Contrast 2, on the
other hand, which tests the effect of ITEM repetition in the context of
a repeated TASK, was positive and its magnitude did not significantly
vary over ORDER or TASK (see Table 16)
.
RESPONSE repetition: Contrast 3 which tests the RESPONSE repeti-
tion effect was also positive and nnaffected by ORDER (see Table 16).
However, analysis of the significant TASK • .6 3111 1 t, effect indicates that RESPONSE
facilitation is larger for CATEGORY than either SYLLABLE or COLOR trials
which did not differ.
TASK repetition: Contrasts 4 and 5 examine the effect of TASK
repetition in the context of a non-repeated ITEM. While neither of
these contrasts was significant (see Table 16)
,
simple effects analy-
sis of the significant ORDER effect supports the reliability of TASK
interference in the O(T-I) condition and TASK facilitation in the
O(I-T) condition. The direction and magnitude of Contrasts 4 and 5
also varied over TASK; however, only the NAME TASK led to consistent
and reliable facilitation.
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Table 16
Repetition Contrasts for ORDER by TASK Conditions
(Experiment II)
NAME
°T-I° I-T
SYLLABLES
°T-I°I-T
CATE
°T-I
GORY
°I-T
COLOR
0 0T-T T_T
MEAN r* U A XTliKANiJ
MEAN
Contrast 1 (RT(1)
-RT(2))
—
X Jl 1 ~ L
1
Contrast F(l, 46)<1 .00
Task F(3, 138)<1 .00
11 -10Order F(l, 46) = 3 63 - 6 6 22 -32 6 - 9 9 -12 - 1
*asK x uraer F(3, 138)=1 %2 (8)(-12) (- 2)
Contrast 2 (RT(5)
-RT(4))
Contrast F(l, 46)=4 73*
Task
Order
F(2,
F(l,
92)<1
46)<1
00
00
8 12 56 21 26 jj /.l 26
Tool- v CirAcr F(2, 92)<1 00
n r- »- o o t- O /DT / ONooncrasc j vKl^JJ--RT(5)) 1
vUH L .. do L m. 46)=33.50**
Task F(2, 92)=11.20**
Order F(l, 46)=1. 13 - 1 34 108 113 14 28 40 58 49
Task x Order F(2, 92)<1. 00
Contrast 4 (RT(1)-•RT(3))
Contrast F(l, 46)<1. 00
Task F(3, L38)=10.01**
42 -26Order F(l, 46)=10.67** 35 10 -48 -16 -26 27 -16 16 0
Task x Order F(l,-L38)=l. 05 (-33) (/) (-13)
Contrast 5 (RT(1)- RT(5)-35)
Contrast F(l, 46)<1. 00
Task F(2, 92)=8. 53**
25Order F(l, 46)=12 .10**
— Do 63 -47 20 -28 30 1
Task x Order F(2, 92)<1. 00
Contrast 6 ((RT(2)
-RT(4))-
-(RT(3)
-rt(5)>;
Contrast F(l, 46)=1. 63
Task F(2, 92)<1. 00
-12 17 -14Order F(l, 46)=4. 91* 38 - 7 70 -11 41 15
Task x Order F(2, 92)<1. 00
Contrast 7 (RT(2)-RT(4)-35)
Contrast F(l, 46)=13 .36**
Task F(3,133)=7. 48**
15 68 -49 15Order F(l, 46)=13 .84** 59 116 -28 62 - 1 65 32
Task x Order F(3,138)<1. 00 (- 6) (64) (29)
Contrast 8 (Additivity)
Contrast F(l, 46)=4. 63*
Task F(2, 9?)<1. 00
-13
-34Order F(l, 46)<1. 00 - 7 -53 -19 -42 -22 -34 - 28
Task x Order F(2, 92)<1. 00
*£ < . 05
**£ < .01
118
Contrasts 6 and 7 examine the effect of TASK repetition in the
context of a repeated ITEM. Overall, Contrast 6 is not significant
but Contrast 7 is significantly greater than Z ero (see Table 16). A
more consistent picture emerges by simple effects analysis of the sig-
nificant ORDER effects. There is no TASK repetition effect for the
O(T-I) condition, but there is significant TASK facilitation in the
O(I-T) condition. Further, in Contrast 6 the TASK repetition effect
is larger for NAME and CATEGORY than SYLLABLE and COLOR trials.
Additivity contrast: Consistent with the findings of Experiment
I, Contrast 8 is significantly less than zero (see Table 16). This
attests to the fact that ITEM and TASK repetition effects are larger
in the context of a repeated second stimulus. This non-additivity
does not, however, vary with ORDER or TASK.
TASK sequencing. As discussed in Chapter IV, closer examination
of TASK sequencing effects can be useful to assessing the multi-layered
LTM hypothesis. Specifically, support for this notion is obtained if
RT for trials with non-repeated TASKS (i.e. RT(1) and RT(2)) system-
atically varies as a function of whether the TASK on the previous
trial was from the same or different hypothesized LTM layer. Table 17
presents mean trial n RTs and F-tests as a function of TASK on trials
n and n-1 for trials with repeated and non-repeated ITEMS. The pre-
sence of a significant trial n-1 main effect and trial n by trial n-1
interaction (see Table 17) indicates that further analysis is warranted.
The specific hypothesis under consideration is that information
about a word (e.g. NAME or SYLLABLES) is conserved in a memory layer
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Table 17
Mean RT as a Function of TASK on Trials n and n-1
(Experiment II)
TT?TAT Ti 1
TRIAL n
TASK ITEM NAME SYLLABLES CATEGORY COLOR
NAME DIFF
SAME
628
585
693
693
883
886
782
767
MEAN 607 693 884 774
^YT T ART T^c; U.Lr r
SAME
654
642
713
693
913
843
797
761
MEAN 648 703 878 779
CATEGORY DIFF
SAME
673
649
724
685
886
804
798
770
MEAN 661 704 845 784
COLOR DIFF
SAME
663
669
713
715
911
925
783
744
MEAN 666 714 918 764
MEAN DIFF
SAME
655
636
711
697
898
865
790
760
GRAND MEAN 645 704 881 775
Task(n) F(3,138)»140. 28**
Task(n-l) F(3,138)= 3.74*
Item F(l } 4 6)= 19,50**
Task(n) x Task(n-l) F(9,4I4)= 4.20**
Task(n) x Item F(3,138)< 1.00
Task(n-l) x Item F(3,138)= 3.09*
Task(n) x Task(n-l) x Item F(9.,414)- 1.57
*£< .05
**£< .01
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(i.e. the lexicon) distinct fro, where Information about concepts (e g
CATEGORY or COLOR) is conserved (i.e. semantic n^ory)
. Since RT
varies over TASKS on trial n, the most appropriate way to examine Table
17 is column by column, excluding diagonal cells whicb represent fast
TASK repetition trials. For both NAME and SYLLABLE trials, RT was
faster when the preceding trial was a lexical rather than semantic
TASK (648 versus 661. and 666 msec for NAME trials and 693 versus 70A
and 714 msec for SYLLABLE trials). For CATEGORY and COLOR trials, on
the other hand, RT was longer when preceded by a TASK from the same
semantic rather than the different lexical memory (918 versus 884 and
878 msec for CATEGORY trials and 784 versus 774 and 779 msec for COLOR
trials)
.
To statistically test these effects, an additional analysis of
variance was performed. A mean RT was computed for each subject for
each of eight conditions defined by: (1) class of trial n memory TASK
(lexical or semantic); (2) memory repetition (same or different); and
(3) ITEM repetition (same or different). While variability attributed
to the between subjects ORDER factor was partitioned from this analysis,
its affect is not relevant to the present consideration and will thus
be ignored in this and subsequent experiments. The relevant means are
graphically presented in Figure 11. As expected, lexical trials were
faster than semantic trials (mean RTs equal 679 and 840 msec for lexi-
cal and semantic trials respectively) (F(l,A6)--275. 70, £<.01). Also,
trials with repeated ITEMS were faster than trials with non-repeated
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Figure 13
TASK Sequencing Effects
(Experiment II)
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ITEMS 1 (mean RTs equal 752 and 766 msec for same and different trials
respectively) (F(1,46)
-7, 86, j> <.01) . Specifically, while lexical
TASKS were faster when preceded by trials from the same memory (i.e.
there was lexical facilitation), the opposite was true of semantic
trials (i.e. there was semantic interference). Further, simple effects
tests (Bonferroni t, EW <.05) supported the reliability of both of
these findings. Finally, none of the interactions with ITEM repetition
were significant, although the observed lexical facilitation was some-
what smaller for trials with repeated than non-repeated ITEMS (mean
facilitation equals 12 and 20 msec for same and different ITEM trials
respectively)
,
while the observed semantic interference was somewhat
greater for trials with repeated than non-repeated ITEMS (mean inter-
ference equals 34 and 11 msec for same and different ITEM trials res-
pectively)
.
Discussion
Processing questions. Results of Experiment II which are relevant
to the. processing questions will be considered first. They are the
This result is conceptually equivalent to a positive ITEM repeti-
tion Contrast 1. The apparent inconsistency between these two measures
is due to slightly different weightings of individual RTs for the two
partitions of trials. The previous conclusion, that the effect of ITEM
repetition in the context of a non-repeated TASK is ambiguous, remains
soundest
.
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ORDER main effect and repetition contrasts. The 160 msec speed ad-
vantage for TASK first subjects, relative to ITEM first subjects,
replicates Experiment I. The repetition contrasts are also basically
compatible with those of Experiment I, although several differences
should be noted. First, in the context of a non-repeated TASK there
Is still no strong evidence of an ITEM repetition effect. Like Experi-
ment I, however, a trend is suggestive of interference for ITEM first
subjects, where ITEM encoding time does not enter into measured RT.
In the context of a repeated TASK, Experiment II replicates the ITEM
facilitation effect observed in Experiment I, although in this case it
is constant over TASKS. Second, the RESPONSE facilitation effect was
also replicated, although in Experiment II it varied over TASKS but
not ORDER. Third, also replicating Experiment I, TASK repetition con-
trasts attest to TASK facilitation for the ITEM first ORDER which var-
ies among TASKS. In the case of the TASK first ORDER, however, the
present data are suggestive of TASK interference. Fourth, the addi-
tivity Contrast 8 again indicates that ITEM and TASK repetition effects
are larger in the context of a repeated second stimulus word.
As in Experiment I, there is ample evidence to attribute all of
these repetition effects, at least in part, to the retrieval stage.
The possibility of ITEM interference for the ITEM first condition in
the context of a non-repeated TASK, the presence of ITEM facilitation
in the context of a repeated TASK in the ITEM first condition (at a
long DIXAY), and the non-additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition, all
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support the contention that ITEM repetition affects retrieval. That
RESPONSE repetition varies among TASKS supports the sa,„e claim with
respect to RESPONSE repetition. Finally, the possibility of TASK
interference in Che TASK first condition, the fact that TASK facilita-
tion for the ITEM first condition is larger than ITEM facilitation for
the TASK first condition (see Table 16), the variability of the TASK
repetition effect over TASKS
,
and the non-additivi ty of ITEM and TASK
repetition, all support the retrieval hypothesis for TASK repetition
effects.
Referring to Table 6, we can interpret these results in terms of
the three classes of retrieval. Once again, the large ORDER main ef-
fect should be taken as strong support of only procedural retrieval.
ITEM repetition effects, on the other hand, are equally compatible
with all classes of retrieval. Further, although lack of an effect of
ORDER on RESPONSE facilitation is least consistent with intersection
retrieval, it is weak counter evidence. Finally, the TASK repetition
results are somewhat ambiguous due to the possibility of interference
for TASK first conditions; none of the retrieval processes predict
such an effect. The presence of TASK facilitation in the context of a
non-repeated ITEM in the ITEM first condition, however, replicates
Experiment I and is damaging to intersection retrieval.
To summarize, the results of Experiment II which are relevant to
questions about retrieval processes are generally consistent with those
of Experiment I. The notion of procedural retrieval is again most com-
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patible with these results> although po8siMiity o£ iask^
ference for TASK first conditions ig partlcularly ^ ^
position. The Gaining experiments, mong other things, provide
additional tests of such an effect. At this point we turn to discus-
sion of the structural issue of a multi-layered LTM which was of major
interest in Experiment II.
^trujLtur^^ By examining effecfcs Qf sequencing
and semantic TASKS, Experiment II provided a test of the hypothesis
that there are isolable lexical and semantic layers of LTM. The re-
sults which are most relevant to this issue are. that retrieving lexical
information was faster when preceded by a same rather than different
memory TASK, but retrieving semantic information was slower in an
analogous case (see Figure 11). That is, there is evidence of lexical
facilitation but semantic interference. Thus, Experiment II provides
general support for the multi-layer notion.
The results of this experiment, however, provide interpretive dif-
ficulty for both associative multi-layered models discussed in Chapter
IV (see Figure 5). First, both models predict lexical interference,
but lexical facilitation was observed in the present experiment. A
possible explanation for this effect which would not discredit the
associative models is that the observed lexical facilitation is a con-
sequence of the particular lexical TASKS used in this experiment.
Specifically, NAME codes may have a special status, causing them not
to compete with other lexical information. Alternatively, number of
SYLLABLES may be one type of information which must be computed, and
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therefore, does not compete with other lexical information. A second
difficulty for both associative models is that neither of them predict
TASK sequencing effects for trials with non-repeated ITEMS
. Yet, such
effects were observed in the present experiment.
An additional point is that the observed semantic interference is
equally compatible with direct and lexical access models. Recall that
semantic facilitation could be taken as counter evidence concerning
direct access models. Experiments III and IV provide additional tests
of this differential prediction.
To summarize, the results of the present experiment provide sup-
port for the general multi-layered LTM hypothesis, but are not natural-
ly accounted for by either of two associative multi-layered models
introduced in Chapter IV. However, one interpretive difficulty, the
presence of lexical facilitation, may be due to the specific TASKS
used in this experiment. This was tested in Experiment IV. On the
other hand, the presence of TASK sequencing effects for trials with
non-repeated ITEMS is more perplexing. It seems appropriate to post-
pone speculation about alternative multi-layer models until the reli-
ability of this effect is established with different, materials
. Ex-
periments III and IV both provide relevant data.
CHAPTER VII
EXPERIMENT III
Experiment III was designed with two main goals in mind. First,
additional data relevant to the issues considered in the previous
two experiments were desired. Although the results of Experiment II
were interpreted as supporting procedural retrieval, the possibility
of TASK interference could provide interpretive difficulties for that
notion. Thus, by using a set of TASKS which partially overlaps with
those of Experiment IT, Experiment III tests the reliability of a TASK
interference effect. In addition, the results of Experiment II sup-
ported the general multi-layered analysis of LTM, but provided inter-
pretive difficulties for two associative versions of that notion. The
present experiment provides additional data concerning the presence of
TASK sequencing effects for trials with non-repeated ITEMS ; such ef-
fects were observed in Experiment II, but were not predicted by associa-
tive multi-layered models. Further, the presence of semantic facilita-
tion would be compatible with lexical but not direct access associative
multi-layered models; while semantic interference was observed in
Experiment II, the present experiment will also provide additional data
relevant to this point.
The second major focus of Experiment III was to test a specific
assumption of many current network models cf LTM. Specifically, a num-
ber of theorists (e.g. Anderson and Bower, 1973; Fiksel and Bower, 1976;
Quillian, 1969; and Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman, 1972) postulate that
associations in the LTM network are labeled. An important question,
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see whether such an inference r.,1«ule is automatically applied whenever
there is an attempt to retrieve PROPERTY information, or only when
the retrieved PROPERTY is, in fact
, a property of the higher level
CATEGORY. This is because half of the PROPERTIES used in this experi-
ment hold only for their ITEM words, while the other half hold for
their CATEGORIES as well (see hierarchical representation of stimulus
material in Figure 12). Thus, whether and how the semantic TASK
sequencing effects depend upon which type of PROPERTY is associated
with the trial n and n-1 ITEMS
, should allow us to address the auto-
maticity question. Further, whether or not there is an overall dif-
ference in RT to retrieve these two types of PROPERTIES will be of
some interest because at least some interpretations of Collins and
Quillian's (1969) model predict that higher level PROPERTIES (STEM and
HEAD) should take longer to retrieve than more immediate PROPERTIES
(BARK and BEAK)
.
However, models which do not hold to the cognitive
economy principle would not predict such an effect because associative
strength between ITEMS and PROPERTIES was controlled (Conrad, 1971).
Method
The procedure was the same as described in Chapter IV.
Subjects. Forty-eight undergraduates at the University of Massa-
chusetts served as subjects; they received extra credit in their psy-
chology classes for participation.
Design.. For half of the subjects TASK words appeared above ITEM
ower
,
have paa, quite explicit abQut their ^^^^^
is restricted to appropriately labeled associations a A(Anderson and B„,
«73; Piksel and Bower, 1976)
. How they fflight
^
a Procedurally oriented LTK will be considered in the discussion of
this experiment.
Anderson (1975) tested the label specificity assumption for SUB-
JECT and OBJECT relations by orthogonally varying tbe number of proposi-
tions in which
. noun played^ Qf^^ ^ ^
restrict their search according to these relations, recognition RT to
sentences containing the experimental nouns should vary with number of
sentences in which the noun was a SUBJECT or OBJECT, depending upon
"hich role it plays in the test sentence. However, Anderson found
that recognition RT increased with both variables. This led him to
conclude that the associative network structure and competitive search
process arc valid, but that subjects do not restrict their search
according to available relational information. The present experiment
examines this same issue for the relational information generally
believed to be available in semantic, rather than episodic, memory.
Further, the experimental paradigm and sequential analyses employed in
Experiments I and II were used here. Specifically, the three semantic
TASKS CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and PROPERTY
, as well as the lexical NAME
TASK were included in Experiment III.
These TASKS have no special status in terms of procedural retriev-
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al and tha predictions summarized in Table 6 still hold. On the
other hand, either intersection or generate-test retrieval might lncor_
porate the assumption that search is restricted to associations which
meet the logical constraints of the present TASKS. Then the scope of
the competitive search and spreading activation should also be limited.
In terms of the present experimental paradigm this would lead to
predicting repetition effects only when both the ITEM and TASK are
repeated.
An issue which is of interest regardless of which class of re-
trieval is correct is what role the inference rule "a PROPERTY of a
subordinate CATEGORY is also a PROPERTY of the concept," plays in
retrieval. If this rule is applied when searching for PROPERTIES, as
Collins and Quillian (1969) and Fiksel and Bower (1976) believe it is,
certain patterns of TASK sequencing effects would be expected. While
a detailed presentation of these predictions will be postponed until
the relevant results have been reported, the basic idea is that if
the inference rule is applied, CATEGORY and PROPERTY, but not INSTANCE
trials, may involve searching common associations or using common LTM
procedures. Therefore, RT to retrieve CATEGORY information should vary
as a function of whether INSTANCE or PROPERTY information was just re-
trieved. Also, RT to retrieve PROPERTY information may vary as a func-
tion of whether INSTANCE or CATEGORY information was just retrieved.
On the other hand, RT to retrieve INSTANCE information should be inde-
pendent of which semantic TASK preceded it.
In addition, the materials chosen for Experiment III allow us to
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Figure 12
Hierarchy Represent,* ion of sti„ulus Katerlal(Fxperinent III) ' -en i
LIVING THING
BARK
p.ropeY.ty
BEAK
ins I
ELM DAISY PERCH CROW
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words on the video display (O(T-I) condition); for the other half of
the subjects the reverse was the case (O(I-T) condition). There was a
500 msec DELAY between onset of the first and second words for all
subjects,
—
erials
-
Subjects were familiarized with material used in this
experiment during the instruction' phase. They were asked to NAME the
ITEM word, tell what CATEGORY it was in, give an INSTANCE, or give a
PROPERTY of the ITEM concept. Four nouns (TREE, FLOWER, FISH, and
BIRD) served as ITEMS. See Figure 12 for a hierarchical representation
of this material.
Results
Error trials (machine and subject errors) and RTs less than 300
msec or greater than 2000 msec were excluded from all analyses. This
accounted for 12% of the trials, an uncomfortably large percentage.
However, closer inspection of errors indicated that they were randomly
distributed among conditions except that NAME trials had fewest errors.
Consistent with the previous two experiments, RT for the TASK first
condition was significantly faster than for the ITEM first condition
(mean RTs equal 953 and 1083 msec for O(T-I) and 0(I-T) respectively)
(F(l,46)=13.09, £ <.01).
Stimulus material
. Mean RT for each ITEM by TASK and ORDER by
TASK condition is presented in Table 18. There was significant vari-
ability among TASKS (mean RTs equal 681, 1102, 1156, and 1133 msec for
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Table 18
for ITEM by TASK and ORDER by TASK Conditi
(Experiment. Ill)
ITEM NAME CATEGORY INSTANCE PROPERTY
FLOWER FLOWFR
695
PT AWT
1108
DAISY
1078
STEM
1133
TREE TREE
673
PLANT
1135
ELM
1086
BARK
1104
FISH FISH
677
ANIMAL
1084
PERCH
1164
HEAD
1131
BIRD BIRD
678
ANIMAL
1080
CROW
1298
BEAK
1162
TASK FIRST 588 1040 1089 1096
ITEM FIRST 774 1163 1224 1170
MEAN 681 1102 1156 1133
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NAME, CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and PROPERTY trials respectively) <F (3,138)
=
377.89, £ < .01). Further analysis of these means (Bonferroni t tests,
EW<.01) indicated that NAME trials are significantly faster than
CATEGORY, INSTANCE
,
or PROPERTY trials, but none of these last three
TASKS differ from each other. Further, a significant interaction
between ORDER and TASK (F(3,138)=3. 99
, £ < .01) can be attributed to
the difference between NAME and other TASKS being 75 msec larger for
the O(T-I) than the O(I-T) ORDER.
In addition, there was significant variability among ITEMS (F(3,
138) =16. 41, p_< .01). Further, the TASK differences varied over ITEMS
(F (9, 414) =18. 52, p< .01, for the TASK by ITEM interaction), although
NAME trials weie consistently fastest. A question of interest is
whether this interaction can be attributed, at least in part, to
PROPERTY times being faster for ITEMS with immediate (TREE and BIRD)
rather than higher level (FLOWER and FISH) PROPERTIES (see Figure 12).
The ansiv'er is negative since mean RTs for the two sets of PROPERTY
trials are identical (1132 msec). Thus, Experiment III provides no
support for the cognitive economy hypothesis. Finally, the ORDER
effect was stable over ITEMS (F(3 , 138)=1. 54
, p_ >.05, for the ORDER by
ITEMS interaction), as was the TASK by ORDER interaction (F(9,414)<
1.00, for the three-way interaction).
Repetition contrasts
. Mean RTs for the five repetition trial
types (see Table 2) are presented for TASK by ORDER conditions in
Table 19. Differences among these trial types will again be con-
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Table 19
Mean RT for Five Trial Types for ORDER by TASK Conditions
(Experiment III)
NAME CATEGORY INSTANCE PROPERTY MEAN
RT(1) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
582
776
1056
1181
1092
1223
1092
1180
955
1090
MEAN 679 1118 1157 1136 1023
RT(2) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
579
787
1056
1176
1080
1247
1091
1186
952
1099
MEAN 683 1116 1163 1139 1025
RT(3) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
603
758
989
1130
1080
1195
1090
1170
940
1063
MEAN 630 1060 1137 1130 1002
RT(4) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
545
679
899
980
905
1053
996
957
836
917
MEAN 612 939 979 977 877
RT(5) O(T-I)
O(I-T)
MEAN
944
1110
1027
944
1110
1027
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sidered In terms of repetition contrasts (see Table 3) presented
along with F-tests in Table 20. As in Experiment II, numbers in paren-
theses below Contrasts 1 4 flnri 7 ^a v j
' ^ Md 7 are based on trials which can be
directly compared to other contrasts. Also, Bonferroni t-tests (EW <
.05) were again used to further assess these contrasts when ORDER, TASK,
or their interaction significantly affected them.
ITEM repetition: Contrast 1 which examines the effect of ITEM
repetition in the context of a non-repeated TASK was non-significant
(see Table 20). Further, while ORDER had a significant effect on this
contrast, neither the facilitation observed in the TASK first condition,
nor the interference observed in the ITEM first condition proved sig-
nificant by simple effects tests. Contrast 2, on the other hand, tested
the effect of ITEM repetition in the context of repeated TASK, and in-
dicated that there was facilitation for CATEGORY trials, the only TASK
where computation of Contrast 2 was possible. Further, although this
effect was three times larger in the O(I-T) than O(T-I) condition, the
ORDER difference was not statistically reliable,
RESPONSE repetition: Contrast 3, also computable only for CATE-
GORY trials, indicated a RESPONSE facilitation effect which did not
vary with ORDER.
TASK repetition: Contrasts 4 and 5 examine the effect of TASK
repetition in the context of a non-repeated ITEM. Both of these con-
trasts indicated Significant TASK facilitation which did not systema-
tically vary with ORDER. In the case of Contrast 4, where the effect
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Table 20
Repetition Contrasts for ORDER by TASK Conditions
(Experiment III)
NAME
°T-I°I
-T
CATEGORY
°T-I°I-T
in oi i_,r*
°T-I°I-T
rkUrcKl
Y
0 0
T-I I-T
MEAN
0 0
T-I T-T
GRAND
MEAN
Contrast 1 (RT(1)-RT(2))
Contrast F(l, A6)<1.00
Task F(3,138)<1.00
Order F(l, 46)=7. 20*
Task x Order F(3,138)<1,00
? "11 0 5 12
-2A 1 -6 A - 9
(0)( (5)
- 3
(2)
Contrast 2 (RT(5)-RT(A))
Contrast F(l, A6)=8.02**
U - Qer Hi, 4o)=1.93 A5 130 «o 1JU 0/
Contrast 3 (RT(3)-RT(5))
Contrast F(l, A6)=2.00
Order F(l, A6)<1.00
-— A6 20 A6 20 33
Contrast A (RT (l)-RT (3)
)
Contrast F(l, A6)=10.26**
Task F(3,138)=A.A1**
Order F(l, A6)<1.00
Task x Order F(3,138)<1.00
-21 18 66 52 12 28 2 10 15 27
(66) (52)
21
(59)
Contrast 5 (RT(l)-RT(5)-35)
Contrast F(l, A6)=5.15**
Order F(l, A6)<1.00 77 36 77 36 57
Contrast 6 ( (RT(2)-RT (A) )- (RT (3)-RT(5) )
)
Contrast F(l, 46)=13.18**
Order F(l, 46)<1.00 111 177 111 177 1AA
Contrast 7 (RT (2)-RT (A)
-35)
Contrast F(l, 46)=45.08**
Task F(3,138)=5.20**
Order F(l, A6)=3.86
Task x Order F(3,138)=l. 21
- 1 73 122 1*62 1A0 158 60 19A 80 1A7
(122) (162)
114
(142)
Contrast 8 (Additivity)
Contrast F(l, A6)=5.35**
Order F(l, 46)=1.20 -A5 -126 -A5 -126 -85
*£ < . 05
**p < .01
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could be measured for all TASKS
, differences were detected among TASKS.
Specifically, facilitation for CATEGORY trials was greater than for any
of the other TASKS which did not differ from each other.
Contrasts 6 and 7 examine the effect of TASK repetition in the
context of repeated ITEMS. Again, both of these contrasts indicated
significant TASK facilitation which did not systematically vary with
ORDER. Also, in Contrast 7, computed for all TASKS, a significant
difference among TASKS was detected. Specifically, facilitation for
NAME trials was smaller than for other TASKS which did not differ.
Additivity contrast: Consistent with Experiments I and II, a
significant violation of additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition effects
which did not vary with ORDER was found.
TASK sequencing. A test of the multi-layered LTM hypothesis is
available in the present experiment by considering whether RT to one
of the semantic TASKS (i.e. CATEGORY, INSTANCE, or PROPERTY) differs
as a function of whether it was preceded by a NAME TASK or a different
semantic TASK. Table 21, analogous to Table 17 presented in the con-
text of Experiment II, provides mean trial n RTs and F-tests as a
function of TASK on trials n and n-1 for trials with repeated and non-
repeated ITEMS. While there was no systematic effect of TASK on trial
n-1, the significant interaction between TASKS on trials n and n-1
suggests that further analysis is warranted. Examining Table 21
column by column, but ignoring the diagonal cells which represent
TASK repetition trials, indicates effects consistent with those of
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Table 21
Mean RT as a Function of TASK on Trials n and n-1(Experiment III)
TRIAL n- 1 TRT AT n
TASK ITEM NAME CATEGORY INSTANCE PROPERTY
NAME DIFF
SAME
686
616
1088
1119
1151
1134
1137
1103
MEAN 651 1104 1142 1120
CATEGORY
SAME
DO/
673
1056
947
1177
1173
1172
1192
MEAN 680 1001 1175 1182
INSTANCE DIFF
SAME
682
697
1154
1101
1140
982
1116
1134
MEAN 690 1127 1061 1125
PROPERTY DIFF
SAME
686
706
1132
1152
1146
1180
1134
988
MEAN 696 1142 1163 1061
MEAN DIFF
SAME
685
673
1107
1080
1153
1118
1140
1104
GRAND MEAN 679 1094 1135 1122
Task(n)
Task(n-l)
Item
Task(n) x Task(n-l)
Task(n) x Item
Task (n-1) x Item
Task(n) x Task(n-l) x Item
F(3,138)=381.74**
F(3,138)= 1.56
F(l, 46)= 28.59**
F(9,414)= 24.83**
F(3,138)= 1.35
F(3,138)= 1.63
F(9,414)= 15.76**
*p_ < . 05
**p_ < . 01
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Experiment II. Specifically, each of the semantic TASKS is fastest
when preceded by a NAME trial.
Figure 13 presents mean RTs for semantic trials preceded by other
semantic TASKS or the NAME TASK with either repeated or non-repeated
ITEMS, An analysis of variance of these means indicates that RT was
significantly longer for semantic trials preceded by other semantic
TASKS rather than the lexical TASK (mean RTs equal 1152 and 1122 msec
for semantic and lexical trial n-1 TASKS respectively) (F (1,46) =17. 25,
£ <-01). Further, there was neither a main (F(l,46)< 1.00), nor inter-
action (F(l,46) <1.00) effect attributable to ITEM repetition. However
consistent with Experiment II, semantic interference is non-significant
ly greater for trials with repeated rather than non-repeated ITEMS
(mean interference equal 36 and 25 msec for same and different ITEM
trials respectively)
.
Label specificity
. Up to this point we have drawn two major
conclusions about TASK sequencing, both cf which can be seen in Table
21. First, RT is fastest when the TASK has been repeated, regardless
of which TASK is considered (i.e. the diagonal cells of Table 21 have
the fastest RTs). The present position is that this is due to facili-
tation of LTM procedures used to retrieve classes of information.
Second, TASK repetition aside, RT to retrieve semantic information is
faster when preceded by a lexical than by a different semantic TASK
(i.e. with the exception of diagonal cells, the first row of Table 21
has the fastest RTs) . The present position is that this is due to
interference restricted to the semantic layer of LTM. The question
Figure. 13
TASK Sequencing Effects
(Experiment III)
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of present interest is whether there is additional systematic
ability associated with the specific sequence of semantic TASKS. As
mentioned in the introduction to this experiment, the presence of such
effects could lead to inferences about label directed search and/or a
hierarchy of LTM procedures.
Table 22 presents mean RTs and F-tests for CATEGORY, INSTANCE,
and PROPERTY trials as a function of TASK on the preceding trial (i.e.
one of two alternative semantic TASKS), and relationship between ITEMS
in the pair of successive trials (i.e. different, same CATEGORY, or
same ITEM)
.
Consistent with the TASK sequencing analyses, variance
attributable to the between subjects ORDER manipulation was partitioned
from this analysis; however, since that variable is not relevant to
the present questions, means are averaged over ORDER). As can be seen
from Table 22, RT to CATEGORY trials was significantly faster when pre-
ceded by an INSTANCE rather than a PROPERTY trial if the ITEM was re-
peated, but the reverse was true if the preceding ITEM was the other
ITEM from the same CATEGORY. RT to INSTANCE trials, on the other hand,
was not significantly affected by TASK on the preceding trial. The
trends, however, mirrored the significant differences observed for
CATEGORY trials. Specifically, INSTANCE trials were faster when pre-
ceded by a CATEGORY rather than a PROPERTY trial if the ITEM was re-
peated, but the reverse was true in other conditions. Finally, RT to
PROPERTY trials was faster when preceded by an INSTANCE rather than a
CATEGORY trial, an effect which was significant when the ITEM was
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Table 22
Mean RT for Label Specificity Test
(Experiment III)
CATEGORY TRIAL
TRIAL n-1 Diff category Same category Same ITEM
INSTANCE 1149 1183 1101
PROPERTY 1137 1115 1152
P(l,46) <1.00 =6.46* =4.84
INSTANCE TRIAL
TRIAL n-1 Diff category Same category Same ITEM
CATEGORY 1176 1175 1173
PROPERTY 1151 1155 1180
F(l,46) = 1.06 <1.00 <1.00
PROPERTY TRIAL
TRIAL n-1 Diff category Same category Same ITEM
CATEGORY 1174 1156 1192
.
INSTANCE 1110 1131 1134
F(l,46) =9.68** =1.08 =5,96*
*2 <.05
**£ <.01
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repeated or came from a different CATEGORY.
As indicated in the introduction, a number of LTM theories pre-
dict systematic differences in these TASK sequencing effects for
trials involving ITEMS with immediate versus higher level PROPERTIES
(e.g. TREE-BARK and BIRD-BEAK are immediate ITEM-PROPERTY pairs, while
FLOWER-STEM and FISH-HEAD are higher level ITEM-PROPERTY pairs; see
Figure 12). Therefore, the present analyses were carried out with the
additional variable of level of trial n ITEM. Note that for same
CATEGORY and same ITEM trials, level of trial n-1 ITEM is totally con-
founded with level of trial n ITEM since there were only two ITEMS from
each CATEGORY. There were neither main nor interaction effects attrib-
utable to this manipulation. This fact, paired with the fact that an
average of three subjects were eliminated from each of these finer
grain analyses due to missing observations, led to presenting means and
F- tests from the grosser analysis.
Discussion
Experiment III re-addressed the issues .of procedural retrieval
and of a multi-layered LTM for which some support was found in the
previous experiments. The question of what special role CATEGORY,
INSTANCE, and PROPERTY relations play in retrieving information from
LTM was also addressed. The results relevant to each of these issues
will be summarized and interpreted in turn.
Processing questions
. As in previous experiments, there is a
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large speed advantage for TASK first subjects. Also consistent with
previous experiments is the presence of repetition effects attributable
to the retrieval stage. First, there is no significant effect of ITEM
repetition in the context of a non-repeated TASK. However, the sig-
nificant effect of ORDER on Contrast 1 which is negative for ITEM first
subjects is again suggestive of retrieval interference. In the context
of a repeated TASK there is ITEM facilitation; its presence in the
ITEM first condition (at a 500 msec DELAY) must be interpreted as a
retrieval phenomenon. Second, RESPONSE facilitation, measured only
for CATEGORY trials, is also present in Experiment III. However, there
is no compelling reason to assign this effect to the retrieval, rather
than response execution stage. Third, both in the context of repeated
and non-repeated ITEMS, the conditions of Experiment III produced a
large TASK facilitation effect. That this effect varied over TASKS
but not ORDER (and was, therefore, present in a TASK first-long DELAY
condition) indicates that the retrieval stage was facilitated. Addi-
tional support for this claim is that TASK facilitation for ITEM first
subjects was larger than ITEM facilitation for TASK first subjects
(see Table 20). Finally, the non-additivity of ITEM and TASK repeti-
tion also supports the contention that both ITEM and TASK repetition
influence retrieval.
Referring to Table 6, we see that Experiment III, like Experiments
I and II, supports procedural, but not intersection or generate-test
retrieval. That is, the speed advantage for TASK first subjects ar-
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Sues generate-test retrieval. Further> ^^ ^^
as TASK facility ln the context o£ non.repeated
^^^^
intersection MtrUwl
. 0n the Qther hand> both of these findi^ s ^
consistent with procedural retrieval, and ITEM and RESPONSE repetition
effects are equally compatible with all models.
Structural^ Experiment III also re-examined the multi-
layered LTM hypothesis. The major relevant result is that semantic
trials again took longer when preceded by other semantic TASKS than by
the NAME (lexical) TASK. That is, the semantic interference effect
observed in Experiment II was replicated, and thus additional support
for the general multi-layered notion was obtained. This particular
finding is equally compatible with direct and lexical access models.
However, that semantic interference was observed for trials with non-
repeated, as well as repeated ITEMS, is not immediately incorporated
by either of these associative multi-layered LTM models. Since this
result was also observed in Experiment II, it is reasonable to conclude
that the associative multi-layered models are in need of modification.
Such a modification will be introduced here and will be tested in Experi-
ment IV. An alternative procedurally oriented multi-layered model will
be suggested in the context of Experiment IV.
One possible modification of associative multi-layered models
assumes that there is general priming following lexical TASKS which
causes all trials following them to be fast relative to trials following
semantic TASKS. This may be due to the use of verbal stimuli and RES-
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PONSES in the present experiments (c.f. Collins and Loftus, 1975).
That is, if lexical memory is used ln encoding ^^^^^
tion stages of processing, it is likely to be in a highly primed state
Since this should not be true if picture stimuli Qr button^ ^
PONSES were used, this hypothesis could be directly tested. An alter-
native explanation of general priming following lexical trials follows
from some limited capacity arguments (c.f. Colker, 1975). The notion
is that trials following fast trials should also be fast, independent
of other considerations. Then, since lexical trials were, on the
average fast,, any trials following them should also be fast, regardless
of structural considerations. While either or both of these mechanisms
may be operating, the present question is whether they are adequate
to explain TASK sequencing effects.
Associative multi-layered models with either of the modifications
make the following two predictions concerning semantic effects. First,
the prediction of semantic interference is strong for these models
because semantic trials should be fast following lexical trials as a
result of lexical priming, but should be slow following semantic trials
as a result of semantic search interference. Consistent with this pre-
diction, semantic interference was observed in both Experiments' II and
III. Second, since the search interference should only be operative
for trials with repeated ITEMS, semantic interference should be more
marked in that case than for trials with non-repeated ITEMS. Trends
from Experiments II and III are also consistent with this prediction
but failed to reach statistical significance (mean semantic interfer-
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ence equals 34 and 11 msec for trials with same and different ITEMS
respectively in Experiment II, and 36 and 25 msec for trials with same
and different ITEMS respectively in Experiment III). Both of these
predictions will be tested again in Experiment IV.
Either of the two modifications of associative multi-layered
models may also explain a second result of Experiment II which pro-
vided interpretive difficulty for the original associative multi-
layered models. That is, while these models predicted lexical inter-
ference (see Figure 5), lexical facilitation was observed. However,
if the general facilitation following lexical trials predicted by these
modifications exceeds lexical search interference, the overall effect
may be facilitatory
.
Further, since the search interference should
only be manifest in trials with repeated ITEMS, a corollary to this
argument is that lexical facilitation should be more marked for trials
with non-repeated than repeated ITEMS. Again, the trend from Experiment
II was in the correct direction, but failed to reach statistical sig-
nificance (mean lexical facilitation equals 12 and 20 msec for trials
with same and different ITEMS respectively)
; Experiment IV will also
provide additional data on this point.
To summarize, while the general notion of a multi-layered LTM was
again supported in this experiment, the purely associative models in-
troduced in Chapter IV proved to be inadequate. Modifications of these
models which are consistent with the results of Experiments II and III
were introduced, and predictions which will be more stringently tested
in Experiment IV were derived.
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I-kelj^ficUv^^ Experiment III ai so investigated
semantic TASK sequencing effects more closely. Specifically, whether
and how labeled associations and the inference rule that "PROPERTIES
of CATEGORIES are also PROPERTIES of ITEMS" are utilized in retrieving
Information from LTM was of interest. The notion of label specific
search, as might be incorporated into an intersection (c.f. Fiksel and
Bower, 1976) or generate-test (c.f. Anderson and Bower, 1973) retrieval
model is resectable. In addition to the lack of support for intersec-
tion and generate-test retrieval provided by the ORDER main effect and
the repetition contrasts (see discussion above), three aspects of the
present data are especially inconsistent with label directed versions
of these models.
First, and weakest is that while the general associative retrieval
models predict ITEM interference in the context of non-repeated TASKS
(see Table 6)
,
there should be no such effect in this experiment since
it used the TASKS assumed to restrict search. While the status of such
interference is by no means established, its persistence over three
experiments in size and magnitude in the ITEM first conditions where
it would not be masked by encoding facilitation is impressive. Par-
ticularly relevant here is that it is no less evident in the present
experiment than it was in Experiments I or II.
Second, while the general version of generate-test retrieval pre-
dicts TASK facilitation in the context of non-repeated ITEMS, a label
directed version does not predict such a result for the present experi-
ment. This is because the present TASKS, which are presumably the
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labels of semantic memory, would affect the generate rather than the
test sub-stage of retrieval. Since TASK facilitation for generate-
test retrieval was predicted on the basis of priming the test sub-
stage, no such effect is predicted for the present TASKS
. Likewise,
no version of intersection retrieval predicts TASK facilitation in the
context of a non-repeated ITEM (see Table 6) ; yet such a result is
clearly present in Experiment III.
The third argument against label directed versions of intersection
and generate-test retrieval is based on predictions they make about
application of the inference rule. These predictions are summarized
in Table 23. A distinction between models with automatic versus selec-
tive application of the inference rule should be drawn. In the former
case, anytime a PROPERTY retrieval is initiated, pathways to the
CATEGORY of the ITEM are activated in attempt to find PROPERTIES of it.
In the latter case, on the other hand, pathways to the ITEM's CATEGORY
are only activated when the PROPERTY which was retrieved holds for the
CATEGORY. The predictions in Table 23 are identical for both classes
of models except in cells with > ; in these cases automatic models
predict inequality while selective models predict equality. Also,
while predictions have been presented for both immediate and higher
level properties, the least conservative test of these models for the
present experiments treats all PROPERTIES as immediate. Empirically,
this assumption seems warranted since there was no main effect for
the attempted manipulation of this variable. Further, since in this
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Table 23
Predictions for Label Specificity Test
CATEGORY TRIAL
ITEM n Diff Category
, Same Category Same ITEM
Immediate I = P
Higher I = P
INSTANCE TRIAL
ITEM n Diff Category Same Category Same ITEM
I > P
I > P
I > P
I > P
Immediate C=P C=P C=P
Higher C=P C=P C=P
PROPERTY TRIAL
ITEM n Diff Category Same Category Same ITEM
Immediate C = I c il I C > I
Higher C = I C<I C < I
C=CATEGORY
I=INSTANCE
P=PROPERTY
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experiment subjects repeatedly retrieved the same single PROPERTY to
each ITEM, it is reasonable to believe that they became "functionally
immediate" PROPERTIES for the course of the experiment. Given these
qualifications, there are four classes of predictions which will be
considered
.
First, none of the associative retrieval models predicts any RT
difference for INSTANCE retrieval because the inference rule does not
involve INSTANCE information. The data confirm this prediction. Se-
cond, none of the models predict any RT differences for trials in which
the ITEM on the preceding trial was from a different CATEGORY. This
is because there are no shared, relevant associations. The data for
CATEGORY and INSTANCE trials confirm this prediction, but PROPERTY
trials do not.
Predictions about retrieving CATEGORY and PROPERTY information
following trials with related ITEMS require application of the com-
petitive search and spreading activation assumptions. In the case of
same CATEGORY trials, weak predictions are derived on the basis of
relevant associations which may be in a high strength state due to
spreading activation during application of the inference rule. In
the case of same ITEM trials, stronger predictions are derived on the
basis of associations shared on trials n and n-1 due to application
of the inference rule.
The third class of predictions then, involve CATEGORY trials. RT
should be faster when preceded by a PROPERTY than INSTANCE trial be-
cause in trying to retrieve a PROPERTY on trial n-1, CATEGORY associa-
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tions may have been activated. They could then be retrieved more
rapidly on trial n. This prediction is verified for same CATEGORY
trials, but the opposite result was found for same ITEM trials. Final-
ly, the fourth class of predictions concerns PROPERTY trials. Here,
if the ITEM is repeated or from the. same CATEGORY, interference may be
predicted. This is because recently activated CATEGORY associations
divert search from the immediate PROPERTY. The data confirm this pre-
diction. In summary, while several predictions about how label directed
associative retrieval models could incorporate the inference rule that
"PROPERTIES of the CATEGORY of an ITEM are also PROPERTIES of the ITEM"
were confirmed, two serious violations of these predictions add to
mounting evidence against such models.
The TASK that remains, then, is to establish how a procedurally
oriented LTM could accomodate the semantic TASK sequencing effects
summarized in Table 22. Clearly such speculation is post hoc and
requires further validation. Nevertheless, the present suggestion is
that it is reasonable to view the semantic TASKS of the present ex-
periment as three important LTM procedures which operate in an un-
labeled LTM network. 1 Then the present data, as well as a priori
knowledge about the relationships among CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and. PROPER-
While it has often been argued that only labeled networks can
avoid many fatal flaws of associative theories, Anderson and Bower
(1973) have demonstrated how an unlabeled network can be generated
equivalent to any labeled network. Further, they convincingly argued
that the critical flaw in associative theories is due to their usual,
but not necessary, acceptance of what Anderson and Bower call the
Terminal Meta Postulate.
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TV information can be used t0 develop an hypothesls^ ^^
of a procedural oriented LTM capable of retrieving these types of
information.
Such an hypothesis is presented pictorially in Figure 14. The
top panel of this figure emphasi 2 es that CATEGORY and INSTANCE TASKS
are, in some sense, inverses of each other. Thus, in terms of the pro-
cedural conceptualization, they may share some_ computational
units. The idea is that if this co^on sub-procedure is tuned for
the appropriate ITEM from the preceding trial, „e should expect facili-
tation; otherwise there may be interference. Such a notion predicts
that both CATEGORY and INSTANCE TASKS should facilitate each other in
the context of a repeated ITEM, but may interfere otherwise. Since
there are only two trial n-1 semantic TASKS in the present exPeriment,
we cannot unambiguously attribute RT differences to interference for
one TASK rather than facilitation for the other TASK; at least four
semantic TASKS would be required for such an analysis. Nevertheless,
with respect to the present speculation about CATEGORY and INSTANCE
procedures, it is interesting to note from Table 22 that all six of
the relevant comparisons are in the predicted direction, although only
two of them are statistically reliable.
A procedural explanation of PROPERTY trials also seems reasonable.
While it is premature to precisely define LTM procedures, it nay be
useful to think of them as packages of dynamically ordered heuristics
which may be applied in serial or parallel. The PROPERTY procedure
then would include, as one of its heuristics, the inference rule that
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Figure 14
Procedural Eepresentat ion of TASKS
(Experiment III)
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the PROPERTY of a CATEGORY is also a PROPERTY of the concept, and
would, on occasion, call the CATEGORY procedure in the process of
retrieving PROPERTY information. The present suggestion is that such
a strategy is inefficient for this experiment which involves repeatedly
retrieving the same PROPERTY for each ITEM. However, if the CATEGORY
procedure is in a high strength state, it may divert the PROPERTY pro-
cedure to use that heuristic. In a serial model this would directly
consume time; in a parallel model it would directly consume processing
capacity, and hence indirectly time. Either way* it leads to the
prediction that PROPERTY trials preceded by CATEGORY trials should
be slow regardless cf whether or not the ITEM was repeated. The three
relevant comparisons are all consistent with this prediction, and two
of them were found to be statistically reliable. It thus seems that
in addition to the general support for procedural retrieval provided
by the ORDER main effect and the repetition contrasts, fine grain
semantic TASK sequencing effects may also be incorporated by this
notion. The next experiment will consider the structural question
of a multi-layered network further, and its results will also be
interpreted in terms of a procedurally oriented LTM.
CHAPTER VIII
EXPERIMENT IV
The previous three experiments generally supported the notions of
isolable LTM procedures and a multi-layered LTM. A further examination
of these issues is provided by the present experiment. Of special in-
terest are the findings of Experiments II and III which provided inter-
pretive difficulty for associative multi-layered models. First, whether
the lexical facilitation observed in Experiment II is a general phenome-
non, or is specific to the NAME and SYLLABLE TASKS was explored by using
two different lexical TASKS in the present experiment. Second, to
account for the reliable TASK sequencing effects for trials with non-
repeated ITEMS, associative models required the modifying assumption
that there is facilitation following lexical trials. This leads to the
following predictions which will be tested in the present experiment:
(1) all sets of lexical TASKS should lead to lexical facilitation, and
this effect should be less marked for trials with repeated than non-
repeated ITEMS; and, (2) all sets of semantic TASKS should lead to
semantic interference, and this effect should be more marked for trials
with repeated than non-repeated ITEMS.
The two lexical TASKS used in the present experiment required sub-
jects to give the FIRST or SECOND syllable of two syllable ITEM Words;
the two semantic TASKS required subjects to give the COLOR or relative
SIZE of ITEM concepts. The logic for choosing these particular TASKS
was to see whether conditions could be found in which lexical inter-
ference and/or semantic facilitation would be obtained. The two lexical
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responses associated with each ITEM were of the same type and might be
represented in a way which would cause interference which might not be
expected between NAME and number of SYLLABLES information. Also, both
COLOR and SIZE might be obtained from a "generated image" of the con-
cept; then, having recently generated the image, deriving new informa-
tion may be faster. Such a notion would be consistent with the idea of
a hierarchy of LTM procedures, an idea which will be further considered
in the discussion section.
Method
The procedure was the same as described in Chapter IV.
Subjects. Forty-eight undergraduates at the University of Massa-
chusetts served as subjects; they received extra credit in their psy-
chology classes for participation.
Design_. For half the subjects TASK words appeared above ITEM words
on the video display (O(T-I) condition); for the other half of the sub-
jects the reverse was the case (O(I-T) condition). There was a 500 msec
DELAY between onset of the first and second words for all subjects.
Materials
.
Subjects were familiarized with material used in this
experiment during the instruction phase. They were asked to give the
FIRST or SECOND syllable of ITEM words (lexical TASKS) or the COLOR or
relative SIZE of the ITEM concepts (semantic TASKS). Four two syllable,
color-specific nouns (PASTURE, DOLLAR, TIGER, and CARROT) served as
ITEMS. Each ITEM was uniquely defined by the conjunction of its COLOR
and relative SIZE. However, half of the ITEMS required each of the two
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COLOR and SIZE RESPONSES.
Results
Error trials (machine and subject errors) and RTs less than 300
msec or greater than 2000 msec were excluded from all analyses; this
accounted for 6% of the trials. Consistent with all previous experi-
ments, RTs from the TASK first condition were significantly faster than
those from the ITEM first condition (mean RTs equal 636 and 839 msec for
O(T-I) and 0(I-T) respectively) (F (1,46) =45. 50, £<.01).
Stimulus material. Mean RT for each ITEM by TASK and ORDER by TASK
condition is presented in Table 24. There was significant variability
among TASKS (mean RTs equal 633, 692, 796, and 931 msec for FIRST,
SECOND, COLOR, and SIZE trials respectively) (F(3,138)=186.00,
_p_<.01.
Further analysis of these means (Bonferroni t tests, EW <.01) indicated
that all TASK types differ from each other. Further, in this experiment,
the TASK effect was consistent over ORDERS (F(3,138) <1.00, for the TASK
by ORDER interaction).
In addition, there was significant variability among ITEMS (F(3,
138) =7. 26, p_<.01), but as with TASKS, this was not influenced by ORDER
(F(3,138) <1.00, for the ORDER by ITEMS interaction). There were, how-
ever, differences in the TASK effects over ITEMS (F(9 ,414)=21. 53, £<.01)
Repetition contrasts. Mean RTs for the five repetition trial types
(see Table 2) are presented for TASK by ORDER conditions in Table 25.
Differences among these trial types will be considered in terms of repe-
tition contrasts (see Table 3) presented with F-tests in Table 26.
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Table 24
Mean RT for ITEM by TASK and ORDER by TASK Conditi
(Experiment IV)
ITEM FIRST SECOND COLOR SIZE
PASTURE PAS
635
TURE
724
GREEN
784
LARGE
782
DOLLAR DOL
616
LAR
687
GREEN
817
SMALL
871
TIGER TI
624
GER
686
ORANGE
808
LARGE
814
CARROT CAR
666
ROT
762
ORANGE
776
SMALL
856
TASK FIRST 530 595 694 726
ITEM FIRST 735 789 • 898 935
MEAN 633 692 796 831 •
Table 25
Mean RT for Five Trial Types for ORDER by TASK Conditions(Experiment IV)
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Table 26
Repetition Contrasts for ORDER by TASK Conditions
(Experirient IV)
Sontrasc 1 (RT(1)-RT(21)
Contrast F '(l, 46)=1.39
Task
* F{3,138)<1.00
0rder F(l, 46)=7.20*
Task x Order F(3,138)<1. 00
Contrast 2 (KT(5)-RT(4)
)
Contrast F (l, 46)=20.71**
Task F(l, 46)=6.84*
0rcier F(l, 46)-1.14
Task x Order F(l, 46)=1.43
FIRST
°T-I°I-T
SECOND
0 0
T-I I-T
SIZE
Vl°I-T
Contrast 3 (RT(3)-RT(5))
Contrast f(1, 46)=9.67**
Task F(l, 46)<1.00
0rder F(l, 46)<1.00
Task x Order F(l, 46)<1.00
-RT(3))
rex, 46)<X.OO
F(3,138)=3.61*
F(l, 46)=9.39**
F(3,X38)-X.96
RT(5)-35)
F(X, 46)<1.00
F(X, 46)=4.93*
F(X, 46)=2.58
F(X, 46)<1.00
Contrast 4 (RT(1)-
Contrast
Task
Order
Task x Order
Contrast 5 (RT(1)-
Contrast
Task
Order
Task x Orde."
Contrast 6 ( (RT (2)-RT (4) )- (RT (3)-RT(5) )
)
Contrast F(l, 46)=16.20**
Task F (l, 46)=67.89**
0r<ler P(X, 46)=7.91**
Task x Order F(l, 46)<1.00
Contrast 1 (RT(2)-RT(4)-35)
Contrast F (l, 46)=30.92**
Task F(3,138)=3.10*
0rdfir P(X, 46)=19.09**
Task x Order F(3,138)=2.08
18 -10 11 -12 24
28 24 70 136
61 79-1-3
39 3 -10 -30 1 20
Contrast 8 (Additivity)
Contrast F(l, 46)=14.78**
Task F(l, 46)=3.40
Order F(l, 46)=3.19
Task x Order F(l, 46)=1.07
15 41
4 51 -35 -19
-12 43 48 160
6 43 14 87 12 12.1
MEAN
Vl°I-T
14-5
(17) (- 8)
50 80
- 17 -36
-47 -140
30 38
8 14
(-14) (14)
-19 16
18 102 60
9 73
(13) (104)
•32
-60
*£ <.05
**£ <.01
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Since RT (5) was not available £or FIRST or SECOND TASK types, means
for Contrasts 1, 4, and 7 are again presented both Including and ex-
clnding these TASKS so they may be directly cohered to other contrasts.
Also, as in previous experiments, significant ORDER, TASK, or ORDER by
TASK effects on any repetition contrast were further analyzed using
Bonferroni t tests (EW <.05). Each class of contrast will now be con-
sidered.
ITEM repetition: Contrast 1 examines the effect of ITEM repeti-
tion in the context of a non-repeated TASK. While there is no overall
effect, simple effects analysis of the significant ORDER effect (see
Table 26), indicate that there is ITEM facilitation for O(T-I) but no
effect for O(I-T). Contrast 2, which examines the effect of ITEM repe-
tition in the context of a repeated TASK is significantly greater than
zero (see Table 26). Further, while there is more facilitation for ITEM
first than TASK first conditions, as evidenced by the significant ORDER
effect, simple effects tests indicate that both conditions are facili-
tated by ITEM repetition.
RESPONSE repetition: Contrast 3 which examines RESPONSE repetition
effects indicates that there is significant RESPONSE facilitation which
does not significantly vary with ORDER or TASK (see Table 26).
TASK repetition: Contrasts 4 and 5 examine the effect of TASK
repetition in the context of a non-repeated ITEM. Neither of these con-
trasts was significantly different from zero (see Table 26). However,
further analysis of the ORDER effect present: in Contrast 4 indicates
that there is TASK facilitation for the ITEM first condition. In addi-
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tion, the. TASK repetition effect measured by these contrasts varied
over TASKS, although only the simple effects test for FIRST trials
was significant.
Contrasts 6 and 7 examine the effect of TASK repetition in the con-
text of a repeated ITEM. Both of these contrasts indicated significant
TASK facilitation which was only statistically reliable in the ITEM
first condition (see Table 26). In addition, the magnitude of these
contrasts varied over TASKS. Specifically, in Contrast 6 facilitation
was larger for SIZE than COLOR trials, while in Contrast 7 these TASKS
did not differ but were both larger than FIRST and SECOND trials which
did not differ.
Additivity contrast: Consistent with all previous experiments the
significance of Contrast 8 attests to a violation of the assumption of
additivity of ITEM and TASK repetition effects which did not vary with
ORDER or TASKS (see Table 26).
TASK sequencing. A major purpose of the present experiment was to
see whether the lexical facilitation observed in Experiment II, and the
semantic interference observed in Experiments II and III would be repli-
cated with this different set of TASKS. Table 27 presents mean trial n
RTs and F-tests as a function of TASK on trials n and n-1 for trials
with repeated and non-repeated ITEMS. The significant trail n-1 main
effect and trial n by trial n-1 interaction suggest that further analy-
sis will be worthwhile. Again, examining this table column by column
due to the significant trial n effect, and ignoring the diagonal cells
which represent TASK repetition trials, such an analysis is available.
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Table 27
Mean RT as a Function of TASK on Trials n and n-1
(Experiment IV)
fpT) TAT 11K1AL n-1 TRIAL n
1Ask ITEM FIRST SECOND COLOR SIZE
r 1RST DIFF 619 678 794 837
SAME 574 643 OUJ oiy
MEAN ">Q7Dy 1 canObO 799 828
SECOND DIFF 618 701 813 841
SAME 623 637 810 835
MEAN 621 669 812 OJO
COLOR DIFF 647 700 791 834
SAME 637 709 720 828
MEAN 642 704 755 831
SIZE DIFF 657 709 795 833
SAME 645 710 799 731
MEAN 651 709 798 782
MEAN DIFF 635 697 798 836
SAME 620 674 784 803
GRAND MEAN 628 686 791 820
Task(n) F(3,138)=175.40**
Task(n-l) F(3,138)= 5.65**
Item F(l, 46)= 51.94**
Task(n) x Task(n-l) F(9,414)= 24.41**
Task(n) x Item F(3,138)= 2.47
Task(n-l) x Item F(3,138)< 1.00
Task(n) x Task(n-l) x Item F(9,414)= 13.29**
*£ <.05
**£ <.01
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First, for lexical trials RT is consistently faster when preceded by the
other lexical TASK than by either semantic TASK (621 versus 642 and 651
msec for FIRST trials, and 660 versus 704 and 709 msec for SECOND trials
a finding which replicates the lexical facilitation of Experiment II.
Second, the results are less consistent for semantic trials. RT does
not appear to be systematically slower when preceded by the other seman-
tic TASK than by a lexical TASK as it was in Experiments II and III (798
versus 799 and 712 msec for COLOR trial and 831 versus 828 and 838 msec
for SIZE trials)
.
Averaging, over TASKS, mean RT is presented for lexical and seman-
tic TASKS preceded by other TASKS in the same versus different memory
for trials with repeated and non-repeated ITEMS in Figure 15. An analy-
sis of variance for these means indicated that RT was faster for lexical
than semantic trials (mean RTs equal 727 and 748 msec for lexical and
semantic trials respectively) (F(l,46)=284.43, £<.0l). Further, RT
was non-significantly faster for trials with repeated ITEMS (mean RTs
equal 735 and 741 msec for same and different ITEMS trials respectively)
(F(l,46)=3.37, p >.05). Of major interest is that RT was faster when
preceded by the alternative TASK from the same memory rather than by
either TASK from a different memory (mean RTs equal 727 and 748 for same
and different memories respectively) (F(l , 46)=40
. 33, p_<.01). Further,
this effect was more marked for lexical than for semantic TASKS as
evidenced by a significant interaction between trial n memory and memory
repetition (F(l,46)=24.03, p_<.01). In fact, simple effects analysis of
this phenomenon indicated that the memory facilitation was only reliable
Figure 15
TASK Sequencing Effects
(Experiment IV)
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for lexical trials (Bonferroni t tests, EW <.05). Elnally> nelther ^
D6m0ry
'
"» re»e"«» nor their interaction was sig-
nificantly affected by ITEM repetition. There was, however, a trend of
more marked lexical facilitation for trials with repeated than non-
repeated ITEMS (mean lexical facilitation equals 42 versus 31 mSec for
same and different ITEM trials respectively).
Discussion
Processing questions. The results of Experiment IV are generally
consistent with those of previous experiments which have been inter-
preted as supporting procedural, rather than intersection or generate-
test retrieval. First, and clearest is the large speed advantage for
the TASK first condition relative to the ITEM first condition. This is
especially damaging to generate-test retrieval which predicts the
opposite result. Second, there is no significant ITEM repetition effect
in the context of a non-repeated TASK, but there is ITEM facilitation in
the context of a repeated TASK. While the ITEM repetition effect is
attributable, at least in part, to the retrieval stage, its nature is
equally consistent with all retrieval processes considered here. Third,
there is RESPONSE facilitation, but no good reason to assign it to the
retrieval stage. Fourth, there is clear TASK facilitation in the con-'
text of a repeated ITEM, and it is attributable to the retrieval stage.
In the context of a non-repeated TASK, the effect is more tenuous. This
fact leaves weaker evidence to reject intersection retrieval than that
provided in previous experiments. Nevertheless, procedural retrieval is
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preferred by the present data as well as those of the preceding three
experiments.
Structural questions. The systematic effects of TASK sequencing
in Experiment IV provide additional support for the general notion of a
multi-layered LTM and impose several interesting constraints on this
idea. First, like the NAME and SYLLABLE TASKS of Experiment II, the
FIRST and SECOND lexical TASKS of the present experiment facilitated
each other. One possible explanation for lack of lexical interference
for pairs of trials with repeated ITEMS in Experiment II was that NAME
and SYLLABLE information is conserved in fundamentally different ways
which do not compete during retrieval. Such an explanation, however,
is untenable for the lexical TASKS used in the present experiment, and
therefore the present result provides serious difficulty for the associa-
tive multi-layered models presented in Chapter IV.
A second possible explanation of lexical facilitation follows from
a modified associative multi-layered model. In this model general prim-
ing following lexical trials leads to the prediction of lexical facilita-
tion. Such a model, however, also predicts that this effect should be
more marked for trials with non-repeated than repeated ITEMS. However,
the trend in. this experiment was in the opposite direction (mean lexical
facilitation equals 42 versus 31 msec for trials with same and different
ITEMS respectively). Further, the modified associative multi-layered
model predicts semantic interference, an effect not observed in the pre-
sent experiment. Thus, even the modified version of purely associative
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multi-layered models cannot adequately account for the present data.
An alternative, albeit post hoc, explanation will be given in terms
of a procedurally oriented LTM. Specifically, if we assume that the
FIRST and SECOND procedures both involve calling, with appropriate para-
meters, a higher level SYLLABLE generation procedure, we might expect
facilitation. This is because the SYLLABLE procedure would be in an
accessible state following either lexical, but neither semantic TASK.
This notion is presented pictorially in Figure 16a.
A similar argument can be brought to bear with respect to the pos-
sible semantic facilitation observed in the present experiment. That
is, if a higher level IMAGE generation procedure is accessed by both
the COLOR and SIZE procedures, facilitation would be predicted (see
Figure 16b). On the other hand, if this procedure is accessed for
COLOR, but not CATEGORY trials in Experiment II, interference may be
expected. The fact that the procedural explanation of these phenomena
is not contingent upon repetition of the ITEM lends some credence to it
since the lack of that effect was replicated three times; most alterna-
tive explanations predict such interactions.
To summarize, the results of the present experiment provide addi-
tional support for procedural over purely associative retrieval proc-
esses. Further, general support for the. multi-layered hypothesis was
again obtained, but counter evidence concerning several associative
versions of this idea were rejected. An alternative procedural explana-
tion was provided.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this final section, results from all experiments relevant to
the questions of a multi-layered LTM and isolable LTM procedures will
each be summarized and interpreted. Then, several additional comments
will attempt to integrate notions about structure and process into a
unified view of human LTM.
LTM Structure
Summary of results
.
Aspects of the current experiments relevant
to the multi-layered LTM notion are the TASK sequencing effects of
Experiments II-IV. In particular, as argued in Chapter IV, the hypothe
sis that lexical and semantic memories are isolable layers of a multi-
layered LTM, can be tested by examining RT as a function of whether
recently retrieved information was from the same or a different hypothe
sized LTM layer. The relevant means for each experiment are presented
in Table 28.^ As discussed in the context of specific experiments and
apparent in this table, the presence of systematic RT differences in
this type of analysis provides support for a distinction between word
(lexical) and concept (semantic) memories.
Three important findings will be summarized. First, in Experimen
II NAME and SYLLABLE TASKS led to lexical facilitation, and this effect
Same TASK RT is not relevant to the present question but is in-
cluded in Table 28 for comparative purposes. It is interesting to note
that these RTs are always fastest.
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Table 28
Mean RT as a function of Memory on Trials n and
TASK Relationship on Trial n-1
(Over Experiments)
TASK n-1 SAME TASK SAME MEMORY DIFFERENT MEMORY
TASK n LEXICAL SEMANTIC LEXICAL SEMANTIC LEXICAL SEMANTIC
ITEM
DIFF
H SAME
•
651
665
688
654
691
726
697
739
£3 MEAN
M
658 671 709 718
H DIFFM SAME
•
671
639
835
875
673
668
855
848
693
680
844
814
t MEAN
w
655 855 667 852 687 829
m DIFFM SAME
686
616
1110
972
1150
1155
686
692
1125
1119
EXP 651 991 1153 689 1121
> DIFFH
SAME
•
661
606
812
725
648
633
815
814
678
675
821
817
£j MEAN 634 769 641 815 677 819
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was not eliminated in Experiment IV by using more similar lexical TASKS
(i.e. FIRST and SECOND syllable). In fact, the facilitation was more
than twice as large in Experiment IV. Second, in Experiment II CATEGORY
and COLOR TASKS, and in Experiment III CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and PROPERTY
TASKS led to semantic interference. However, in Experiment IV, when the
semantic TASKS COLOR and SIZE were used no such interference was observed,
Third, neither lexical nor semantic effects were contingent upon repeti-
tion of the ITEM; in fact, these effects were no larger for trials with
repeated than non-repeated ITEMS.
Interpretation of results. While these results provide support
for the general notion of a multi-layered LTM, difficulties they provide
for purely associative versions of this notion will be summarized here.
Predictions for two associative multi-layered models, a direct and lexi-
cal access model, were derived in Chapter IV and are summarized in Fig-
ure 5. These predictions follow from the strength assumptions intro-
duced in Chapter I, and the additional constraint that competitive
search and spreading activation are more important within rather than
between LTM layers. Thus, for trials with repeated ITEMS, search inter-
ference is expected if pairs of successive trials involve TASKS from
the same rather than different LTM layers. The lack of lexical .inter-
ference in both Experiments II and IV, as well as the presence of TASK
sequencing effects for trials with non-repeated ITEMS is inconsistent
with predictions of both of these models.
A modifying assumption of associative multi-layered models, that
there, is general priming following lexical trials, was introduced in
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the context of Experiment III. While this notion was consistent with
the results of Experiments II and III, it failed to pass the tests of
Experiment IV. Specifically, such a model predicts that: (1) all pairs
of lexical trials should lead to lexical facilitation which should be
more marked for trials with non-repeated ITEMS; and (2) all pairs of
semantic trials should lead to semantic interference which should be
more marked for trials with repeated ITEMS. While lexical interference
was observed in Experiment IV, it was more marked for trials with re-
peated ITEMS. While this latter result was not statistically reliable,
it was opposite the result predicted. Further, rather than semantic
interference, there was a trend suggestive of semantic facilitation with
the TASKS of Experiment IV, Thus, purely associative multi-layered
models are rejectable. An alternative explanation of these phenomena
in terms of a procedurally oriented LTM was suggested in the context of
Experiment IV, and will be pursued further following consideration of
results relevant to processing questions.
LTM Process
Summary of results
. Aspects of the current experiments relevant
to the processing questions are the ORDER main effect and the repetition
contrasts. Mean RTs for each ORDER of each experiment are presented in
Table 29. As can be seen, TASK first conditions are consistently faster
than ITEM first conditions, and this effect was highly reliable in every
experiment
.
Mean values of each of the repetition contrasts for each ORDER of
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each experiment are presented in Table 30. The F-tests for each con-
trast and its ORDER effect are derived from an analysis of variance
which included experiment as a factor; the O(T-I) and O(I-T) F-tests
are derived from simple effects analyses. A fairly consistent picture
is available. First, in the context of a non-repeated TASK, there is
no reliable ITEM repetition effect (i.e. Contrast 1 is not significantly
different from zero), although there is a consistent but non-signifi-
cant, small interference effect in ITEM first conditions, where encoding
facilitation could not mask retrieval interference. In the context of a
repeated TASK, there is reliable ITEM facilitation for both ORDERS (i.e.
Contrast 2 is positive). In two out of three experiments where this
contrast was measured for multiple TASKS, it varied over TASKS. Second,
there is reliable RESPONSE facilitation for both ORDERS (i.e. Contrast 3
is positive). Third, in the context of a non-repeated ITEM, there is
significant TASK facilitation only for ITEM first, conditions (i.e. Con-
trasts 4 and 5 are positive for O(I-T)). Further, this effect appears to
vary over TASKS. In the context of a repeated ITEM, there is TASK facili
Cation for both ORDERS (i.e. Contrasts 6 and 7 are positive), albeit
larger for ITEM first conditions. This effect also varies over TASKS.
Finally, there is a reliable violation of additivity of ITEM and TASK
repetition (i.e. Contrast 8 is negative), but the magnitude of this ef-
fect is stable over ORDER and TASK manipulations.
The reasons for assigning the ITEM repetition effect, at least in
part, to the retrieval stage are: (1) the possibility of ITEM inter-
ference in the context of a non-repeated TASK; (2) the presence of ITEM
176
Table 29
Mean RT for ORDER by Experiment Conditions
EXPERIMENT
I
EXPERIMENT
II
EXPERIMENT
III
EXPERIMENT
IV
MEAN
TASK FIRST 651 686 953 636 723
ITEM FIRST 736 846 1083 839 860
MEAN 694 766 1018 738 792
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Table 30
Repetition Contrasts for ORDER by Experiment Conditions
Contrast 1
Contrast
Order
SriI-T
Contrast 2'
Contrast
Order
I-T
(RT(1)-RT(2))
F(l,208)<1.00
F(l,208)=4.09*
F(1,10A)<1.00
F(l, 104)^3.75
(RT(5)-RT(4))
F(l,208)=37.80**
F(l,208)=2.90
F(l,104)=9..03**
F(l,104)=26.54**
Contrast 3
Contrast
Order
0„
0.T-I
I-T
(RT(3)-RT(5)
F(l,208)=27.97**
F(l,208)< 1.00
F(l,104)=14.09**
F(l,104)=13.98**
Contrast 4 (RT(1)-RT(3)
Contrast
Order
I-T
Contrast 5
Contrast
Order
I-T
F(l,208)=27.96**
F(l,208)=22.81**
FQ ,104)<1.00
F(l,104)=40.15**
(RT(l)-RT(5)-35)
F(l,208)=5.91*
F(l,208)=3.35
F(l,104)< 1.00
F(l,104)=10.16**
Contrast 6 ( (RT (2)-RT(4) )- (RT (3)-RT (5) )
)
Contrast F(l,208)=42. 79**
Order F (1,208) = 7. 37**
0
T-I
I-T
F(l,104)=7.13*
F(l,104)=44.01**
Contrast 7 (RT(2)-RT(4)-35)
Contrast F (1 , 208) =106 . 49**
Order F (1 , 208) = 30. 85**
T-I
I-T
F(l,104)=10.74
F(l,104)=133.68**
Contrast 8
Contrast
Order
0„
0
T-I
I-T
(Additivity)
F(l,208)=24.67**
F(l,208)=3.25
F(l,104)=4. 74*
F(l,104)=24.28**
II III IV
°T-I°I-T °T-I°T-T °T-tVT 0 0^
-13 -2 9 -12 4 -9 14 -5
(-13) (-2) (8) (-12) (0) (5) (17) (-8)1
12 16 30 22 45 130 50 80
7 22 40 58 46 20 30 38
14 42 -16
(14) (42) (-33)
16 15 27 -8 14
(7) (66) (52) (-14) (14)
-14 29 -28 30 77 36 -19 16
39 60 -11 41 111 177 18 102
11 47 -1 65 80 147 9 73
(11) (47) (-6) (6.4) (122) (162) (13) (104)
-25
-18 -22 -34 -45 -126 -32 -88
MEAN
0 0
T-I I-T
2 -7
(1) (-4)
32 57
GRAND
MEAN
28 33
3 27
(9) (30)
28
39 91
23 79
(32) (89)
-31 -61
*£ < . 05
**£ < .01
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facilitation in the context of a repeated TASK for ITEM first condi-
tions at long DELAYS; (3) the variability of ITEM facilitation over
TASKS; and (A) the non-additivity with TASK repetition. Whether or not
RESPONSE repetition exerts any influence on the retrieval stage, or
its influence should be solely attributed to response execution facilita-
tion is more ambiguous. It was significantly larger for ITEM first con-
ditions only in Experiment I and varied over TASKS only in Experiment II,
Fortunately, predictions about the effect of RESPONSE repetition on
retrieval are not importantly different among classes of retrieval;
thus, this ambiguity can easily be tolerated. The reasons for assigning
the TASK repetition effect, at least in part, to the retrieval stage are:
(1) the presence of facilitation in the context of a repeated ITEM for
TASK first conditions at long DELAYS; (2) the fact that TASK facilita-
tion for ITEM first conditions is consistently larger than ITEM facili-
tation for TASK first conditions; (3) the variability of TASK facilita-
tion over TASKS; and (4) the non-additivity with ITEM repetition.
Interpretation of results
. By isolating experimental effects to
the retrieval stage, we can analyze the nature of processing involved.
Predictions which follow from three sets of retrieval assumptions were
derived in Chapter IV and are summarized in Table 6. Considering the
present results in terms of these predictions, there is consistent
support for procedural retrieval as well as consistent counter evidence
concerning intersection and generate-test retrieval. The large and
reliable speed advantage for TASK first conditions follows naturally
from the notion that a TASK procedure directs retrieval. On the other
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hand, it provides strong evidence against generate-test retrieval which
assumes that search proceeds from the ITEM node. Intersection retrieval
models could only predict such a result by assuming that search from the
TASK is diffuse, and therefore slow relative to search from the ITEM.
Then, a head start on the slower search for TASK first subjects would
lead to the observed ORDER effect.
A corrollary of this version of intersection retrieval is that the
ORDER effect should be most marked for TASKS with large RESPONSE sets,
where the LTM network is most diffuse. Clearly, the NAME TASK has the
largest RESPONSE set, and the ORDER effect was, in fact, largest for
NAME trials in both Experiments II and III. However, as was previously
suggested, the NAME TASK may be special. Thus, in assessing the present
hypothesis it is important to consider other TASKS, even though their
ordering on a RESPONSE set size dimension is somewhat more ambiguous.
A possible ordinal scale, along with observed ORDER effects is pre-
sented in Table 31 for TASKS from all experiments. As can be seen,
NAME trials aside, there is no support for the hypothesis that the
ORDER effect is more marked for TASKS with larger RESPONSE sets. Fur-
ther, it is doubtful that any reasonable modification of the scale
would lead to better prediction of the ORDER effect. Therefore, even
this modified version of intersection retrieval is not supported by the
present data.
• Next, neither the ITEM nor RESPONSE repetition effects provide
strong evidence for or against any of the retrieval models. TASK repe-
tition effects, on the other hand, are important. All retrieval proc-
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Table 31
ORDER Effects as a Function of RESPONSE Set Size of TASKS
(Over Experiments)
TASK EXPERIMENT
I
EXPERIMENT
II
EXPERIMENT
III
EXPERIMENT
IV
4 k
NAME 218 186
SECOND 194
FIRST 205
PROPERTY 74
INSTANCE 135
CATEGORY 126 123
COLOR 51 117 204
SIZE 209
SYLLABLES 119 179
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esses predict TASK facilitation in the context of repeated ITEMS
, at
least for ITEM first subjects, and it is clearly present in all experi-
ments. The critical prediction concerns TASK repetition effects in the
context of non-repeated ITEMS; intersection retrieval predicts TASK
interference, while generate-test and procedural retrieval predict TASK
facilitation.
The most unambiguous confirmation of either prediction would be
found in the TASK first condition of Contrasts 4 and 5 since TASK en-
coding time does not contribute to measured RT (except in the 0 DELAY
condition of Experiment I; see Table 4). However, as argued in Chapter
IV, it is likely that Stage III processing masks such effects. For
intersection retrieval, this is because in TASK first conditions, search
from the ITEM begins after search from the TASK, and therefore dominates
RT. For generate-test and procedural retrieval, on the other hand, it
is because for TASK first conditions, Stage III priming may have effects
equivalent to TASK repetition. Thus, it is not surprising that the data
are ambiguous on this point.
A somewhat weaker argument about the effect of TASK repetition in
the context of a non-repeated ITEM can be derived from ITEM first data.
The issue is whether the observed facilitation should be attributed to
the encoding or retrieval stages. Recall that one reason for attributing
TASK facilitation to the retrieval stage was based on a subtractive ar-
gument. This argument required the assumption that ITEM facilitation
(i.e. Contrast 1) in TASK first conditions can be used as an upper
bound estimate of encoding repetition effects. Then, that TASK facili-
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tation (i.e. Contrasts 4 and 5) in ITEM first conditions exceeds ITEM
facilitation in TASK first conditions, can be taken as support of the
retrieval stage hypothesis. However, as mentioned in Chapter IV, the
necessary assumption for this argument is of questionable status for
repetition effects in the context of a non-repeated second stimulus.
A second reason for attributing the TASK facilitation to the re-
trieval stage was based on an additive factors argument. This argument
required the assumption that variability over TASKS is due to retrieval
rather than encoding differences. Then, that TASK facilitation (i.e.
Contrasts 4 and 5) in ITEM first conditions varies over TASKS, can be
taken as support of the retrieval stage hypothesis. In this case, the
necessary assumption seems well-founded because there is TASK variabili-
ty in TASK first conditions (which do not involve TASK encoding time)
for both ITEM repetition Contrast 2 and TASK repetition Contrasts 4-7.
For this reason, and because of the consistent and stable non-additivity
of ITEM and TASK repetition effects as tested by Contrast 8, the previous
conclusion is sound. Specifically, TASK repetition effects in the con-
text of non-repeated ITEMS for ITEM first conditions should be attrib-
uted, at least in part, to the retrieval stage.
It is possible, however, that the retrieval effect is interference,
but is masked by a large encoding facilitation effect. Counter evidence
for this possibility is provided by the lack of an ORDER effect in Con-
trast 2 in every experiment and in Contrast 1 in two out of four experi-
ments. That is, if the conditions of these experiments were sensitive
to large encoding effects, ITEM facilitation for the TASK first but not
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ITEM first conditions would be expected. The lack of such a pattern
of results indicates that encoding facilitation is not important in the
present experiments. Therefore, the conclusion of retrieval Stage TASK
facilitation in the context of non-repeated ITEMS holds firm.
This conclusion provides further counter evidence concerning inter-
section retrieval which predicts the opposite effect. While it is com-
patible with generate-test retrieval, that class of processes was re-
jectable on the basis of an incorrect, but fundamental, prediction about
the ORDER main effect. Thus, upon closer analysis, and considering the
data from all experiments, the previous conclusion in favor of procedural
retrieval seems well-founded. Also, the counter evidence concerning
purely associative retrieval processes was shown to hold for a broader
class of models than considered in Chapter IV.
Procedural retrieval
.
The remaining task is to determine what
additional information about procedural retrieval can be derived from
the present experiments. Three aspects of the data should be useful—
the nature of main effect and repetition differences among TASKS, the
nature of the non-additivity of ITEM and RESPONSE repetition, and the
fact that Stage III processing apparently masks TASK facilitation in
the context of non-repeated ITEMS.
Systematic differences in patterns of RTs among TASKS of the
present experiments may help refine the notion of isolable LTM proced-
ures. First, it is interesting to note that mean RT is positively cor-
2related to an overall measure of TASK repetition (_r=.80,
_p_<.01).
2
The overall measure of TASK repetition was the mean of Contrasts
4 and 7, the two repetition contrasts computable for all TASKS.
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However, there are violations of this relationship both within and
between experiments. Second, as can be seen in Table 32, the RESPONSE
set size dimension introduced in Table 31 is neither a good predictor
of mean RT (r=.12, £ >.05), nor of TASK facilitation (r=-.12, £ >.05).
In fact, the only systematic conclusion which is obvious from these
data is that both mean RT and TASK facilitation are consistently smaller
for lexical than semantic TASKS (mean RTs equal 676 and 931 msec for
lexical and semantic TASKS respectively; mean TASK facilitation equals
16 and 50 msec for lexical and semantic TASKS respectively). Third,
it is important to note that the TASK effects are context dependent.
For example, the COLOR TASK was used in three experiments and mean RT
varied from 707 msec in Experiment I to 820 msec in Experiment II, while
mean TASK facilitation varied from 9 msec in Experiment II to 41 msec
in Experiment I. Given the systematic effects obtained from finer
grain TASK sequencing analyses of non-repeated TASK trials, this result
is not surprising. Finally, it is suggested that more detailed analysis
of specific TASKS may lead to a better understanding of procedural re-
trieval. Such an analysis was attempted in the context of Experiments
III and IV, and several additional points about the SYLLABLE TASK of
Experiments I and II will be mentioned in Appendix A.
The nature of interactive effects between ITEM and TASK repetition
also provide some insight about the nature of LTM procedures. The rele-
vant finding is that TASK facilitation was larger in the context of re-
peated than non-repeated ITEMS. That this effect was constant over OR-
DER suggests that it cannot be explained in terms of encoding facilita-
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Table 32
Mean RT and TASK Repetition Effects as a Function
of RESPONSE Set Size of TASKS
(Over Experiments)
TASK
EXPERIMENT
I
EXPERIMENT
II
EXPERIMENT
III
EXPERIMENT
IV
RT REP RT REP RT REP RT RFP
NAME 655 40 681 1 7J_ /
SECOND 692 6
FIRST 633 24
PROPERTY 1133 67
INSTANCE 1156 85
CATEGORY 902 28 1102 101
COLOR 707 41 820 9 796 20
SIZE 831 39
SYLLABLES 680 16 715 -13
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tlon of the ITEM which would only be expected in TASK first conditions
of trials with repeated ITEMS and TASKS. The alternative suggestion
offered here is that TASK facilitation includes both ITEM independent
and dependent components. The former may be thought of as a general
increase in accessibility or computability of the TASK procedure,
while the latter may be thought of as parameter tuning. Clearly, fur-
ther work is required to verify this notion. However, one encouraging
source of support, available in the present data, is the effect ORDER
has on TASK repetition. Specifically, Stage III processing which occurs
in TASK first, but not ITEM first conditions masks TASK facilitation in
the context of a non-repeated ITEM. On the other hand, it reduces,
but does not eliminate the effect in the context of a repeated ITEM.
Such a pattern of results would be expected if Stage III processing is
equivalent to the ITEM independent, bat not ITEM dependent, processing,
as seems likely.
To summarize, the results of the present experiments not only pro-
vide support for procedural retrieval, but also provide some useful in-
formation about isolable LTM procedures. Specifically, different TASK
procedures require different amounts of processing time, are more or
less susceptible to facilitation, and both of these effects are .sensi-
tive to the dynamic state of LTM which varies with recent processing. 1
Also, both parameter independent and dependent components of these LTM
procedures can be separately primed.
An implicit assumption in the present discussion has been that the
TASK procedures used by subjects when faced with the present experimen-
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tal paradigm, are part of their semantic representations of the TASK
concepts. This may not be correct. Rather, in unnatural laboratory
conditions, subjects may compile temporary procedures solely for use
in the experiment. However, it is suggested that even if this is
correct, it tells us something interesting about cognitive processing.
Specifically, human beings have the capacity to establish isolable
retrieval processes which can be used, when appropriately cued, to
retrieve an entire class of facts. Further, it is suggested that as-
pects of the present data indicate that semantic memory should, at least
in part, be implicated for the present findings. The systematic vari-
ability in TASK main and repetition effects indicate that the procedures
being used in these experiments have a semantic component. This was
especially clear in Experiment III where TASK sequencing effects were
explained in terms of the semantic relationship among TASKS. Thus, the
present position is that the procedural retrieval notion supported in
the present experiments leads to a particular orientation toward struc-
tural issues, and may be richer than that provided by alternative proc-
essing notions. An attempt to elaborate on this and integrate the struc-
ture and processing results obtained in these experiments follows.
LTM Structure and Process
In the introductory chapter of this dissertation it was argued that
viewing LTM as a network, a basically associative structure, was useful.
However, the present experiments seem to consistently point to inadequa-
cies of purely associative notions about memory. While the multi-layered
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hypothesis was supported, associative versions were inadequate. Like-
wise, associative notions about how relational information is used in
retrieving information from LTM were also resectable. In fact, a fairly
broad class of purely associative retrieval processes encompassed by
intersection and generate-test models failed to capture the results of
the present experiments.
A second point made in Chapter I was that in addition to its asso-
ciative nature, LTM exhibits a fundamentally constructive property. To
the extent that purely associative notions were inadequate to explain
the results of the present experiments, they demonstrated some ways
this constructive property plays a role in very simple LTM retrieval.
A third point expressed in Chapter I was that both the associative and
constructive nature of LTM could be captured in a network theory. The
remaining challenge is to integrate the constraints imposed by the pre-
sent results into a broader view of LTM, and thereby come one step
closer to that objective.
A post hoc description of procedurally oriented LTM which is con-
sistent with both the results of these experiments and the biases ex-
pressed in their interpretation will be presented. First the structure
of this memory will be described, along with processes necessary, to
accomplish the experimental TASKS. Then, how the. memory accounts for
the major results of these experiments will be outlined.
Figure 17 pictorially presents a segment of LTM which should be
adequate to complete any of the experimental TASKS. Lexical memory
contains a node Tor each TASK and ITEM word. The ITEMS are grouped
Figure 17
Procedurally Oriented LTM
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'es are
pres-
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together to simplify the figure; however> a fuUy
would have separate lexical nodes for each ITEM. These lexical nod,
assumed to conserve information about words. In the context of the
ent experiments NAME, number of SYLLABLES, and FIRST and SECOND syllable
of each word can be derived from lexical memory. Associations among lex-
ical nodes are assumed to be phomenic and/or orthographic. There is also
an association relating each lexical node to at least one semantic node.
In the case of TASK words semantic nodes are pictorially represented in
Figure 17 as procedure boxes. As in lexical memory, the semantic represen-
tation of ITEM words are grouped together only for economy in the figure.
While we are still a long way from understanding the nature of seman-
tic representations of concepts, several points can be made. First, as
stated in Chapter II, these nodes can be thought of as points of inter-
section among token occurrences of concepts. The token representations
are not included in Figure 17, but as previously outlined, are assumed to
be represented declaratively (i.e. in propositions) in episodic memory
with pointers to semantic nodes. Second, semantic nodes are also the
point of intersection among conceptual associations. Thus, meaning is
abstracted from experience and from direct semantic associations. Third,
the present suggestion is that at least some concepts have additional
semantic knowledge which is procedurally represented and allows them to
derive classes of information from other parts of LTM.
In terms of the present representation, encoding a word can
be defined as making contact with its lexical representation. Also,
two types of retrieval processing can be defined. First, associative
retrieval involves traversing associative pathways in the LTM network,
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is
both within and between memory layers. Second, procedural retrieval
a special type of process available to some semantic concepts. In terms
of Figure 17, it involves traversing solid control structure lines
between procedure boxes. While it is useful to think of associative
retrieval in terms of traversing arcs in the LTM network, it may be more
appropriate to think of procedural retrieval in terms of parameter-
dependent subroutine calls. Finally, the strength assumptions presented
in the introduction serve to make this LTM network dynamic and context
dependent. Specifically, both associative and procedural processing
times are assumed to be a function of current relative strength of
associations and procedures respectively. Further, recently processed
associations and procedures, and their LTM neighbors, are in temporary
high strength states following use.
The particular hierarchy of procedures and control structure pre-
sented in Figure 17 was derived from analysis of the TASKS and results
of the present experiments. The NAME procedure is the only one which
directly accesses lexical representations of ITEM words. The procedures
associated with other lexical TASKS—SYLLABLE
,
FIRST, and SECOND--indi-
rectly access the lexicon through the NAME procedure. An additional
higher order "SYLLABLE" procedure was included to capture the fact that
the three non-NAME lexical TASKS used here all dealt with syllable infor-
mation about ITEMS; presumably other lexical TASKS would not use this
higher order procedure. The semantic TASKS used in these experiments
form two groups. The CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and PROPERTY TASKS of Experi-
ment III deal with non-physical aspects of the concepts, and have a well-
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specified internal structure, as discussed in the context of that experi-
ment and diagramed in Figure 14. The COLOR and SIZE TASKS of Experiment
IV, on the other hand, deal with physical properties of the concepts,
and as such are hypothesized to access semantic representations of ITEMS
through a higher order IMAGE procedure.
Since this model is a special case of the procedural retrieval
model presented in Figure 8, predictions derived for that model and
summarized in Table 6, hold here. Specifically, the procedurally directed
retrieval model predicts TASK first subjects to be faster than ITEM first
subjects, as observed. It also makes strong predictions about TASK
facilitation which are consistent with the data. In addition, TASK main,
repetition, and sequencing effects can be interpreted in terms of this
model. First, the ordering of TASK RT, summarized in Table 32 can, at
least in part, be accounted for. NAME times are fastest since they re-
quire a single computation which accesses the same ITEM representation
used in encoding. Other lexical TASKS are fast relative to semantic
TASKS because while additional computation is required for both types
of TASKS, the semantic representation of the ITEM must be accessed for
semantic but not lexical TASKS. Second, like many other models, it is
reasonable to assume that processes which require more processing are
more benefited by repetition. Therefore, as observed we might expect
a positive correlation between TASK RT and TASK repetition effects.
Third, a property unique to a procedurally oriented LTM is that
TASK sequencing effects can be explained in terms of overlap of pro-
cedures. Thus, we find lexical facilitation because all lexical TASKS
er
seman-
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use the NAME procedure. The effect is bra.r ttrr x large in Experiment IV than in
Experiment II because the FIRST and SECOND TASK share the higher ord
"SYLLABLE" procedure as well. Further, the particular pattern of
tic interference observed in Experiment III was already explained in
terms of the relationship among CATEGORY, INSTANCE, and PROPERTY pro-
cedures (see Figure 14). Likewise, the possible semantic facilitation
observed in Experiment IV was explained in terms of the common use of a
higher level "IMAGE" procedure by both COLOR and SIZE procedures (see
Figure 16). Semantic interference in Experiment II, on the other hand,
might be expected because while there are no common procedures between
CATEGORY and COLOR TASKS, there might be procedural or associative inter
ference.
The present conceptualizations might also explain why these TASK
sequencing effects were not contingent upon repetition of the ITEM. Spe
cifically, on the basis of TASK repetition data (i.e. Contrasts 4 and 5)
it was previously concluded that there is an ITEM independent component
of TASK facilitation. Therefore, TASK sequencing effects should also be
expected in the context of non-repeated ITEMS. However, the TASK repe-
tition data indicated that there is additional ITEM dependent TASK
facilitation as well (i.e. Contrast 8 was negative). Therefore,
' we
should expect larger TASK sequencing effects in the context of repeated
than non-repeated ITEMS; however, there was no clear evidence of this.
Since the overall TASK sequencing effect for pairs of successive trials
with different TASKS was so small, it is not surprising that the two
components (i.e. ITEM independent and dependent facilitation) were not
195
separable as they were for the somewhat larger TASK repetition effects.
Nevertheless, it is a point which merits further consideration in the
context of a generally acceptable model.
In conclusion, the ideas explored in this dissertation are not par-
ticularly new. Both the notions of multiple-layers of representations
of knowledge and of procedural retrieval probably have roots in Greek
epistomology and certainly have been entertained by modern psychologists
and computer scientists. What may be a contribution in the present work
is that particular realizations of these notions, albeit simplistic,
have been defined in terms of experimental expectations, and contrasted
with alternative notions about LTM structure and process. The ideas
supported by the present experiments, however, are clearly in need of
further refinement. Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the human mind
is that exploring one question always leads to a plethora of other
questions
.
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APPENDIX A
One More Bit of Data: Analysis of the SYLLABLE TASK
The SYLLABLE TASK used in Experiments I and II seems especially
well-suited for further considering the nature of the LTM procedures
used to generate classes of RESPONSES. In particular, one possibility
is that a counting process derives number of SYLLABLES from a lexical
representation of the ITEM NAME. Such a notion predicts that retrieval
time should be longer for SYLLABLE trials with two rather than one SYL-
LABLE ITEMS. However, as can be seen in Figure 18, in both experiments
mean RTs were ordered in the opposite direction (mean SYLLABLE RTs equal
700 and 661 msec for one and two SYLLABLE ITEMS respectively in Experi-
ment I, F(l,66)=59.79, £ <.01; and 722 and 707 msec for one and two
SYLLABLE ITEMS respectively in Experiment II, F(l,46) <1.00). Before
speculating on the type of LTM procedure which would take longer to
decide that a word has one than two SYLLABLES, we must reject the pos-
sibilities that these RT differences are attributable to encoding or
response execution stage effects. By the former explanation, it simply
takes longer to encode one than two SYLLABLE ITEMS; by the latter ex-
planation, it simply takes longer to say "ONE" than "TWO".
Two sources of evidence lead to rejection of an encoding explana-
tion of the SYLLABLE effect. In fact, they indicate that encoding time
is longer for two than one SYLLABLE ITEMS. First, as can be seen in
Figure 18, in both Experiments I and II RT for non-SYLLABLE TASKS (i.e.
COLOR in Experiment I and NAME, CATEGORY, and COLOR in Experiment II)
was longer for two than one SYLLABLE ITEMS (mean other-TASK RTs equal
680 and 734 msec for one and two SYLLABLE ITEMS respectively in Experi-
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ment I, F(l,66)=110. 82
, £ <01; and 779 and 788 msec for one and two
SYLLABLE ITEMS respectively in Experiment II, F (1 , 46) =6 . 74
, p_<.01).
Second, the shorter RT for two than one SYLLABLE ITEMS for SYLLABLE
trials was more marked for ITEM first conditions (which do not include
ITEM encoding time) than for TASK first conditions (mean SYLLABLE effects
equal 8 and 69 msec for O(T-I) and O(I-T) respectively in Experiment I,
F(l,66)=35.96, p_<.01; and 5 and 36 msec for O(T-I) and O(I-T) respective-
ly in Experiment II, F(l,46)=25.98, £<.01).
The interacting effect of number of SYLLABLES and ORDER on SYLLABLE
RT discredits a response execution stage explanation as well. However,
additional data were collected to directly test the hypothesis that it
simply takes more time to say "ONE" than "TWO". Twelve subjects gave
four blocks of 48 trials on RT data. The experimental situation was very
similar to that used in Experiments I-IV. One difference, however, was
that all trials involved READING one of four stimuli; therefore, no TASK
word was presented. In addition, in this experiment the minimum inter-
trial interval was one second, whereas in previous experiments it was
3.5 seconds. Also, here RTs less than 100 or greater than 1000 msec
were excluded from analyses. The four stimuli were "ONE", "TWO", "1",
and "2".
If RT differences in the SYLLABLE TASK of Experiments I and II
are attributable to response execution differences, RT in the present
experiment should be longer to "ONE" and "1" than to "TWO" and "2". As
can be seen in Figure 18, the opposite was true (F (1,11) =8. 06, _p_<.05).
Further, while word trials took longer than digit trials (F 1,11) =29. 09,
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£ <.01), the number effect held for both types of code. In fact, the
lack of a significant interaction between number and code (F (1,11)
-3.69,
R >.05) provides evidence that the present result should not be attrib-
uted to encoding effects.
To summarize, it was hypothesized that the SYLLABLE procedure might
involve a counting process which derives number of SYLLABLES from a NAME
code. Such an hypothesis predicts longer SYLLABLE RT for two than one
SYLLABLE ITEMS. However, the observed RTs from Experiments I and II were
opposite this prediction. Further, the longer RTs for one than two SYL-
LABLE ITEMS must be attributed to the retrieval stage because: (1) it
takes longer to encode two than one SYLLABLE ITEMS; and (2) it takes
longer to execute the verbal RESPONSE "TWO" than "ONE".
Two properties of ITEM words used in Experiments I and II may ex-
plain this counter-intuitive result. First, each SYLLABLE was an aver-
age of 4.1 letters for one SYLLABLE ITEMS, but only 2.8 letters for two
SYLLABLE ITEMS. Second, the individual SYLLABLES were less common for
one than two SYLLABLE ITEMS. These two facts suggest that individual
SYLLABLES were more accessible for two than one SYLLABLE ITEMS. Thus,
the present suggestion is that the SYLLABLE procedure involves a count-
ing process, but time to count a SYLLABLE depends upon its accessibility.
That is, procedural retrieval time is sensitive to properties of the
ITEM which information is being derived about, as well as TASK demands.
This conclusion is consistent with the previous conclusion that both
ITEM independent and dependent repetition effects influence retrieval.


